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THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM AT FIFTY 
KEVIN C. KENNEDY' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 1, 1998, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-
World Trade Organization ("GATT-WTO") system celebrated its 50th 
anniversary. The importance of the GATT-WTO system to opening 
international markets for goods, services, and' capital, in addition to providing 
secure and predictable access, cannot be overestimated. Every business 
considering foreign markets for its goods, services, or capital needs answers 
to a host of vitally important questions before moving forward. The first 
question is whether market access exists. If a target market is closed to foreign 
goods, services, or investment, then further inquiries are moot. Assuming that 
access to a foreign market exists, the next question is how open is that market? 
What barriers to trade will be encountered as a business enters a foreign 
market? Will foreign laws discriminate in favor of local competitors? If a 
foreign business becomes too successful, what, if anything, prevents the 
importing or host country from enacting laws or adopting regulations that 
restrict or deny foreign businesses continued access to its market? How certain 
is the legal environment for trade and investment? Do international rules exist 
to prevent a rollback on market access? If they do exist, are they sufficiently 
predictable that strategic business planning is possible? 
In many respects, the GAIT -WTO system ensures access to 
international markets, levels the playing field among international 
competitors, and establishes predictable law for U.S. businesses. The core 
rationale for the GATT-WTO system is to open markets. For its first two 
decades, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade focused on redEcing 
tariffs and eliminating import quotas on goods, the leading trade-
protectionist devices used to shield domestic industries from import 
competition. By the mid-1960s, as tariff levels declined and as quotas were 
reduced or eliminated, governments resorted to a variety of non-tariff 
barriers to trade ("NTBs") to protect their domestic industries. Among these 
were antidumping duties, countervailing duties, products standards, and 
valuation of goods. In 1979, with the conclusion of the GATT-spon:::ored 
Tokyo Multilateral Trade Negotiations Round, many of these NTBs were 
addressed through a series of side agreements or "Codes" that were designed 
• Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University. J.D., Wayne State 
University; LL.M., Harvard Law School. 
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to keep the playing field level. With tariffs and NTBs in decline as effective 
trade protectionist devices, governments turned to "gray area" measures -
most notably, voluntary restraint agreements ("VRAs") - to circumvent the 
Tokyo Round commitments and to protect domestic firms.l With the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Multilateral Trade Negotiations Round in 1994, 
VRAs were made illegal unless concluded under the strict criteria set out in 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards.2 Today, countries are once 
again in search of new ways to protect their workers and industries; two of 
the most popular are minimum labor and environmental standards. 
This paper describes the market access created by the GATT -WTO 
system over the past five decades, as well as the legal disciplines it brings 
to international trade. These legal disciplines not only ensure market access 
for goods and services, but they also restrict governments' ability to adopt 
protectionist laws and regulations that impede or block international trade 
and foreign investment. This paper begins with a background discussion on 
the GATT-WTO system. It then examines the Uruguay Round agreements 
on market access and the regulation ofNTBs. 
II. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 
A. A Brief History of GA IT 
GATT traces its origins to 1944. In that year, at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire, the delegates of the United States and the United Kingdom 
proposed a comprehensive economic and financial plan for post-World War 
II reconstruction and development. The delegates envisioned the formation 
of three international economic and financial institutions. Two of them, the 
World Bank ("Bank") and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), were 
created to address development and monetary issues. The International 
Trade Organization ("ITO") rounded out the institutional triad. GATT was 
to serve as an interim agreement until the ITO and its founding document, 
the Havana Charter, could be approved by nationallegislatures.3 
1 See Kevin C. Kennedy, Voluntary Restraint Agreements: A Threat to Representative 
Democracy. 11 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. I (1987). 
2 See General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex lA, 33 I.L.M. 1144 
(1994); Agreement on Safeguards, art. 11.I(b) [hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards], reprinted in 
GATT SECRETARIAT, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MUL TILA TERAL 
TRADF.NEGOTIATlONS (1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Results]. 
3 For a complete history of GATT and the Bretton Woods system, see generally ARMAND VAN 
DORMAEL,BRETTONWOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM (1978); GJ. LANJOUW, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE INSTITUTIONS (\995); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (\969); 
KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); OLIVIER 
LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 4-6 (\985); ROBERT E. 
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1990); Gerald A. Bunting, GATT 
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In September 1946, the United States drafted a proposed Charter 
that became the basis for discussions at the First Session of the Preparatory 
Committee on the Havana Charter.4 Effective January 1, 1948, national 
representatives provisionally approved GATT in an effort to expedite 
international negotiations on tariff reductions, and their implementation, 
pending approval of the Havana Charter by national legislatures. President 
Truman approved it on behalf of the United States pursuant to authority 
granted under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. 
GAIT Article XXIX makes it plain that GAIT was not intended by 
its drafters to function on a permanent basis. Its drafters contemplated that 
once the Havana Charter entered into force, and with it the ITO, Part II of 
GATT, which contains the bulk of the international legal commitments 
(other than the MFN obligation and tariff commitments), would be 
suspended.s The Havana Charter was a far more complete document than 
GATT. It contained provisions relating to employment, economic 
development, restrictive business practices, and dispute resolution under 
ITO auspices.6 
The Havana Charter never entered into force. In fact, the United 
Nations, the depositary for Charter accessions, received no acceptances of 
the Charter. Once it became clear that the Havana Charter had no chance of 
being approved by the neo-isolationist U.S. Senate, the State Department 
. issued a statement that the Charter would not be submitted again to 
Congress. As a consequence, GAIT was pressed into service by default to 
fill the institutional vacuum, despite its shortcomings. Nevertheless, for 
nearly five decades, GATT became the centerpiece of international trade 
and the Evolution of the Global Trade System: A Historical Perspective, II ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 505 (1996). 
4 The members of the Preparatory Committee were Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Africa, the USSR, the UK, and the United States. With the exception of the former Soviet 
Union, all of these countries became GATT contracting parties under Protocols of Provisional 
Application. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND 
PRACTICE, vol. I, at 4 n.l (1995) [hereinafter GUIDETO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE]' 
For a history of the preparatory work on GATT, see GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra at 1-9; JACKSON, supra note 3, at 35-57; DAM, supra note 3, at 10-16; LONG, supra note 3, at 4-6; 
Armin von Bogdandy, International Trade Law, in U.S. TRADE BARRIERS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 74-76 
(Eberhard Grabitz & Armin von Bogdandy eds., 1991). 
S GATT Article XXIX provides in pertinent part: 
2. Part II of this Agreement shall be suspended 
on the day on which the Havana Charter enters into force. 
3. If by September 30, 1949, the Havana 
Charter has not entered into force, the contracting parties 
shall meet before December 31,1949, to agree whether 
this Agreement shall be amended, supplemented or 
maintained. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Oct. 30, 1947, 11 T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT]' 
6 See generally CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1949). 
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law, doubling as a multilateral trade agreement and an international trade 
forum for its 114 contracting parties. 
B. GATT's Basic Economic Premise 
Although not explicitly stated in GATT, the guiding economic 
premise that und€?rlies the entire GATT-WTO system is open trade. One 
commentator has explained open trade (sometimes referred to as liberal 
trade) in the following terms: 
In a liberal economic system, government does not thwart 
private parties in their attempts to enter voluntary 
transactions, and taxes are stable, predictable, and 
nonprohibitive. The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) is liberal in this sense .... Interventions [by 
governments] in liberal exchange across frontiers to make 
trade fair may be the political price of liberalism, but such 
interventions are themselves its antithesis.' 
Why did open trade become GATT's desideratum? The answer is short but 
compelling. By exploiting the law of comparative advantage, liberal trade 
policies permit the unrestricted flow ofthe best goods and services at the 
lowest prices, thereby increasing total world wealth. Under the law of 
comparative advantage resources are allocated efficiently across and within 
industries in response to competitive pressures from imports. Both of these 
phenomena lead to product specialization and increased firm size, which in 
turn lowers the unit cost of goods and services. 
The role that multilateral trade rules play in fostering liberal trade 
manifests itself in two important ways. First, specialization and economies 
of scale become possible because of secure access to a barrier-free 
international market. Second, increased international competition leads to 
product and process innovation, further reducing costs and expanding 
consumer choices.s 
7 See Martin Wolf, Why Trade Liberalization is a Good Idea, in THE URUGUAY ROUND, A 
HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 14 (1. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski 
eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK]' See also DoUGLAS IRWIN, AGAINST THE 
TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE (1996); For alternative perspectives on open trade and 
the GAIT -WTO system, see Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. P A. 
1. INT'L ECON. L. 33 (1996); Leonard Bierman, Donald R. Fraser & James W. Kolari, The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: World Trade From A Market Perspective, 17 U. PA. 1. INT'L ECON. L. 
821 (\996). 
R For a collection of the classical and contemporary arguments in support of free trade and 
the ar,guments for protectionism, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
5-78 (1996) [hereinafter BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW]. See also The Miracle of Trade, THE 
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C. GATT's Core Legal Principles 
How does GAIT achieve its goal of promoting liberal trade? It does 
so primarily through four core legal commitments, sometimes referred to as 
the four pillars of GAIT. They are: (1) the unconditional most-favored-
nation ("MFN") obligation that prohibits importing countries from 
discriminating against or giving preferences to any other country, regardless 
of whether the latter has made any trade concessions to the former; (2) the 
national treatment obligation, which requires that imports be treated the 
same as the like domestic product insofar as taxes and other domestic 
regulations are concerned; (3) binding commitments to reduce tariffs on 
imports; and (4) the elimination of quotas on imports. 
As a general proposition, any government regulation of or 
interference with international trade that deviates from the liberal trade 
philosophy of GAIT is disapproved. But that is true only as a general 
matter. Despite its commitment to the goal of liberal trade, GAIT permits 
government intervention in the market to regulate or prohibit the flow of 
goods across national borders under limited circumstances. Besides 
authorizing the imposition of tariffs on imported goods,9 GAIT also permits 
deviations from the liberal trade paradigm in three important circumstances. 
First, an importing country facing a balance-of-payments shortfall 
may temporarily impose "quantitative restrictions" (i.e., quotas) on imported 
goods until its balance-of-payments position improves.lO Second, domestic 
industries seriously injured by imports of competing products may receive 
"safeguard" relief from their home government (known in the United States 
as Section 201 escape clause relief). Such relief can take the form of a 
temporary increase in tariffs, the imposition of quotas, or both, on 
competing imports. II The third exception is a set of GAIT excepticns. 12 
They are found in Articles XX and XXI, covering public health and safety 
measures, inter alia, and national security, respectively. 
GAIT 1947 and the trade philosophy it embodies weathered a series 
of protectionist storms reasonably well over its 50-year history. From its 
inception GAIT never was intended to be a permanent agreement or an 
international trade organization. Against incredible odds, however, GAIT 
acquitted itself reasonably well in both roles, l3and its success in promoting 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 1996, at 61-62; Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Errvironment: Lessons 
from the Federal Experience. 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1329, 1330 (1992). 
9 See GATT, supra note 5, art. 11:2. 
10 See id. art. XII. 
"See id. art. XIX; 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254. 
12 See GATT, supra note 5, arts. XX, XXI. 
I) See GATT's Last Chance, THE ECONOMIST, June 1, 1991, at 65; A Lifeboat/or Trade, THE 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 1990, at 11. 
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trade liberalization is undisputed. 
D. GAIT's Four Pillars 
1. Introduction 
The GATT -WTO system is built on four legal principles or "pillars" 
that support the other legal obligations undertaken by WTO Members. The 
four pillars of the GATT-WTO system are: (1) the unconditional most-
favored nation obligation; (2) tariff bindings; (3) the national treatment 
obligation; and (4) the elimination of quantitative restrictions. 
The unconditional MFN obligation requires that a WTO Member 
treat imports from a Member on an equal, nondiscriminatory basis vis-a-vis 
all other Members' imports. The MFN obligation is "unconditional" in the 
sense that MFN treatment must be accorded all imports from WTO 
Members, regardless of country of origin, and regardless of whether the 
exporting Member negotiated reciprocal trade concessions with the 
importing Member. 
The economic rationale for the MFN commitment is the basic, but 
compelling, one that discrimination can lead to wasteful trade diversion. 
Without the benefit of the MFN principle, the most efficient producers may 
not have equal access to a foreign market because of discriminatory trade 
preferences in favor of less efficient producers from other countries. The 
unconditional MFN principle fosters economic efficiency by promoting the 
most efficient allocation of resources and, thereby, lowering costs of 
production, increasing consumer choices, and promoting world economic 
growth. Unconditional MFN also serves the important political function of 
facilitating trade negotiations that would otherwise become extremely knotty 
if reciprocity were demanded as a condition for receiving the benefits of a 
trade concession. 
The second pillar of the GATT -WTO system is tariff bindings. 
Tariffs (also known as customs duties) are the one fonn of trade protection 
permitted under GATT. In a perfect world of totally liberalized trade any 
fonn of government-sanctioned trade protection would be unacceptable. The 
political reality, however, is that at the time of the birth of the GATT -WTO 
system in 1947, contracting parties' tariff rates were high in order to protect 
domestic industries from import competition. Consequently, the progressive 
liberalization of trade through the gradual reduction of tariffs was the only 
palatable GATT response. 
Besides the political reasons for the existence of tariffs, an economic 
case can be made for why tariffs are preferable over all other fonns of trade 
protection. Unlike import quotas and other non-tariff barriers to trade, tariffs 
are "transparent," that is, the level of protection they afford can be readily 
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and accurately determined. This in tum permits a foreign producer to 
calculate at what price it will have to ,sell its goods in order to be 
competitive in a foreign market. The transparency of tariffs also facilitates 
trade negotiations by assisting trade negotiators who are often under 
domestic political pressure to secure reciprocal trade concessions. At a 
minimum, the exchange of tariff concessions permits a rough apples-to-
apples comparison, as well as one domestic interest group to be leveraged 
against another. 
If, in GAIT parlance, negotiated tariff concessions are "bourd," 
they cannot be increased above the bound duty rate unless compensation is 
paid to other adversely affected WTO Members (such compensation will 
usually take the form of increased duties on goods of export interest to the 
Member raising its tariff). Tariffbindings enable foreign producers to better 
plan their entry into an export market by locking in one variable in the price 
structure - the duty rate imposed on their product at the time of importation. 
Working hand in glove with tariff bindings is the MFN clause. Through the 
operation of the unconditional MFN commitment, negotiated tariff 
concessions are generalized and, thereby, made multilateral. 
The third GATT -WTO pillar is the national treatment obligation. 
The principle of nondiscrimination embodied in the MFN commitmeht is 
carried over to the national level, so that Members are required to treat 
imports no less favorably than the domestic like product respecting intefllal 
measures and taxation. 
Completing the tetrad of GATT -WTO pillars is the obligation to 
eliminate quantitative restrictions on imports and exports. This obligr:,tion 
permits the laws of supply and demand to determine the price of goods, 
rather than allowing prices to be set by an artificial short supply created by 
a government restriction on the quantity of a productthat may be impc-rted 
or exported. 
2. The MFN Commitment 
GATT Article I: 1 contains the core MFN obligation. Within its 
scope are four areas of government activity, three that take place at the 
border and a fourth that deals with goods once they have entered the 
customs territory of a WTO Member. 14 The MFN obligation applies equally 
14 Article I: 1 provides that with respect to (I) customs duties and charges of any kind imposed 
on importation or exportation, (2) the method of levying those duties and charges, (3) all rules and 
formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and (4) all matters referred to in paragraphs 
2 and 4 of Article III concerning national treatment in internal taxation and regulation: 
any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by 
any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other contracting party shall be accorded 
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to bound or unbound tariff items. IS In addition, a Member cannot cite more 
favorable treatment in one instance to offset less favorable treatment in 
another instance and, thereby, claim observance of the MFN obligation on 
balance. 16 If imports from two WTO Members are "like products," then 
those imports are entitled to identical treatment regardless of their country 
of origin.17 
3. Tariff Bindings 
The crowning achievement of the GAIT -WTO system has been the 
progrt!ssive reduction of tariff levels over the course of its 50-year history. 
Tariffs or customs duties on imported goods are the only form of trade 
protection that the GATT -WTO system does not specifically prohibit. 
Rather, the imposition oftariffs is permitted with very few qualifications, 
the most important being that they be imposed on an MFN basis. 18 
The GATT preamble and Article XXVIII his provide for 
multilateral tariff negotiations to reduce existing tariff rates and to bind 
tariff concessions. When tariff concessions are "bound," the duties assessed 
on the "bound" items may not be greater than the bound rate. 19 Bindings are 
a legal guarantee that tariffs will not be increased above the maximum tariff 
level. Members are free to set a tariff at any level they wish below the bound 
rate without prejudice to their right to increase the tariff to the bound rate at 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties. 
The text of Article I: 1 is plain that the rule of nondiscrimination among WTO Members 
applies unconditionally. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. I: I. 
IS See GATT Dispute Panel Report on Spain -- Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, June 
11,1981, GATT B.LS.D. (28th Supp.) at 102, III (1981). A WTO Member is not relieved of its MFN 
obI igation because it did not enter into a tariff binding on the imported item. 
16 See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Complaint - Non-Rubber Footwear from 
Brazil, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 128,151 (1992). 
17 Because no definition of the term "like product" is included in GATT, decisions on this 
question are made on a case-by-case basis after applying a variety of criteria that GATT panels have 
found to be relevant, including the product's end-uses in a particular market, consumer tastes and habits, 
and the product's characteristics. See, e.g., Report of the GATT Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 97, 102 (1970). See generally Rex 1. Zedalis, A Theory o/the GATT 
"Like Product" Common Language Cases, 27 VAND.1. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1994). 
I' GATT Article II: 1 (a) sets out this basic obligation: 
Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the 
other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than 
that provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate 
Schedule annexed to this Agreement. 
See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art II: 1. 
191t is possible to make a tariff concession without entering into a binding on that concession. 
Until the Uruguay Round, most developing-country tariff rates were not bound. Because tariffs are 
relatively easy to administer and can be revenue raising if not trade prohibitive, they are the trade barrier 
of choice for most developing countries. 
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a later date. With bound tariff rates exporters can price goods destined for 
a foreign market knowing exactly what the duty rate on the goods will be 
when they arrive at the foreign destination, thus keeping an important 
element of an item's total price fixed. 
If an importing Member raises a duty rate above the bound tariff 
rate, adversely affected trading partners are entitled to compensation. 
Compensation can include tariff reductions by the importing Membe;- on 
goods of export interest to adversely affected exporting Members, or it can 
be retaliatory and take the form of increased tariffs by the adversely affected 
Member on items of special interest to exporters in the Member making the 
tariff withdrawal. 
Besides encouraging the reduction of tariff levels, the GA TT -WTO 
system recognizes tariffs as the only form of permissible financial charge 
that may be imposed on imported goods. It undergirds this policy through 
other GAIT articles, such as Article III, prohibiting discriminatory internal 
taxes, and Article VII, prohibiting excessive charges associated with 
customs procedures. 
Once tariff concessions are negotiated, insuring their integrity and 
preventing their circumvention is one of the main objectives of the GAIT-
WTO system. This objective is accomplished in several ways, including 
through the unconditional MFN commitment and rules on valuation. 
Regarding the mutilally supporting roles that GATT Articles I and II play 
for each other, the unconditional MFN obligation ensures that if Member A 
has negotiated specific tariff reductions on goods it exports to Member B in 
exchange for tariff cuts on goods that Member B exports to Member A, 
Member A can rest assured that it will not lose the benefit of its bargain if 
Member B thereafter negotiates an even lower tariff rate on those same 
goods with Member C. Unconditional MFN ensures that goods origin:tting 
from Member A will receive the same tariff treatment from Member B that 
Member B accords to goods originating from Member C. 
In order to prevent circumvention of tariff bindings through devices 
that either improperly inflate the price of imported goods or lower the price 
of the domestic like product, GAIT employs a number of devices, including 
(1) rules on valuation that prevent an importing country from overvaluing 
imported items and thereby wiping out the benefit of any tariff concession,20 
(2) rules on national treatment that require imported items and the like 
domestic product to be treated equally for purposes of internal taxes and 
regulations,21 and (3) rules on government subsidies to local industries 
20 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. VII; Agreement on Implementation of Article VII 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. IS, 1997, WTO Agreement, Annex lA, 
Uruguay Round Results, supra note 2. 
21 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. III. 
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where such subsidies can have the effect of lowering the price of 
domestically produced goods to the competitive disadvantage of the 
imported like product.22 
A fourth innovation to prevent circumvention of tariff bindings was 
introduced in 1994. Prior to 1994, a contracting party was not required under 
GATT 1947 to record with GATT its "other duties or charges" under Article 
II. This lack of transparency made it difficult for other contracting parties 
to determine if a contracting party was in violation of its Article II 
obligations regarding such duties and charges. However, the Uruguay Round 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article 1I:1(b) required Members to 
recor·-j in their schedule of concessions all such "other duties or charges" 
levied on bound tariff items. All such recorded charges and duties are 
bound, and the assessment of any new or omitted "other duties or charges" 
on bound tariff items is prohibited.23 The 1994 Understanding further 
required Members to record in their schedule of concessions the nature and 
level of all other duties or charges, regardless of whether those duties and 
charges are imposed on bound items or on imports generally. Such 
recordation is without prejudice to the right of other WTO Members to 
challenge at any time the GATT-consistency of such "other duties or 
charges."24 . 
4. The National Treatment Obligation 
The ArtiCle III national treatment obligation is the third pillar in the 
GATT-WTO system. National treatment clauses were standard in bilateral 
treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation concluded between the 
United States and many of its trading partners, and are thus not unique to the 
22 See, e.g., GATT Dispute Panel Report on EEC -- Payments and Subsidies Paid to 
Proce~sors and Producers of Oil seeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GAIT 8.I.S.D. 
(37th Supp.) at 86 (1990) [hereinafter Report on EEC - Oilseeds] 
23 See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article 1I:I(b) of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. IS, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex lA, paras. 1,2, & 7. 
24 To prevent the erosion of the benefit oftariff concessions, Article 11:3 provides that "[n]o 
contracting party shall alter its method of determining dutiable value or of converting currencies so as 
to impair the value of any of the concessions provided for in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this 
Agreement." WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11:3. Without this restriction, a WTO Member that had 
made a 10-percent concession on tariffs could wipe out the benefit of the concession by altering its 
valuation or currency conversion methodologies with a 10-percent upward adjustment. 
GATT Article 11:4 restricts import monopolies from providing protection in excess of the 
amount of protection provided in the appropriate Schedules. Policing this rule requires a comparison of 
the purchase and resale prices of the import monopoly, with allowances being made for reasonable 
transportation costs and related overhead costs, and a reasonable margin of profit. 
. GATT Article VII, as amended and clarified by the Agreement on the Implementation of 
Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, lays down methodologies that WTO 
Members are to adhere to when making valuation determinations. 
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GATT-WTO system.25 The general theme of Article III of GATT is to 
prohibit Members from circumventing tariff concessions through non-tariff 
barriers to import trade that might undermine the benefit of a tariff 
reduction. Like its MFN counterpart, national treatment is a 
nondiscrimination obligation, but imposed at the national level. C?nce 
imports have entered a Member's territory, internal taxes must be applied 
equally to imports and the like domestic product, and national regulations 
must not treat imports "less favorably" than similar domestic goods. The 
national treatment obligation is also part of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services ("GATS").26 . . 
The broad purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the 
application of internal tax and regulatory measures. Article III ensures that 
internal measures are not applied to imported or domestic products in a 'way 
that affords protection to domestic products. To that end, WTO Member; are 
obligated to provide equality of competitive conditions - a level playing 
field - for imported goods vis-a-vis like domestic products. 
Article I1I:4 is the source of specific national treatrpent 
commitments with respect to internal regulations affecting imports. Article 
I1I:4 provides: 
The products of the territory of any contracting 
party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution 
or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent 
the application of differential internal transportation 
charges which are based exclusively on the economic 
operation of the means of transport and not on the 
nationality of the product. 
By its express terms, Article III:4 is limited to regulations affecting:like 
25 See, e.g., Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1911, U.S.-Japan, art. VI, 4 U.S.T. 
2063; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, Dec. 8, 1923, U.S.-Germany, art. VIII, 44 
Stat. 213, as amended 49 Stat. 3258 (1925). ("The nationals and merchandise of each High Contracting 
Party within the territories of the other shall receive the same treatment as nationals and merchandise of 
the country with regard to internal taxes, transit duties, charges in respect to warehousing and other 
facilities and the amount of drawbacks and bounties."); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular 
Rights, U.S.-Hung., June 24, 1925, art. VIII, 44 Stat. 2441; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and 
Consular Rights, June 19, 1928, U.S.-Aust., art. VIII, 47 Stat. 1876. 
26 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. IS, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IB, 
33I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS). 
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products?7 The operative word in paragraph 4 is "affecting" - a broad term 
that includes internal regulations that not only govern the sale, purchase, or 
distribution of imported products, but also those which have a negative 
effect on the competitive opportunities enjoyed by imports vis-a-vis the 
domestic like product in the importing Member's home market.28 Thus, for 
example, a 1984 GAIT panel report condemned as violative of the national 
treatment obligation a requirement in the Canadian Foreign Investment 
Review Act ("FIRA") that as a condition on government approval of a 
foreign investment, parts, supplies, and materials had to be purchased 
locally. Unless the foreign investor agreed to purchase goods of Canadian 
origin in preference to imports, provided the former were "competitively 
available," its investment would not be approved.29 Even though the 
obligation was imposed on investors and not importers, the regulation was 
nevertheless violative of Article III:4. In the panel's words: 
The Panel sympathizes with the desire of the Canadian 
authorities to ensure that Canadian goods and suppliers 
would be given a fair chance to compete with imported 
products. However, the Panel holds the view that the 
purchase requirements under examination do not stop short 
of this objective but tend to tip the balance in favor of 
Canadian products, thus coming into conflict with Article 
III:4.30 
27 See GATT Dispute Panel Report on EEC - Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, Mar. 14, 
1978, GATT B.I.S.D. (25th Supp.) at 49,65-66 (1978). 
28 See, e.g., GATT Dispute Panel Report on Italy - Discrimination Against Imported 
Agricultural Machinery, Oct. 23,1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60-64 (1959). 
29 See GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment 
Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D.( 30th Supp.) at 140, 159-61 (1984) [hereinafter 
Administration of the FlRA]. 
30 See id. at 166. The GATT panel also rejected the argument that the undertakings of private 
investors to purchase locally did not constitute "regulations or requirements" within the meaning of 
Article III:4. The panel stated: 
[W]ritten purchase undertakings . . . once they were 
accepted [by the Canadian government], became part of 
the conditions under which the investment proposals were 
approved, in which case compliance could be legally 
enforced .... [T]he word 'requirements' as used in Article 
I1I:4 could be considered a proper description of existing 
undertakings. 
See id. at 158. Accord GATT Dispute Panel Report on EEC - Regulations on Imports of 
Parts and Components, Mar. 20. 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp. B) at 132, 197 (1990) ("[N]ot only 
requil ements which an enterprise is legally bound to carry out ... but also those which an enterprise 
voluntarily accepts in order to obtain an advantage from the government constitute 'requirements' ... 
"). See id. 
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The FIRA dispute highlighted the apparent gap in coverage of internal 
measures directly affecting foreign investment that indirectly affect trade in 
goods. This· gap has been partially closed by the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures ("TRIMs Agreement"),rliscussed below. 
Internal regulations that are de facto and de jure neutral may still 
violate Article III:4 if they adversely affect the competitive opportunities of 
imports in the domestic market. Exposure of imported products to the, risk 
of discrimination is itself a form of discrimination prohibited under Article 
UpI In the GAIT panel report, Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain 
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, 32 the panel concluded 
that Canadian minimum price regulations for beer undermined one of the 
fundamental purposes of Article III:4, which is to ensure that internal 
regulations do not dilute or eliminate the benefit of Article II tariff 
concessions. Moreover, the aforementioned report established that equality 
of treatment of imported products vis-a-vis the like domestic product still 
may be a national treatment violation. Even though the two products are 
treated identically (e.g., as in the case of minimum price regulations), a 
national treatment violation nevertheless exists if the imported product could 
undersell the like domestic product but for the minimum price control. 
- Just as tariff bindings afford exporters a minimum level of certainty 
regarding pricing, the national treatment obligation prevents importing 
Members from using internal regulations in a way that frustrates exporters' 
ability to reasonably assess the legal and regulatory climate in a target 
export market. 
5. The Elimination of Quotas 
The fourth pillar of the GAIT -WTO system, and the most important 
of the original the GATT 1947 commitments respecting non-tariff barriers 
to trade, is the Article XI commitment to eliminate quantitative restrictions 
(quotas) on imports and exports. Article XI prohibits quantitative 
restrictions for two reasons. First, quotas lack the transparency of customs 
duties. Second, by creating an artificial short supply, quotas prevent the laws 
of supply and demand from determining the price at which domestic and 
imported goods should be sold. 
When GAIT 1947 entered into force, the use of quotas was 
widespread. Despite the Article XI commitment, the use of quotas continued 
relatively unabated in several key economic sectors over the next five 
31 See Report on EEC - Oilseeds, supra note 22, at 124-25. 
32 GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada - Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain 
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, Feb. 18,1992, GATT B.LS.D. (39th Supp.) at 27, 
84-85 (1992). 
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. decades. In some instances, import and export quotas were formalized 
through legal agreements between exporting and importing countries, the 
most notorious of these being the Multifiber Arrangement on textiles and 
clothing that was in effect continuously from 1974 through 1994. In other 
instances, export quotas were put in place through legal instruments labeled 
"voluntary export restraints" ("VERs"). The most noteworthy of these VERs 
are the 1981 agreement between the United States and Japan limiting 
exports of Japanese automobiles to the United States, and the VERs of the 
1970s and 1980s on exports of steel and steel products. Although VERs 
were passed off to the public as beneficial and harmless, there is little doubt 
that their sting was felt in the form of higher prices to consumers. 
The prohibition on quantitative restrictions is broad. First, both 
import and export quotas are prohibited. Second, any type of government 
measure that may lead to the imposition of a quota is prohibited. As is the 
case with alleged national treatment violations, whether a quantitative 
restriction has actual trade effects is irrelevant. The existence of a 
quantitative restriction, regardless of whether it actually impedes imports or 
exports, violates Article XI: 1 because it affects the conditions of 
competition.33 The prohibition on quantitative restrictions is supplemented 
by the TRIMs Agreement, discussed below, which prohibits host-country 
restrictions on the importation or exportation 'of goods as a condition to 
government approval of a foreign investment. 
There are three important GATT-authorized exceptions to the 
general prohibition on quantitative restrictions. The first concerns quotas 
imposed on agricultural products that are part of a government market 
stabilization program. The second is an exception under Article XII for 
quotas imposed to correct a balance-of-payments problem.34 The third is an 
exception for quotas imposed as a remedy under an Article XIX safeguard 
action. 
A de Jacto fourth exception to both the Article XI proscription on 
quantitative restrictions and the Article XIII requirement of 
nondiscrimination in the allocation of quotas is the VRA or VER. Under the 
terms of a VRA, exporting countries of a product agree to limit the volume 
oftheir exports to an importing country. The proliferation of these grey-area 
n See Report on EEC - Oilseeds, supra note 22, at 130. 
~. WTO Members invoking Article XII or XVlll:B as of 1995 include Bangladesh, Egypt, 
India, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, and 
the former Yugoslavia. WTO Members which have disinvoked Article Xli or XVlll:B since 1979 include 
Argel'tina, Brazil, Colombia, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Korea, Peru, and Portugal. 
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measures35 (a neologism for "GAIT-inconsistent") was becoming a serious 
threat to the continued relevance of GATT both as an institution and as a 
legal instrument for regulating international trade. The Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Safeguards directly addresses the subject ofVRAs, requiring 
Members to phase them out over a five-year period and thereafter making 
them illegal unless they are concluded in strict observance of the rules laid 
down in the Safeguards Agreement.36 " 
E. GATT Regulation of Other Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade 
Non-tariff barriers can be defined by what they are not - all barriers 
to trade that are not tariffs. Admittedly, this definition is not espec;ally 
gratifying or enlightening. Crafting a more useful definition, however, is 
probably futile. The 50-year experience of the GAIT -WTO system shows 
that the garden ofNTBs is hardy, diverse, and full of hybrids. With the deep 
reductions in import duties that the GA IT -WTO system has witnessed since 
1947, coupled with stricter disciplines on the use of quantitative restrict;ons, 
the use ofNTBs proved irresistibly tempting to some WTO Members with 
protectionist proclivities. 
The balance of commitments in the GAIT -WTO system serve 
mainly to strengthen the four pillars by prohibiting Members from ereeting 
non-tariff barriers to trade as a substitute for tariffs and quotas. The most 
important of these commitments concern transparency of government iUles 
and regulations on import trade, national standards and technical regulations 
on imported goods, government procurement, and customs classification and 
valuation of goods. 
1. Transparency of National Regulations on Trade .' 
There can be little question that the smooth functioning of a 
multilateral trade system requires transparency of the trade regulations and 
measures adopted by its Members. To that end, GAIT Article X, 
Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations, provides in palt: 
Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings of general application, made 
effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the 
35 At the time the Uruguay Round was launched, 96 VRAs were in force affecting products 
ranging from steel, machine tools, transportation equipment, electronic products, footwear, textiles, 
agricultural products, and automobiles. Of these 96 arrangements, S3 protected EEC markets and 32 
protected the U.S. market. See Gary Samson, Safeguards. in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK, 
supra note 7, at 143-45. 
36 See Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 2, art. 11.1 (b). 
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classification or the valuation of products for customs 
purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to 
requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or 
exports or on the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting 
their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, 
warehousing, inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or 
other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as 
to enable governments and traders to become acquainted 
with them. 
. While Article X of GAIT is designed as a prophylactic to forestall resort to 
byzantine and obscure internal and border measures affecting trade, its 
shortcomings have been the topic of discussions within the GATT -WTO 
system.37 
2. The GATT Article XX General Exceptions 
Article XX permits Members to derogate from general GATT 
obligations in limited circumstances. A WTO Member that initially is 
unsuccessful in defending a border measure against the charge that it is 
inconsistent with a GAIT obligation will often argue in the alternative that 
one or more of the Article XX exceptions applies. However, any Member 
invoking Article XX in defense of a challenged measure carries the burden 
of proving that the measure meets the criteria for an Article XX exception.38 
Article XX consists of a chapeau or preamble, followed by ten 
specific exceptions.39 Any Member invoking an Article XX exception must 
n See GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 300. 
). See, e.g., Administration of the FlRA, supra note 29, at 164. 
)9 Subject to the qualifications set forth in the chapeau, nothing in GATT is to be construed 
to prevent adoption or enforcement of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public 
morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) relating to the exportation of 
gold or silver; 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations ... relating to customs enforcement ... the 
protection of [intellectual property rights], and the 
prevention of deceptive practices; 
(e) relating to the products of 
prison labor; 
(f) imposed for the protection of national 
treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption; 
HeinOnline -- 16 Wis. Int’l L.J. 437 1997-1998
Vol. 16, No.2 The GATT-WTO System at Fifty 437 
show, first, that its measure is not applied in a manner that constitutes a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail. Second, any such measure 'must not amount to 
a disguised restriction on trade.40 
a. Measures for the Protection of Human, Animal, or Plant Life or Health 
Article XX(b) authorizes measures "necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health." This provision allows Members to give 
priority to health over trade liberalization, provided a measurt; is 
"necessary." In the first WTO panel report, Standards for Reformulated and 
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations 
under any intergovernmental commodity agreement ... ; 
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic 
materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such 
materials to a domestic processing industry during periods 
when the domestic price of such materials is held below 
the world price as part of a government stabilization plan 
... ; or, 
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of 
products in general or local short supply .... 
An Article XX analysis is two-tiered. First, the challenged measure must meet the criteria of 
one of the specific Article XX exceptions; second, the measure must pass muster under the Artide XX 
chapeau. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States -- Standards for Refonnulatcd and 
Conventional Gasoline, 33 I.L.M. 603 (Apr. 29, 1996). 
40 In the Appellate Body's inaugural report, Standards for Reformulated and Convei!lional 
Gasoline, the Appellate Body offered the following views on the breadth of the chapeau: 
[T]he chapeau says that "nothing in this Agreement shall 
Id. at 617. 
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any contracting party of measures . . ." The exceptions 
listed in Article XX thus relate to all of the obligations 
under the General Agreement: the national treatinent 
obligation and the most-favored-nation obligation, of 
course, but others as well .... 
The Appellate Body continued: 
"Arbitrary discrimination", "unjustifiable discrimination" 
and "disguised restriction" on international trade may, 
accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to 
one another. It is clear to us that "disguised restriction" 
includes disguised discrimination in international trade. It 
is equally clear that concealed or unannounced restriction 
or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust 
the meaning of "disguised restriction." We consider that 
"disguised restriction", whatever else it covers, may 
properly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international 
trade taken under the guise of a measure fonnally within 
the terms of an exception listed in Article Xx. ... The 
fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and 
object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the 
exceptions to substantive rules available in Article xx. 
Id. at 629 (emphasis in original). 
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Conventional Gasoline,41 the panel examined whether U.S. Clean Air Act 
regulations42 that discriminated against imported gasoline were "necessary," 
within the meaning of Article XX(b).43 The panel agreed with the United 
States that "a policy to reduce air pollution resulting from the consumption 
of gasoline was a policy within the range ofthose concerning the protection 
of human, animal and plant life or health."44 The panel asked whether 
alternative measures were reasonably available that were either GAIT-
consistent or less inconsistent with it than the existing U.S. regulations. The 
panel concluded tlJat a regulatory scheme that permitted importers to use 
individual baselines similar to those available to U.S. refiners was one such 
alternative, in contrast to the statutorily mandated baselines that included 
penalties for submission of false foreign data. In the panel's view, "the 
United States had not demonstrated that data available from foreign refiners 
was [~,ic] inherently less susceptible to established techniques of checking, 
verification, assessment and enforcement than data for other trade in goods 
subject to US regulation [e.g., under the antidumping or countervailing duty 
laws].,,45 
A recurring issue under Article XX(b) has been one of transparency, 
i.e., (he lack of adequate publication, notification, and consultations 
conct'ming measures taken under paragraph (b). In 1989, Chile complained 
that millions of dollars in fruit exports to the United States were lost because 
of a U.S. ban on Chilean fruit following the discovery of toxic chemicals in 
Chilean grapes. Chile urged the establishment of a system for the' 
expeditious notification and review of such measures to ensure that the 
measures adopted were proportionate to the threat. Later that year the 
Director-General offered a recommendation to the GAIT Council which 
was duly noted. Its three recommendations are: (1) a measure taken should 
not be any more severe, and should not remain in force any longer, than 
necessary to protect the human, animal, or plant life or health involved; (2) 
the importing country should notify the Director-General as quickly as 
possible by telephone followed by a written communication to all 
contracting parties; and (3) the importing country should submit to 
expeditious informal consultations with the principally concerned 
contracting party as soon as a trade-damaging act has occurred with a view 
41 Report of the WTO Panel on United States - Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 274 (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Standards for Gasoline]. 
42 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.40·80.91 (1995). 
43 For a discussion of the Panel Report, see generally Cynthia M. Maas, Should the WTO 
Expand GATT Article )()(?: An Analysis of United States - Standards for Reformulated and 
Conwntional Gasoline, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 415 (1996). 
44 See Standards for Gasoline, supra note 41, at 296. 
4$ Id. at 297. 
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to reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute.46 The 1994 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
incorporates and expands on the Director-General's 1.989 initiative. 
3. The Article XXI Security Exception 
Article XXI lists government measures that are exempt from regular 
GA TT obligations when taken on national security grounds. They are: (1) 
furnishing information the disclosure of which the Member considers 
contrary to its essential security interests; (2) taking action for the protection 
of the Member's essential security interests relating to fissionable materials 
or arms traffic, or taken in time of war or other international emergency; and 
(3) taking action in pursuance of a Member's obligations under the V.N. 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. . 
The practice under Article XXI has centered around Article 
XXI(b )(iii): action which a Member considers necessary for the protection 
of its essential security interests taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations. During the Falklands war in 1982, for example, the 
European Community (UEC"), Canada, and Australia imposed a two-month 
import ban on goods from Argentina. Argentina complained that this a'~tion 
violated, inter alia, Articles I, II, and XI. The countries taking the measure 
stated that Article XXI did not require notification. The upshot was a 
Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement adopted by 
GATT on November 30, 1982, which stated cryptically that contracting 
parties affected by action taken under Article XXI retain their full rights 
under the General Agreement.47 
In 1985, the United States imposed a trade embargo on Nicaragua, 
invoking the Article XXI(b)(iii) exception.48 Following a complaint from 
Nicaragua, a panel was established to examine the U.S. measures, but its 
terms of reference precluded the panel from judging the validity or 
motivation for the invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii).49 In 1991, the ,EC, 
Canada, United States, Japan, and several other countries imposed trade 
sanctions on the former Yugoslavia. Because of the uncertainty over the 
status of the successor government, a GATT complaint was not acted upon. 
Before 1996, the GATT security exceptions had not been a source 
of serious disruption of the GATT-WTO system. However, with the 
46 See Streamlined Mechanism for Reconciling the Interests of Contracting Parties in the 
Event ofTrade-Damaging Acts, GATT S.LS.D, (36th Supp.) at 67 (1989). 
47 See Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, Nov. 30,1982, GATT 
8.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1982). 
48 See GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 601. 
49 See id, Dispute Panel Report on United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, Oct. 
13, 1986. See id. at 60 L 
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enactment in 1996 of two controversial U.S. laws tightening trade sanctions 
against Cuba, Iran, and Libya, an area that had been relatively calm began 
to stir. 
a. The Helms-Burton Dispute 
Extremely controversial legislation was enacted in 1996 that was 
designed to tighten the u.s. trade embargo on Cuba formalized under the 
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.50 On March 12, 1996, President Clinton 
signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 
1996, popularly known as the Helms-Burton Act.51 The Act broadened the 
U.S. embargo against Cuba by barring U.s. foreign aid to countries that 
provide assistance to Cuba; authorizing U.S. nationals who had property 
confifcated by the Cuban government since 1959 to sue foreign companies 
if the~' are "trafficking" in the property that was expropriated by the Cuban 
government after the Cuban revolution; and barring the issuance of visas to 
aliens who, after the effective date of the Act, confiscate, convert, or traffic 
in prcperty expropriated from a U.S. citizen. 
The President has the power to suspend for up to six months at a 
time the implementation of provisions in Title III of the Act that authorize 
U.S. nationals to bring lawsuits to recover confiscated property, if doing so 
would be in the national interest. In an effort to quell the international furor 
touched off by the Helms-Burton Act, President Clinton suspended Title III 
in July 1996, postponing the effective date of that portion of the Helms-
Burton Act until February 1, 1997. On January 3, 1997, President Clinton 
issued another Title III waiver, stating that he will continue to suspend its 
operation so long as U.S. trading partners continue their efforts to promote 
a transition to democracy in Cuba.52 
so The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified at 22 
U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994)), gave a belated congressional imprimatur on the trade embargo the United 
States first imposed by President Kennedy against Cuba in February 1962. The Embargo on All Trade 
with Cuba, Proclamation No. 3447,3 C.F.R. 157 (1962). 
II See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERT AD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
114, tlO Stat. 785 (Mar. 12, 1996), (codified at 22 U.S.C. §6021 (1997)). See also Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419,419 (1996); Brice M. 
Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Is Consistent with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 
434 (1996); Jonathan R. Ratchik, Note, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995, II AM. 
UJ. INT'L L. & POL'y 343, 351-57 (1996) (for a discussion of the Act in the context of GATT). 
52 True to his word, President Clinton waived the Title III provisions again on July 17, 1997, 
for an additional six months. No sooner had President Clinton issued his first Helms-Burton waiver than 
he signed into law legislation to prevent foreign .investment in the Libyan and Iranian oil industries in 
excess of $40 million annually. This legislation also triggered protests from U.S. trading partners. See 
Europe Paws Ground Over US Sanctions Aimed at Iran, Libya, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 9, 1996, 
at 7; EU Files Formal Protest with u.s. Over Law Penalizing Foreign Firms with Ties to Iran, Libya, 
13 INT.'L TRADE REp. (BNA) at 1315 (1996); Canada Criticizes U.S. Iran-Libya Law as Unsupportable 
Extraterritoriality, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 1316 (1996); u.s. Mulls Sanctions Over Iran Oil 
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The Helms-Burton Act triggered diplomatic protests and threats of 
retaliation from several U.S. trading partners, including Canada, Mexico, 
and the EU. S3 The EU approved blocking legislation .in 1996 to prevent 
enforcement in EU-member courts of U.S. judgments entered pursuant to 
Title III ofHelms-Burton.s4 
In 1996, the EU filed a complaint with the WTO's Dispute 
Settlement Body against the United States, alleging that the Helms-Burton 
Act violates GATT Articles I (MFN), III (national treatment), V (freedom 
of transit), XI (the prohibition on quotas), and XIII (the allocation of 
quotas); and GATS Articles I (scope), III (transparency), VI (impartial 
administration of domestic regulations), XVI (market access), and XVII 
(national treatment). It was anticipated that the United States would defend 
the Helms-Burton Act on Article XXI's national security grounds, but it was 
feared that the United States would reject any standard tenus of reference 
for a panel and judge for itself whether its national security interests ~'ere 
genuinely implicated. After discussions with the United States in April 
1997, the EU requested a suspension of the WTO panel proceedi'Jgs, 
pursuant to Article 12.12 of the Uruguay Round Dispute Settlep~;ent 
Understanding.s5 The suspension followed an agreement with the Uri"ited 
States that an effort would be made to secure from Congress waiver 
authority under Title IV, which denies U.S. entry to any foreigner trafficking 
in U.S. property confiscated in Cuba.56 
Considering the disruption to the stability of the GATT -WTO 
system that the phrase "essential security interests" could cause if interpreted 
broadly or unilaterally by the Member invoking it, it is fortunate that Article 
XXI has not evolved into the exception that swallowed GATT. If every 
WTO Member arrogates for itself the right to be the final arbiter on 
Deal, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2,1997, at 3. 
53 See EU Formally QuestiOns u.s. Policy Toward Cuba, Requests WTO Procedure, 13 INT'L 
TRADE REP. (BNA) at 719 (1996); Christopher Offers Reassurances to Mexico on Helms-Burtc n Act, 
13 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) at 761 (1996); OECD Talks on Investment Agreement Distracted by u.s. 
Cuba Policy Debate, 13 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) at 889 (1996). Canada and Mexico :;ought 
consultations with the United States under NAFTA Chapter Twenty. 
54 See EU Approves Blocking Legislation in Reaction to Helms-Burton Act, 13 INT'L TRADE 
REP. (BNA) at 1243 (1996). Canada and Mexico have enacted similar blocking legislation in response 
to Helms-Burton. See "Antidote" Bill to Helms-Burton Approved by Mexican Lawmakers. 13 INT'L 
TRADE REP. (BNA) at 1575 (1996); Canadian House of Commons Approves Legislation to Combat 
Helms-Burton Law, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 1589 (1996); Jorgen Huber, The Helms-Burton 
Blocking Statute of the European Union. 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 699, 699 (1997). 
55 See Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, United States -- Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act, WTIDS38/5 (1997), available in 1997 WL 371060. See u.s., EU Approve 
Plan to Resolve Dispute Over Helms-Burton. OffiCials Say, 14 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) at 686 (1997). 
56 See EU Said Not Planning to Revive Challenge to Helms-Burton Challenge, 14 INT'L 
TRADE REP. (BNA) at 1040 (1997); EU Warns It Will Reinstate Complaint On Helms-Burton if 
Congress Tightens Law, 14 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) at 1069 (1997); For and Against Punishing US 
Allies on Cuba, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 3,1997, at 19. 
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questions relating to trade and national security, such action could deliver 
a mortal blow to the GATT-WTO system. 
III. THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE BIRTH OF THE GATT -WTO SYSTEM 
A. Overview of the Uruguay Round Results 
Five decades had left GATT, the founding document of international 
trade, dog-eared. Derogations from the most-favored-nation and national 
treatment obligations in the form of GATT-authorized waivers, the 
imposition of quotas in a manner that ignored GATT rules on quantitative 
restrictions, the existence of high tariffs in developed countries on goods of 
the greatest export interest to developing countries, and the lack of an 
effective dispute settlement mechanism for the speedy and binding 
resolution.of disputes were all sources of mounting and vociferous criticism 
of GATT. Critics charged that the acronym "GATT" stood for "the 
Gentlemen's Agreement to Talk and Talk." 
After seven years, the most far-reaching and comprehensive 
development iri world trade since 1947 took place in 1994 with the 
succe·ssful completion of the Uruguay Round.s7 Peter Sutherland, the first 
Director-General ofthe World Trade Organization, described the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round as "a defining moment in modern history."s8 If it 
hasn't silenced the critics, the Uruguay Round at least has turned down the 
volume. The Uruguay Round arrested the slide away from liberal trade and 
the multilateral rules designed to promote it by renewing the original GATT 
57 For additional reading on the Uruguay Round, see generally THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: 
A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1996) [hereinafter A NEGOTIATING 
HISTORY]; JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND·(1995); ERNEST H. PREEG, TRADERS IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM (1995); THE URUGUAY ROUND RESULTS: A 
EUROPEAN LAWYERS' PERSPECTIVE (Jacques H.J. Bourgeois et al. eds., 1995); EDMOND MCGOVERN, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION (1996); THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION (Terence P. Stewart ed., 
1996) [hereinafter THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION]; THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY 
ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES (Harvey M. Applebaum & 
Lyn M. Schlitt eds., 1995) (hereinafter THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 
ACT; JOHN KRAUS, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS: A BUSINESS GUIDE TO THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND (1994); JEFFREY 1. SCHOTT & JOHANNA W. BOORMAN, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 
(1994); URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, STATEMENT OFADMINISTRA TIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. 
103-316 at 659-67 (1994) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION]; John H. Jackson, The 
Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO: Significance & Challenges, in THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, supra, at 5; Symposium: Uruguay Round--GATTIWTO, 29 INT'L LAW. 335 (1995); 
Terence P. Stewart, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: An Overview of Major Issues and Potential 
Troub£e Spots, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra, at 29; Symposium: Negotiating the Free 
Trade Labyrinth, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 281 (1997). 
5R See PHILLIP EVANS & JAMES WALSH, THE EIU GUIDE TO THE NEW GATT 1 (1994) 
[hereinafter EIU GUIDE TO GATT]. 
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1947 commitment to open markets and eliminate government intervention 
that impedes trade flows. What is more, the Uruguay Round has expanded 
the multilateral trade system's portfolio by including two new sectors: 
services and intellectual property. 
Among its long list of accomplishments, the Uruguay Round can 
take credit for securing commitments from Members to eliminate several 
high-profile NTBs. These NTBs include barriers to agricultural trade and to 
trade in textiles and clothing, import licensing procedures, preshipment 
inspections, product standards and technical regulations, trade-related 
investment measures, and safeguard actions. The Uruguay Round brings 
renewed legal discipline to voluntary restraint agreements, so-called "gray 
area" measures, that are technically subject to GAIT rules but had manuged 
over time to slip past GAIT regulation.59 
The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations ("Final Act"), signed in Marrakesh on April 
15, 1994,60 covers all areas negotiated in the Uruguay Round, with the 
specific market access commitments on tariff reductions and non-tariff 
barriers to trade in goods and services being recorded in national Schedules 
of Concessions and Commitments, respectively. Outside of the Final Act, 
the most important of the Uruguay Round agreements is the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization,61 under which the institutional 
functions of GAIT 1947 are replaced by the World Trade Organization.62 
The WTO Agreement establishes a single institutional framework that 
encompasses (1) GAIT, (2) a series of understandings that amend GAIT 
1947, and (3) multilateral trade agreements ("MTAs") covering international 
rules on trade in goods, services, and intellectual property rights.63 The 
59 See Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 2, art. 11.1 (b). This Article prohibits the .resort 
to voluntary restraint agreements unless entered into in strict conformity with criteria of the Safeguards 
Agreement. 
W See generally Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Uruguay Round Results, supra note 2 [hereinafter Final Act]. 
61 See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 2. See Amelia Porges, The Malrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra 
note 57, at 63. 
62 For additional discussion on the World Trade Organization, see generally MCGOVERN, 
supra note 57; Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson, The Roadfrom GAIT to MTO, 3 MINN. 1. GLOBAL 
TRADE 35 (1994); Thomas J. Dillon, The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World 
Trade?, 161\11CH. J. INT'L L. 349 (1995); David Palmeter, International Trade Law in the Twenty-First 
Century, 18 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1653 (1995); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International 
Relation Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829 (1995); Raymond 
Vernon, The World Trade Organization: A New Stage in International Trade and Development, 36 
HARV. INT'L LJ. 329 (1995); Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmotism, 4 
1. INT'L L. & PRAC. 3 (1995); Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GAIT: From the Havana 
Charter to the World Trade Organization, 34 COLUM. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 123 (1995). -
(,J The following Annexes are appended to the WTO Agreement and are an integral part of it: 
GAIT 1994, as amended (Annex IA), General Agreement on Trade in Services (Annex 18), Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Annex I C), Understanding on Rules and 
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MT As are integral parts of the WTO Agreement and are binding on all 
WTO Members.64 The six Uruguay Round Understandings included in 
Annex lA; GATT 1947, as amended and modified; waivers granted under 
GA T1' 1947 and still in force on the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement; and the Marrakesh Protocol, to which the WTO Members' 
schedules of market access commitments are appended, are referred to 
collectively as "GATT 1994." 
The Uruguay Round negotiators concluded the following twelve 
MTA$ on trade in goods: 
1. Agreement on Agriculture; 
2. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures ("SPS Agreement"); 
3. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; 
4. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement"); 
5. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRIMs 
Agreement"); 
6. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Antidumping Agreement"); 
7. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Customs Valuation 
Agreement"); 
8. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; 
9. Agreement on Rules of Origin; 
10. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; 
11. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM 
Agreement"); and, 
12. Agreement on Safeguards.65 
In addition to the twelve MTAs on trade in goods, the Uruguay Round 
negotiators broke hew ground by including two new sectors in the GATT-
WTO system: (1) services trade under the General Agreements on Trade in 
Services, and (2) the protection of intellectual property rights under the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
("TRIPS Agreement").66 
The trade system envisaged by the WTO Agreement is a "single 
undertaking" approach. That is, membership in the WTO requires accepting 
all the results of the Uruguay Round without exception, i. e. , GATT 1994 and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Annex 2), Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 
3), Plurilateral Trade Agreements (Annex 4). 
64 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. II: 1-2. 
6S See generally Uruguay Round Results, supra note 2. 
(,(, See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex Ie, art. 14.5. 
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the MTAs.67 The "a la carte" approach of the Tokyo Round was terminated, 
with the exception of the plurilateral trade agreements (PTAs) listed in 
Annex 4 on government procurement, dairy products, and bovine meat. .The 
PTAs are part of the WTO Agreement for the Members that accept them; are 
binding on those Members, but create no obligations or rights for others.68 
With the establishment of the WTO as the successor organization 
to GAIT, GAIT in its WTO metamorphosis finally emerged as a permanent 
international organization and a fully binding international trade agreement 
after nearly 50 years of provisional status. 
B. Tariff Reductions 
Over the course of the eight GATT-sponsored multilateral trade 
negotiation rounds, average tariffs in developed countries have been 
significantly reduced. While average tariff levels in developed countries had 
fallen dramatically over the past 50 years, tariff structures had not changed 
as dramatically, with tariffs remaining persistently high on certain finished 
manufactured goods, including textiles and footwear.69 Following the 
Uruguay Round, tariff rates in developed countries stand at an average of 3 
percent on imports from other developed countries, down from the 5.5 
67 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11:2. The Uruguay Round MTAs contain market-
access commitments and schedule the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in the various 
sectors covered by the MT As. For timetables on this trade liberalization, see generally Timeline of 
Uruguay Round Commitments, INT'L ECON. REV. 18 (USITC, Sept. 1995). 
68 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11:3. Three of the PTAs - the Agreement on 
Govemment Procurement, the Intemational Dairy Agreement, and the Intemational Bovin.: Meat 
Agreement -- are successor agreements to ones concluded in the Tokyo Round. The texts ofth~ Dairy 
and Bovine Meat Agreements are exactly as negotiated in 1979, but the agreements have been ;edated 
and their titles changed from "Arrangement" to "Agreement." Those two agreements were tenninated 
at the end of 1997. See id. art. VI:3, Termination of the Intemational Bovine Meat Agreement, D~cision 
pursuant to art. VI:3; art. VIII:3, Termination of the Intemational Dairy Agreement, Decision pursuant 
to art. VIII:3. 
The fourth PTA, the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, is a holdover agreement flOm the 
Tokyo Round and remains in force but without coming under WTO auspices. The Uruguay· Round 
negotiators contemplated that the four PTAs would emerge from the negotiations. Failing an EU-US 
agreement on civil aircraft, only three became a formal part of the Uruguay Round package of 
agreements . 
The four PT As are unique in the GATT -WTO system in that they operate under a conditional 
MFN principle, instead of the unconditional MFN principle that covers the rest of the GATf-WTO 
agreements. The conditional MFN principle permits the parties to the PT As to exclude all free riders, as 
was the case with the Tokyo Round Codes. 
69 At the start of the Uruguay Round, average tariff rates in the Quad (Canada, the EU, Japan, 
and the United States) on finished manufactures were 6.9 percent in the United States, 8.1 percent in 
Canada, 7 percent in the EU, and 6.4 percent in Japan. Average tariff rates on raw materials at the same 
time were 1.8 percent in the United States, 2.6 percent in Canada, 1.6 percent in the EU, and 1.4 .percent 
in Japan. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, TRADING FOR GROWTH: THE NEXT ROUND 
OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 77 (1985). The post-Uruguay Round average tariff rates in developed countries 
on raw materials is 1 percent; on semi-manufactured goods, under 3 percent; and on finished products, 
under 5 percent. See EIU GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 58, at 74. 
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percent pre-Uruguay Round average, or a 45 percent reduction. Developed 
countries reached agreement in the Uruguay Round on tariff concessions 
that resulted in bound tariff rates on 99 percent of the value of imported 
manufactured goods and on 98 percent of the value of all imports to 
developed countries from all sources.70 Although this figure is impressive, 
it represents only a marginal improvement on the Tokyo Round results 
which bound 94 percent of all developed countries' tariffs.71 What is 
impressive about the Uruguay Round results on this score, however, is that 
as palt of the market access package of agreements, the Quad Members 
(Canada, the EU, Japan, and the United States) agreed to eliminate most 
tariffs in several sectors, including pharmaceuticals, construction equipment, 
medical equipment, steel, beer, spirits, furniture, toys, paper, and farm 
equipment; to reduce tariffs for other products by an average of one-third; 
and to chop tariff "spikes" of 15 percent or greater.72 
Developed countries' average tariff rates on imported goods from 
developing countries stand at 4.8 percent post-Uruguay Round, 1.8 percent 
higher than the average duty rate on imported goods from developed 
countries.73 Developed countries' average tariffs on textiles and footwear 
goods of obvious export interest to developing countries remain persistently 
high even after the Uruguay Round, at 12.4 percent and 7.1 percent, 
respectively.74 
The results for developing countries in the Uruguay Round tariff 
. negotiations parallel the agreements reached by developed countries in 
many respects. Many developing countries still maintain high average 
tariff~" augmented by sharp spikes for protected sectors ofthe economy. For 
example, average tariffs in China stand at 51 percent on manufactured 
goods, although average tariffs on raw materials have been reduced to 17 
percent. India's tariffs average 27 percent,75 although it has committed to 
reducing its tariffs on most products to world levels sometime after 2000.76 
Despite the high tariffs in China and India, many developing countries 
participating in the Uruguay Round reduced their tariff rates by 28 percent 
from pre-Uruguay Round levels, resulting in average tariffs of 10.7 percent 
70 See Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, Trade in Manufactures: The Outcome of the Uruguay Round 
and Developing Countries Interests, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 55, 
at 55 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995); EIU GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 58, at 72. 
71 See EIU GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 58, at 72. 
72 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1993: OPERATION OF THE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 5 (USITC, No. 2769, 1994). 
7J See de Paiva Abreu, supra 70, at 56. 
74 See EIU GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 58, at 73. 
7S See id. at 72. 
76 See China to Lower Tariffs on Raw Materialsfor Second Time in Two Years, Ministry 
Says, 14 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) at 1542 (I 997);fndia to Reduce Import Tariffs to World Levels Over 
Next Few Years, 13 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) at 1553 (1996). 
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on imported goods from developed countries, compared to the pre-Uruguay 
Round 14.9-percent average tariff rate.77 
In a parallel development at the Uruguay Round on tariff bindings, 
many developing countries bound a large percentage aftheir tariffs as well. 
After the Uruguay Round, 61 percent of the tariffs on manufactured goods 
imported by developing countries will have a bound duty rate, compared 
with 13 percent before the Uruguay Round.78 Several developing countries, 
mainly in Latin America, agreed to bind 100 percent of their tariff on 
manufactured goods, while Asia averaged 70 percent on manufactured 
goods. India, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thai!and 
bound between 60 to 89 percent of their tariffs on manufactured goods.79 
Overall, existing pre-Uruguay Round tariff rates were reduced 40 
percent as a result of the Uruguay Round. Seventeen percent of industrial 
goods will enter developed countries duty free by 1999.80 
With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture, a wide range of non-tariff barriers on agricultural products, 
including quotas, voluntary restraint agreements, and variable import Ie vies 
were eliminated and "tarrified," i.e., converted into tariff equivalents that 
provide approximately the same level of trade protection as the previous 
non-tariff barriers.8l Developed countries made a commitment to reduce 
agricultural tariffs by 36 percent over six years. Developing coun~ries 
committed to a 24 percent reduction over ten years.82 Tariffs on agricultural 
products will be high for the foreseeable future and the subject of fU,ture 
77 See de Paiva Abreu, supra note 70, at 56. Average tariffs for select Latin American 
countries show a relatively low tariff rate, but with significant tariff "spikes" for certain import-sensitive 
sectors of the economy. For example, Bol ivia, with an average tariff of 10 percent, and Chile, with an 
average tariff of II percent, have adopted moderate uniform tariffs. Most countries in the region have 
adopted a tiered structure of escalating rates but with moderate total averages, such as Argentina at 12 
percent, Colombia at II percent, Brazil at 14 percent, and Uruguay at 20 percent. See Sam Lair", Latin 
American Trade Liberalization, 4 MINN. 1. GLOBAL TRADE 195,203-04 (1995). The introduction of the 
MERCOSUR common external tariff is not expected to affect the average tariff rates of MERCOSUR 
countries, although tariff structures may be affected. Zero tariffs rates are exceptional, and most 
maximum rates are set between 30 percent and 40 percent. With tariffs rates being structured in much 
the same way as developed countries tariffs, foodstuffs and basic commodities have the lowest rates, 
followed by goods that have undergone an intermediate stage of production, such as produce) goods, 
which receive the mid-range rates, and finished imported goods, such as automobiles, being asse,sed the 
highest duty rates. The average tariff rates of the largest Latin American countries at the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round were 12 percent for Argentina, 10 percent for Bolivia, 14 percent for Brazil, II 
percent for Chile, 11 percent for Colombia, 12.5 percent for Mexico, 21.5 percent for Uruguay, and 10 
percent for Venezuela. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade Policy Reviews 1989-93; 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Council Overview of Developments in International Trade and 
the Trading System: Annual Report by the Director General, GAIT Doc. No. CfRMIOV/31Rev.1 (1992). 
78 See de Paiva Abreu, supra note 70, at 55. 
79 See id. 
80 See EIU GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 58, at 72. 
R1 See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex lA, Uruguay 
Round Results, supra note 2, art. 4 [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture]. 
82 See id. arts. 4, IS. 
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tariff-reduction negotiations. 
The Marrakesh Protocol provides that as a general rule WTO 
Members will implement their tariff reductions in five equal stages, with the 
first reduction taking place on the date the WTO Agreement enters into 
force (January 1, 1995), and with each successive reduction being 
implemented on January 1 of each of the following years. The staging does 
not apply to tariff reductions for agricultural products. Members are free to 
implement reductions sooner, but the final cut must be implemented no later 
than January 1, 1999. 
1. Trade in Information Technology Products. 
Manufacturers interested in creating well-paying jobs for workers, 
earning a high return on their investment, and being competitive in world 
markets for their goods have shifted all or a substantial portion of their 
manufacturing base out of low value-added, labor-intensive production and 
reinvested in more capital-intensive, high value-added pursuits. Their 
primary focus has been on advanced-sector products. Similarly, 
governments interested in job creation and fostering new industries have 
lowered or eliminated altogether tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in 
advanced-sector products.83 
One of the most important advanced-product sectors is information 
technology products. (Other advanced-sector products include, of course, 
civil aircraft and parts, pharmaceuticals and scientific equipment.) The most 
noteworthy achievement of the first WTO Ministerial Conference held in 
Singapore in December 1996 was the successful conclusion of the 
Infonnation Technology Agreement (lilT A"). The parties to the ITA agreed 
to eliminate all duties on a host of information-technology products 
beginning July 1, 1997, and ending no later than January 1,2000.84 A non-
exhaustive list of the products covered by the ITA includes the following: 8s 
• computers (supercomputers, mainframe computers, work stations, 
personal computers, automatic teller machines, calculators, and all computer 
HJ The author's assertion is based on the experience of developing country economies in the 
1990s. In 1996, for example, the United States exported nearly $40 billion in computer and office 
equipment, $30 billion in airplanes and parts, and $21 billion in scientific instruments for a total of$91 
billion. This figure represents 15 percent of total U.S. exports of goods in 1996. See U.s. Trade 
Developments, INT'L ECON. REV. 23 (USITC, Feb./Mar. 1997). 
84 WTO, Council for Trade in Goods, Implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on Trade 
in Information Technology Products, GILl I 60 (1997). 
85 For a complete list of the products by name and HS headings included in the ITA, see 
Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products, Attachments A & B, 
WT/MIN(96)/16 (1996). 
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peripherals )86 
• telecommunications equipment (telephone sets, cordless phones, 
cellular phones, pagers, answering machines, fax machines, switching and 
transmission equipment, and optical fiber cable) 
• software 
• semiconductors (memory chips, microprocessors, manufacturing 
equipment, and test equipment)87 
• printed circuit boards 
In view of this list of products, even a casual observer can see how the ITA 
and the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications are perfect complemt!nts 
to one another. 
The ITA is a set of three documents: (1) the Ministerial Declara1:ion 
on Trade in Information Technology Products,88 (2) Implementation of the 
Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products 
prepared by the Council for Trade in Goods,89 and (3) the participa;;ing 
Members' schedules of tariff concessions.90 
a. Ministerial Declaration 
The Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology 
Products memorializes the parties' agreement on information technology 
(lilT") products. Fourteen WTO Members91 (28 governments counting the 
15 EU-member states), accounting for over 80 percent of world trade i:l IT 
products, agreed on December 13, 1996, to bind and eliminate over a 2Y2-
year period all duties and charges of any kind on the products listed in the 
two attachments to the Declaration. By late March 1997, 11 more WTO 
Members (the Czech Republic, Costa Rica, Estonia, India, Israel, Ma,::au, 
86 For an analysis of the GATS commitments on computer services, see Julie Thome" 
Computer Services: Examination of Commitments Scheduled Under the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, INDUS" TRADE & TECH, REV, I (USITC, July 1-996), ~ 
87 Bilateral trade in semiconductors between the United States and Japan is covered by an 
arrangement first negotiated in 1986, and renewed in 1996, The 1996 agreement creates a fOftlm for 
cooperative efforts in areas such as standards, intellectual property protection, and trade liberalization, 
Texts of the arrangements and agreements are available from the website of the Electronic Industries 
Association of Japan (EIAJ) at <http://www.eiaj.org>. For additional reading on the U.S.-Japan 
semiconductor trade regime, see Robert Carr, Evolution of the u.s.-Japanese Semiconductor Trade 
Regime, INDUS., TRADE & TECH. REv. 45 (USITC, Jan. 1997); Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Semiconductor Market Share in Japan Reaches 29.4% in the Fourth Quarter, Press Release, May I, 
1997, available at <http://www.ustr.gov>. 
88 Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products, WTIMIN(96)/16 
(1996). 
89 Council for Trade in Goods, Implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in 
Information Technology Products, GIL/160 (1997). 
90 See U.S. Schedule of Tariff Concessions for the ITA, available at 
<hnp:llwww.ustr.gov/agreements/italusitanote.html>. 
91 The original parties to the ITA are Australia, Japan, Canada, Korea, Taiwan, Norway, the 
EU, Singapore, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Iceland, Turkey, Indonesia, and the United States. 
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Malaysia, New Zealand, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Thailand) also 
joined the 14 charter Members. By March 26, 1997, 25 schedules of tariff 
concessions had been approved, covering more than a 92-percent share of 
. world trade in IT products.92 The criterion laid down in the Ministerial 
Declaration that 90 percent of the world IT market had to be represented 
before the ITA would enter into force thus had been reached.93 Under the 
generalizing effect of the unconditional MFN commitment, all WTO 
Members are entitled to these accelerated tariff reductions, even though not 
all WTO Members participate in the ITA. 
The annex on modalities appended to the Declaration provides the 
terms on scheduling tariff concessions on covered IT products and on tariff 
reductions. All tariff concessions must be bound no later than July 1, 1997, 
and eliminated in equal steps. The first duty rate reduction is to be made on 
July 1, 1997, the second on January 1, 1998, the third on January 1, 1999, 
and the last on January 1,2000. 
The participants agreed to encourage "autonomous" elimination of 
customs duties prior to these dates. In that connection, the EU agreed to 
accelerate the reduction of its seven-percent duty on semiconductors a year 
early (January 1, 1999), in exchange for a commitment from the United 
States to eliminate on July 1, 1997, all duties on IT products with duty rates 
of three percent or less, or where the EU's share ofthe U.S. market for the 
product is 10 percent or greater. Over $2.5 billion in EU imports to the 
United States will benefit.94 
b. Implementation of the Ministerial Declaration 
In March 1997, the ITA participants established a Committee of 
Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology 
Products.95 The Committee's function is to oversee the implementation of 
the ITA and to serve as the forum for meetings of the participants. . 
The ITA participants also adopted procedures for consultations on 
and review of product cov~rage. 96 The procedures include the submission of· 
92 See Implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology 
Products, Note by the Secretariat, Informal Meeting of26 March 1997, G1L/1591Rev.l, at 2 (1997). 
93 Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products, Annex, para. 4, 
WTIMIN(96)/16 (1996). By May 1997,41 Members had signed the Ministerial Declaration, representing 
more than 95 percent of world trade in IT products. See Us., Major Trading Partners Urge Others to 
Improve Offers in Financial Services Talks, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 811 (1997); USTR Says 
Information Technology Agreement 'On Track' to Take Effect on Schedule July J, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 
(BNA) at 206 (1997). 
94 See Us., EU Will Speed Tariff Cuts Under WTO Accord, Officials Say, 14 INT'L TRADE 
REP. (BNA) at 454 (1997). 
·95 See Implementation ofthe Ministerial Declaration, supra note 92, paras. 3-6. 
96 See id. para. 7. 
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lists of additional IT products for possible additional tariff concessions no 
later than December 31, 1997. No later than June 30, 1998, the Committee 
must meet to decide whether to revise the list ofIT pro.dJlcts in Attachments 
A and B to the Annex to the Declaration. On July 17, i 998, talks on an "ITA 
II" were suspended until at least September 1998.97 
2. Schedules of Tariff Concessions 
Each of the ITA participants submitted revised schedules of tariff 
concessions that reflect the duty reductions agreed to under the ITA. 98 Over 
300 tariff line items were included in the U.S. schedule submitted on April 
2, 1997. Over 75 IT products scheduled by the United States already 
received duty-free treatment as the result of concessions made either during 
the Uruguay Round negotiations or under the Agreement on Trade in Civil 
Aircraft. Other IT products scheduled by the United States carried duty rates 
ranging from 9.4 percent to 0.8 percent. Over 115 products carry duty rates 
of three percent or less, and fewer than 50 products carry duty rates of six 
percent or greater. 99 
C. Transparency Provisions 
An indication of the seriousness with which the WTO Members take 
the transparency issue, and of the general level of dissatisfaction with 
Members' compliance with the GATT-WTO notification and publication 
requirements, are the two Uruguay Round agreements dealing with 
transparency. The first is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM"). 
The TPRM is the successor to the Trade Policy Review Mechanism first 
created in 1989.100 The second is the Decision on Notification Procedures, 
a partial successor arrangement to the 1979 Tokyo Round Understanding 
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveill"nce. 
The purpose ofthe TPRM is to improve WTO Members' adherence 
97 See ITA II Talks Suspended, WTO Press Release 110 (July 17, 1998) (copy on file with 
author). 
98 The schedules have been annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol of Accession to the WTO, 
available at <http://www.wto.org>. The ITA permits Members to extend the time period fClr tariff 
elimination "in limited circumstances." India has taken advantage of this exception by agreeing to 
eliminate tariffs on information technology products by 2005. See India to Eliminate Tariffs On Info· 
Tech Products by 2005. 14 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) at 1019 (1997). 
99 In 1997, a group of U.s. capacitor and resistor manufacturers brought suit in the U.S. Court 
ofintemational Trade challenging the President's authority to enter into the IT A. See Kemet Electronics 
Corp. v. Barshefsky, 976 F. Supp. 1012 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1997). Although the court preliminarily ruled 
that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the President's authority to issue a proclamation 
implementing the tariff cuts called for under the ITA, the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction 
was denied. 
100 Decision Creating a Trade Policy Review Mechanism, L14903, 36th Supp. 203 (1989). 
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to GAIT -WTO commitments made under the MTAs through the systematic 
and periodic review of Members' trade policies and practices by the Trade 
Policy Review Body. The Quad Members are subject to TPRM review every 
two years. The next sixteen Members in terms of shares of world trade are 
subject to review every four years. The remaining Members are subject to 
review every six years, with a longer period for least-developed country 
Members. The operation of the TPRM will be reappraised in 2000. 
The Decision on Notification Procedures advances the transparency 
goal as well. In the Decision the Members reaffirmed their commitment to 
notify and publish measures affecting the operation of GATT 1994 and 
create a central registry for filing notifications. The Council for Trade in 
Goods is responsible for reviewing notification obligations and procedures 
under the MTAs. The Decision contains an Annex, Indicative List of 
Notifiable Measures, that lists the types of measures subject to notification: 
tariffs; tariffs quotas and surcharges; quantitative restrictions, including 
voluntary export restraints and orderly marketing arrangements affecting 
imports; other non-tariff measures, such as licensing, mixing requirements, 
and variable levies; customs valuation; rules of origin; government 
procurement; technical barriers; safeguard actions; anti-dumping actions; 
countervailing actions; export taxes; export subsidies, tax exemptions and 
concessionary export financing; free-trade zones, including in-bond 
manufacturing; export restrictions, including voluntary export restraints and 
orderly marketing arrangements; other governmental assistance, including 
subsidies and tax exemptions; the role of state-trading enterprises; foreign 
exch;,inge controls related to imports and exports; government-mandated 
countertrade; and any other measure covered by the MTAs. lol 
In addition to the transparency commitments in GATT Article XI, 
the TPRM, and the Uruguay Round Decision, several of the MTAs contain. 
their own transparency provisions. 
First, Article 18.2-18.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture requires 
Members to submit notifications on the implementation of commitments 
mad~ under the Agreement generally, and 'specifically to notify promptly 
any new domestic support measure. 
Second, Article 7 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures obligates Members to "notify changes in their 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures and ... provide information on [such] 
measures in accordance with the provisions of Annex B." Annex B, 
Transparency of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations, requires Members 
to publish promptly all such regulations in a manner that enables interested 
Members to become acquainted with them, and to allow a reasonable 
101 See Final Act, supra note 60, pt. B. 
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passage of time between promulgation and entry into force of such 
regulations "in order to allow time for producers in exporting Members,.::md 
particularly in developing country Members, to adapt their products and 
methods of production to the requirements of the importing Member."102 
Third, Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement requires Members to give 
advance notice of any proposed product standard in order to give other 
Members a reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposal before it 
takes effect. Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement, Code of Good Practice for the 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards, provides guidelines 
that governmental and non-governmental standardizing bodies are to follow 
when preparing standards, including notice and an opportunity to comment 
by interested persons. 103 
Fourth, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing is sprinkled with 
express notification requirements. 104 
Fifth, in Article 6.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, Members "reaffirm, 
with respect to TRIMs, their commitment to obligations on transparency and 
notification in Article X ofGATI 1994, in the undertaking on "Notification" 
contained in the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, 
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance adopted on 28 November 1979 and in 
the Ministerial Decision on Notification Procedures adopted on 15 April 
1994." 
Sixth, Article 2.5 of the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection 
provides that "User Members shall ensure that preshipment inspection 
activities are conducted in a transparent manner." Article 2.6 of the 
Preshipment Inspection Agreement further requires that exporter~ be 
provided with a list of all the information that is necessary for exporters to 
comply with inspection requirements. 
Seventh, the Agreement on Rules of Origin, having the long-range 
goal of eventual harmonization of Members' rules of origin, commits 
Members during and after the transition period to publish their laws, 
regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings relating to ;ules 
of origin as if they were subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions 
102 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
WTO Agreement, Annex lA, Uruguay Round Results, supra note 2, Annex B:2 [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement]. 
IOJ See, e.g., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, 
Annex lA, Uruguay Round Results, supra note 2, arts. 2, 3, 4, 10; Annex 3: Code of Good Practice for 
the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards [hereinafter TBT Agreement). The TBT 
Agreement is in effect an agreement on transparency that requires notification and publication of all 
national regulations dealing with product standards. 
104 See, e.g., Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. IS, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 
lA, Uruguay Round Results, supra note 2, arts. 2.3, 2.4, 2.7, 2.17, 2.18, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 [hereinafter 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing]. 
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of Article X: 1 of GAIT 1994.105 As part of the long-range harmonization 
program, Members are further obligated to provide the WTO Secretariat 
with their rules of origin, and judicial decisions and administrative rulings 
relating to rules of origin. 106 
Eighth, Article 5 ofthe Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 
requires Members instituting licensing procedures to notify the Committee 
on Import Licensing. 
Ninth, Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures directs Members to submit notifications of subsidies annually in 
sufficient detail to enable other Members to evaluate the trade effects and 
to understand the operation of notified subsidy programs. 
Tenth, Article 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards, Notification and 
Consultation, obligates Members to notify the Committee on Safeguards 
when initiating any safeguards proceeding or granting any escape clause 
relief. Article 13, Surveillance, charges the Committee on Safeguards with 
monitoring Members' compliance with the Agreement. 
Finally, the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement have their own 
transparency provisions. GATS Article III, Transparency, requires Members 
to publish promptly all relevant measures of general application that affect 
the operation of GATS, and to notify annually any new laws or amendments 
to existing laws that significantly affect trade in services. Similarly, Article 
43 of the TRIPS Agreement, Transparency, requires Members to publish all 
laws, regulations, and decisions dealing with the subject matter of the 
Agreement, and to notify the Council for TRIPS of all such laws, 
regulations, and decisions. 
In view of this litany of transparency obligations, it is fair to 
conclude that the GATT-WTO system is obsessed with transparency, and 
justifiably so. Recalling Aristotle's maxim, "knowledge is power," it is not 
hard to understand why. Subjecting WTO Members' trade policies and 
practices to the kind of scrutiny that one sees at the national level in 
demvcracies is an important check against a slide into non-compliance with 
GAT:r-WTO disciplines. The extent to which Members are prepared to be 
subjected to this kind of scrutiny is also a rough measure of the extent to 
which accountability figures in international trade relations. 
D. The SPS Agreement 
Before the Uruguay Round Agreements were added to the GAIT-
WTQ legal regime, Article XX(b) was the only GAIT provision - and at 
IUS See Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Uruguay Round 
Results, supra note 2, Annex lA, arts. 2(g), 3(e). 
106 [d. art. 5.1. 
HeinOnline -- 16 Wis. Int’l L.J. 455 1997-1998
Vol. 16, No.2 The GATT-WTO System at Fifty 455 
best a skeletal one - dealing expressly with the subject of sanitary and 
phytosanitary ("SPS") measures. Experience has sho~n that SPS measures 
are frequently employed as other, more traditional barriers to trade (c.g., 
tariffs and quotas) are reduced or eliminated. Many countries, including the 
United States, often have had the unhappy experience of negotiating tariff 
reductions and quota eliminations, only to be met with a suspect~PS 
measure that wipes out the benefit of the earlier bargain. 107 Until the SPS 
Agreement, no multilateral trade agreement existed with a fully articulated 
set of rules governing a country's use ofSPS measures in connection ~vith 
imported goods.108 The SPS Agreement filled this gap by circumscrihing 
WTO Members' use of such measures as a non-tariff barrier to trade . 
. ' 
The SPS Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures that may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade. 109 The 
SPS Agreement does not create any substantive SPS measures per se. 
Instead, the Agreement sets forth a number of general procedural 
requirements to ensure that a SPS measure is in fact a scientifically-based 
107 See generally Jennifer Haverkamp, Provisions of the Uruguay Round with a PO/ential 
Effect on u.s. Environmental Laws and Regulations, in THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND (Institnte on 
Current Issues in International Trade ed., 1995). 
108 By the time the Uruguay Round was concluded, one regional agreement existed go~'erning 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, namely, NAFTA Chapter Seven:B. Its rules were derived in large 
part from earlier drafts of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary MeasLres. 
109 The SPS Agreement provides a comprehensive definition of sanitary and phytosiUlitary 
measures. An SPS measure is any measure applied: 
(a). to protect animal or plant life or health within 
the territory of the Member from risks arising 
from the entry, establ ishment or spread of 
pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or 
disease-causing organisms; 
(b). to protect human or animal life or health within 
the territory of the Member from risks arising 
from additives, contaminants, toxins or 
disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages 
or feedstuffs; 
(c). to protect human life or health within the 
territory of the Member from risks arising from 
diseases carried by animals, plants or products 
thereof, or from the entry, establishment or 
spread of pests; or 
(d). to prevent or limit other damage within the 
territory of the Member from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests. 
See SPS Agreement, supra note 102, Annex A, § I. See Marsha A. Echols, Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 57, at 191; John J. Barcelo 
lll, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment - the GA IT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 755 (1994); Robert M. Millimet, The Impact of 
the Uruguay Round and the New Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: An Analysis of 
the U.S. Ban on DDT, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 443 (\995). See generally WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND 
PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES (\ 996). 
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protection against the risk asserted by the country imposing the measure, 
rather than a disguised barrier to trade. I 10 
The Agreement expressly recognizes that countries have a 
legitimate right to protect human, animal, and plant life and health, and to 
establish a level of protection for life and health that they deem appropriate. 
As explained more fully below, the provisions of the SPS Agreement are 
designed to preserve the ability of Members to act in this area while at the 
same 'time guarding against the use of unjustified SPS measures that are 
primarily designed to protect a domestic industry. 
The basic right of Members under the SPS Agreement is the ability 
to take SPS measures necessary for the protection of human, animal, or plant 
life or health. This right is qualified by three provisos. Such measures must 
be (1) applied only to the extent necessary, (2) based on scientific principles, 
and (3) maintained with sufficient scientific evidence, except that such 
measures may be imposed temporarily, when evidence is insufficient, 
pending receipt of additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk. III 
A Member is free to establish its own level of sanitary and 
phytosanitary protection, including a "zero risk" level if it so chooses. 
Regardless of the level of risk a Member chooses to adopt, however, a 
measure must be based on scientific principles and on sufficient scientific 
evidence. The judgments to be drawn from that evidence are left to the 
Member, because scientific certainty is rare. Many scientific determinations 
require judgments among competing scientific views (e.g., whether or not 
global warming is taking place; if it is, whether the cause is attributable to 
humans; and, if so, what the proper response is). There is obviously a good 
deal of "play in the joints" of the SPS Agreement. ll2 
The problem of misuse of SPS measures is especially acute in 
connection with imports of agricultural products. They are frequently the 
target of legitimate and· not so legitimate SPS measures. There was a 
concern in some quarters that as the provisions of the Uruguay Round 
Agre~ment on Agriculture eliminate or substantially reduce tariff and quota 
barriers to agricultural trade, a new set of SPS measures would be 
introduced as contingent protection, that is, whose sole purpose would be to 
protect domestic agricultural producers from import competition. To counter 
such a development preemptively, the SPS Agreement was negotiated in 
110 See generally David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA 
Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 817 (1994). 
. III See SPS Agreement, supra note 102, arts. 2.3, 5.7. 
112 See Zane O. Gresham & Thomas A. Bloomfield, Rhetoric or Reality: The Impact of the 
UruguJ)l Round Agreement on Federal and State Environmental Laws, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1143 
(1995). 
HeinOnline -- 16 Wis. Int’l L.J. 457 1997-1998
Vol. 16, No.2 The GATT-WTO System at Fifty 457 
tandem with the Agreement on Agriculture to ensure that the benefit) of 
liberalized agricultural trade are not diluted. Indeed, Article 14 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture underscores the importance of not allowing 
unjustified SPS measures to undermine the gains of the Agriculture 
Agreement. It provides that "Members agree to give effect to the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.,,1\3 
As illustrated by the long-brewing dispute between the United States 
and the EU over the 1987 EU ban on U.S. beef from cattle fed with growth-
inducing hormones, the problem of SPS measures used to block trade in 
agricultural products is a real one. The United States claimed the ban lacked 
any scientific justification, a position with which the EU took strong issue. 
The issue finally was resolved by the Appellate Body in 1998 in favor of the 
United StatesY4 
E. The TBT Agreement 
The elimination of tariffs as a significant barrier to trade is cold 
comfort to manufacturers whose products cannot enter a foreign mark ~t in 
any event because of nonconformity with local product standards. The cost 
of having products modified, tested, and approved by authorities if' the 
foreign market can effectively cancel the benefit of reduced tariffs. In the 
arsenal of weapons at a country's disposal to block the free flow of goods 
across national borders, one of the most insidious and effective NTDs is 
product standards. What makes product standards insidious is that the same 
standard can simultaneously be a legitimate health and safety regulation and 
a disguised restriction on trade. For example, a country may decide to set the 
bar high for environmental, health, and safety regulations compared w.ith 
other countries out of a legitimate concern for the health and welfare of its 
citizens, but perhaps also in part to protect local manufacturers from import 
competition. Even when national product standards are not consciously used 
to block imports, standards often differ from one country to another, 
impeding the free flow of goods. Because of such differences, mino~ but 
III Article 14 of the Agreement on Agriculture also provides that least-developed ·country 
members may delay the application of the SPS Agreement until 2000. See Agreement on Agriculture, 
supra note 81, art. 14. Other developing countries were permitted to delay the application of the 
Agreement until January 1, 1997, ifnecessary because of a lack of technical expertise or infrastructure. 
No specific problems with regard to the implementation of the Agreement by developing country have 
been brought to the attention of the Committee on SPS Measures. 
114 See Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities -- EC Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), AB-1997-4, WTIDS26/ABIR (1998). For additional background 
on the dispute, see Kristin Mueller, Hormonal Imbalance: An Analysis of the Hormone Treated Beef 
Trade Dispute Between the United States and the European Union, I DRAKE 1. AGRIC. L. 97 (1996); 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, WTO Hormones Report Confirms u.s. Win, Press Release 97-
76, Aug. 18, 1997, available at <http://www.ustr.gov>. 
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costly modifications must often be made to a product destined for foreign 
markets. 
In theory, countries ought to be able to reach some consensus on a 
common set of environmental and safety requirements, but reaching any 
consensus has proven di,fficult in practice. To be sure, some standards 
harmonization has occurred. In the case of automobiles, for example, the 
United States was the first country to adopt pollution standards for 
automobile exhaust emissions, and made them more stringent in 1983. The 
1983 rotandards were adopted by Japan and Switzerland for some models. lls 
In 1996, industry officials from the United States and the EU approved a 
series of recommendations to their respective governments for harmonizing 
safety and environmental standards in the automobile industry, motivated 
. in large part by the additional I O-percent cost of designing and developing 
automotive products for the tWo markets. 116 
Despite the barrier to trade that technical standards can create, most 
product standards are not the invention of some malevolent bureaucrat bent 
on wrecking world trade. Product standards are commonplace in a 
developed economy. They may be voluntary (e.g., U.S. Department of 
Agriculture standards for grading eggs) or mandatory (usually referring to 
a technical regulation that is government-imposed). Standards are 
sometimes developed at a time when national markets are isolated from each 
other, so that there is simply no incentive to harmonize national standards. 
A simple example, but one with which every international traveler is 
familiar, is that of electric plugs, outlets, and voltage. Any American who 
has had the unhappy experience of plugging a 120-volt rated hair dryer into 
a 220-volt outlet in Europe (assuming the U.S. traveler had the right adapter 
plug for the 220-volt outlet in the first place) is familiar with the 
consequences of a lack of harmonization in product standards. In some 
instances, the incentive to harmonize is high because it is in everyone's best 
interests to do so. For example, as soon as telegraphy became transoceanic, 
radio telecommunications would have been thrown into chaos if countries 
did not step in and agree to harmonize standards and assign radio 
frequencies through international bodies, such as the International 
Telegraphic Union and its successor, the International Telecommunications 
UnionY' 
Once market access significantly improved and trade flows 
substantially increased, the differences in product standards and certification 
lIS See Lawrence Eicher, Technical Regulations and Standards, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: 
A HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 137, 138. 
116 See U.S, EU Firms Urge Governments to Harmonize Automotive Standards, 13 INT'L 
TRADE REP. (BNA) at 641 (1996). 
111 See Eicher, supra note 115, at 138. 
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systems presented a significant barrier to trade. As imports were tested to 
determine whether they conformed with domestic standards, the suspicion 
grew that standards and certification procedures were being used as a 
gossamer-thin disguise to restrict trade. From an economic perspective, this 
suspicion, if true, was unwelcome. From a legal perspective, if any techr:ical 
regulation or conformity assessment procedure expressly discriminates 
against imports, such regulation or procedure in all likelihood violates 
GAIT Article III (in the case of an internal measure) or GA IT Article XI 
(in the case of a border measure). Any alleged violation of these ,two 
Articles must be considered against the backdrop of Article XX's general 
exception that permits the adoption and enforcement of measures to protect 
human, animal, or plant life or health. The chapeau to Article XX provides, 
however, that any such measures "must not be applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction to international trade .... " In addition, GATT panels and the 
Appellate Body have adopted a "least trade restrictive" principle - also 
known as the minimum derogation principle - when assessing measures that 
seek the protective cover of Article XX. They ask whether there. are 
alternative measures reasonably available that would be as effective as the 
one adopted !hat are less trade restrictive than the measure adopted. I 18 If 
there is, then the measure adopted does not qualify under the Article XX 
exception. 
Putting to one side the question of GAIT-legality for a moment, the 
lack of harmonization of national standards (or "standardization") can be a 
formidable problem for a manufacturer exporting a product to a number of 
countries with different product standards. Manufacturing a single product 
that meets all of the national standards may be impossible, thus requiring a 
different version of the product for different export markets, thereby raising 
the unit cost of the product because of the inability to achieve economies of 
scale in production runs. In addition, transparency can be a problem when 
local'producers are able to discover new rules or amendments more quickly 
than foreign competitors. Finally, if testing and certification is required 
during the production process, it will be impossible to export the product 
unless the firm is willing to bring in (and the importing country is willing to 
send) foreign inspectors, or unless the importing country is willing to accept 
foreign conformity assessment certifications. In light of the waste associated 
Jl8 See, e.g., Report of the Appellate Body, United States -- Standards for Refonnulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, 1996-AB-I, WT IOS21 ABIR, at 27 (1996); Report of the GATT Panel, United 
States -- Restrictions on Imports ofTuna, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) (unadopted); Report of the 
GATT Panel, Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Sillmon, B.I.S.D. (35th 
Supp. 98) at 113-15, paras. 4.4-4.7 (1988). See also Report of the GATT Panel, United States -- Section 
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, B.I.S.D (36th Supp.) at 345,392-393, paras. 5.25-5.27 (1989). 
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with a lack of standardization, harmonizing standards makes good economic 
sense. 
Standards can be the result of market forces or government 
intervention. A group of market-dominant manufacturers, for example, 
might respond to consumer demands that certain features of their products 
be designed in an identical way, such as the location of the brake and 
accelerator pedals in a car. Trade associations might try to anticipate 
consume~ demands and reach agreement on standardization. Competition in 
the market place also might settle the issue. When a manufacturer beats the 
comp~tition and secures the lion's share oftlie market, its product becomes 
"the standard." For example, the VHS format for videocassettes beat out 
Sony's Beta format, even though the latter was considered superior by some 
users. In the war for market share in personal computers, the team of IBM 
and Microsoft have won the standards battle with Apple. At other times 
governments intervene and mandate a standard, often in the name of 
consumer protection. In the United States, for example, the standards for 
black-and-white and color television receivers were set by the federal 
government. 
The Uruguay Round TBT Agreement builds on its predecessor 
agreement, the Tokyo Round Standards Code. Using the IS-year experience 
ofthe Standards Code, the Uruguay Round negotiators started with the text 
of the Standards Code and drafted a successor agreement that restates, 
clarifies, and modestly expands the Code. In contrast to the Code's limited 
coverage with only 46 signatories, the TBT Agreement, as one of the twelve 
MTAs covering trade in goods, is binding on all WTO Members. The TBT 
Agreement balances the ability of governments and the private sector to 
implement legitimate standards and the procedures for assessing product 
conformity with those standards against their unjustified use to protect a 
domestic industry. The TBT Agreement establishes rules on distinguishing 
legitimate standards and conformity assessment procedures from 
protectionist measures and procedures in three areas: (1) the preparation and 
adoption of technical regulations and standards; (2) conformity assessment 
proct~dures and mutual recognition of other countries assessments; and (3) 
information and assistance about technical regulations, standards, and 
conformity assessment procedures. Like its predecessor, the TBT 
Agreement does not establish or prescribe standards, technical regulations, 
or conformity assessment procedures. Rather, as explained more fully 
below, it establishes general procedural requirements to be observed when 
adopting or using such measures so that they do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to trade. 
The SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement are mutually 
exclusive. The TBT Agreement excludes from its scope of coverage sanitary 
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and phytosanitary measures as defined in the SPS Agreement. \19 The SPS 
Agreement similarly provides that it does not affect Members' rights under 
the TBT Agreement with respect to measures outside the scope of the SPS 
Agreement. 120 
Despite their mutual exclusivity, the substantive provisions of the 
two agreements mirror each other in most respects. A significant difference 
between the SPS and TBT Agreements, however, is. the test used to 
determine whether a measure is impermissibly protectionist in nature. 
Whereas the TBT Agreement relies on a nondiscrimination test, the inquiry 
under the SPS Agreement is based on scientific justification and ,risk 
assessment. A strict requirement of nondiscrimination would not be 
practicable for SPS measures that discriminate against imported goods based 
on their origin. Goods may pose a risk of disease precisely because the 
goods come from a Member where such disease is prevalent. The S:lme 
situation might not be true for similar goods coming from another Member. 
Discrimination is, therefore, tolerated under the SPS Agreement, so long as 
it is not arbitrary or unjustifiable. . 
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement directs Members to adopt 
international standards where such standards exist. The leading internati·Jnal 
body involved in the drafting and promulgation of international technical 
standards is the International Standards Organization ("I SO"), a federation 
of 91 national standards organizations. Standards that the ISO adopts are 
voluntary. 
The ISO is currently developing two series of standards directly 
bearing on the TBT Agreement. One series is known as the ISO 14000 series 
for environmental management systems, environmental auditing systems, 
life-cycle analysis, and environmentallabeling. 121 These standards will have 
a far-ranging impact on environmental management programs of firms 
located in Members that adopt these standards. 122 
The second series is known as ISO 9000 series of quality stand;rrds. 
These standards cover five areas in the production and manufacturing 
process: (1) design, development, production, installation, and servicing; (2) 
build-to-print, installation, and servicing without design; (3) assembly and 
119 See TBT Agreement, supra note 103, art. I.S. 
120 See SPS Agreement, supra note 102, art. 1.4. 
121 See generally RICHARD BARRETT CLEMENTS, COMPLETE GUIDE TO ISO 14000 (1996); 
DON SAYRE, INSIDE ISO 14000: THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
(1996); TOM TIBOR & IRA FELDMAN, ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
(1996); PaulaC. Murray, The International Errvironmental Management Standard, ISO 14000: A Non-
Tariff Barrier ora Step to an Emerging Errvironmental Policy?, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. S77 (1997). 
122 Information on the ISO 14000 series is available at <http://www.isoI4000.com>. See 
generally Rafe Petersen, ISO 14000 Internet Databases, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 613 (1997). Information on the 
work by the U.S. member of the ISO on ISO 14000, the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI"), 
available at <http://www.ansi.orglhome.html>. 
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test; (4) implementation and control; and (5) implementation ofiSO 9000 
(audits, certification, and registration).123 A typical use of ISO 9000 
standards is in the automobile industry. In the United States, for example, 
the Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) require that suppliers 
of raw materials, component parts, subassemblies, and service parts meet 
ISO 9000 quality standards. 124 
1. The EC-US Mutual Recognition Agreements 
In June 1997, the United States and the EU concluded a package of 
mutual recognition agreements ("MRAs") in six sectors covering 
approximately $50 billion in two-way trade. 125 The six sectors covered are: 
telecommunications equipment, medical devices, phannaceuticals, 
recreational craft, electrical safety, and electromagnetic compatibility. The 
MRAs eliminate the need for dual testing and certification in these six 
sectors, saving manufacturers more than $1 billion in annual costs. This 
savings is equivalent to a two to three-point reduction in tariffs.126 
The MRAs provide that the parties will accept or recognize the 
result~ of procedures used in confonnity to specified legislative, regulatory, 
and administrative provisions of each party, when those results are produced 
by the other party's confonnity assessment bodies or authorities. 127 In short, 
the MRAs allow U.S.-origin products or processes destined for the EU to be 
assessed for confonnity in the United States with EU testing, inspection, and 
certification standards, and vice versa. Designating Authorities in the United 
States and the EU are responsible for monitoring the perfonnance of 
conf0fmity assessment bodies within their respective territories. 128 For 
example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration is the Designating 
Authority responsible for monitoring confonnity assessment bodies in the 
United States under the Sectoral Annex on Phannaceutical Good 
123 See JAYANTHA K. BANDYOPADHYAY, QS-9000 HANDBOOK (1996); JOHN T. RABBIT & 
PETER A. BERGH, THE ISO 9000 BOOK: COMPETITOR'S GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE AND CERTIFICATION 
(1993): GREG HUTCHINS, THE ISO 9000 IMPLEMENTATION MANuAL (1994); ROBERT T. CRAIG, THE No-
NONSENSE GUIDE TO ACHIEVING ISO 9000 CERTIFICATION (1994); Lisa C. Thompson & William 1. 
Thompson, The ISO 9000 Quality Standards: Will They Constitute a Technical Barrier to Free Trade 
Under the NAFTA and the WTO?, 14 ARIZ. 1. INT'L & COMPo L. 155 (1997). Information on ISO 9000 
is available at <http://www.is09000.com>. 
124 See BANDYOPADHYAY, supra note 123, at 4. 
125 See Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the United States of America and the 
European Communities (1997), available at <http://www.ustr.gov>. 
12(, See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, u.s., EU Reach Agreement on Mutual 
Recogllition o/Product Testing or Approval Requirements, Press Release, June 13, 1997, available at 
<http://www.ustr.gov>. 
127 See Agreement on Mutual Recognition, supra note 125, Arts. 3.1, 3.2. 
128 See id. art. 6. 
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Manufacturing Practices. 129 
The MRAs will be phased in and fully implemented in 18 months 
for recreational craft,130 two years for telecommunic~tion and electronic 
products, \31 and three years for pharmaceuticals and ~edical devices. \32 
F. Trade in Agricultural Products 
The Agreement on Agriculture is part of a package of Uruguay 
Round Agreements that addresses agricultural trade issues. 133 The 
Agreement has three main features: (1) increased market access for 
agricultural products; (2) commitments to reduce domestic subsidies on 
agricultural products; and (3) commitments to reduce export subsidie? on 
agricultural products. The long-term objective of the WTO Members is to 
establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system that includes 
substantial reductions in agricultural support and protection. 134 The 
Agreement on Agriculture initiates this reform process in the· areas of 
market access, domestic subsidies, and export subsidies. 13s 
Over the course of the GATT-WTO system's 50-year history, WTO 
Members have erected a vast array of non-tariff barriers to agriculture tI ade, 
in the form of quotas, variable import levies, and voluntary import. and 
export restraints. To remedy this situation, the market access commitm~nts 
of the Agreement on Agriculture require (1) a guaranteed minimum ac~ess 
129 See id. Sectoral Annex on Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practice, app. 2. 
130 See id. Sectoral Annex for Recreational Craft § 6.1. 
131 See id. Sectoral Annex for Telecommunications Equipment § VIII: 1; Sectoral An,lex for 
Electromagnetic Compatibility § VIII: 1. 
132 Id. Sectoral Annex for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices, art. 5; Sectoral 
Annex on Medical Devices, art. 5. 
133 The SPS Agreement and the Ministerial Decision Concerning Least Developed and Net 
Food-Importing Developing Countries are important adjuncts to the Agreement on Agriculture. These 
two Uruguay Round Agreements and the Ministerial Decision, together with the market access 
commitments made by the WTO Members in their respective Schedule of Commitments, form an 
Uruguay Round package of agricultural trade agreements. . 
For additional analyses of the Agreement on Agriculture, see STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION, supra note 57; MCGOvERN, supra note 57, at §§ 14.1-14.3 (1996); The Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, 
supra note 57, at 865; DALE E. HATHAWAY & MELINDA D.INGCO, Agricultural Liberalization and the 
Uruguay Round, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, supra note 70, at 1; IAN 
GOLDIN & DoMINIQUE VAN DER MENSBRUGGHE, The Uruguay Round: An Assessment of Economywide 
and Agricultural Reforms, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, supra note 70, 
at 25; Joseph A McMaI1on, The Uruguay Round and Agriculture: Charting a New Direction?, 29 INT'L 
LAW. 411 (1995). 
For a summary analysis of the Agriculture Agreement, see EIU GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 
58, at 17-23. See also U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1993, supra note 72, at 6-9. 
134 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 81, preamble, para. 2. 
135 See also Christopher Rusek, Trade Liberalization in Developed Countries: Movement 
Toward Market Control of Agricultural trade in the United States, Japan, and the European Union, 48 
ADMIN. L. REV. 493 (1996). 
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level for all agricultural products, (2) the "tariffication" of non-tariff barriers 
into tariff equivalents, and (3) the use oftariff-rate quotas to ensure that the 
market access commitments are honored. 136 
In situations were there are no significant imports of agricultural 
products, WTO Members provide in their Schedule of Commitments 
minimum access opportunities for such imports. Access is based on a 
percentage of domestic consumption, beginning at 3 percent in 1995 and 
increasing to 5 percent by 2000. In cases where imports are greater than 
these thresholds, current market access levels are to be maintained. 13? 
The minimum access commitments will permit at least some trade 
in agricultural products to occur in cases where previously non-tariff barriers 
effectively blocked such trade, and/or where the newtariff equivalents are 
so high that they continue to block all such access. 138 
, The tariffication process is an important first step toward greater 
liberalization of the agricultural sector in future WTO negotiations. Unlike 
non-tariff barriers, that are difficult to quantify in terms of their impact on 
trade ·flows primarily because they are not transparent, the impact of tariffs 
on trade are quantifiable because they are transparent. Non-tariff barriers 
also can be administered in an arbitrary manner, making planning on the 
part of exporters impracticable if not impossible because such barriers 
become a moving target. Bound tariffs, on the other hand, present a fixed 
target that cannot be raised arbitrarily. Exporters in that case are able to plan 
for sales in foreign markets. Moreover, tariffs simplify trade negotiations 
because they are quantifiable, making comparisons of trade barriers due to 
tariffs easier for negotiators. 
Recognizing the pernicious effect that non-tariff barriers have had 
on agricultural trade, Article 4 of the Agreement prohibits Members from 
maintaining, resorting to, or reverting to non-tariff measures, old or new. 
The process of tariffication - converting non-tariff measures into ordinary 
customs duties - yields a tariff that is equivalent to the level of protection 
afforded by the non-tariff measures that the new tariff replaces. 139 It requires 
1)6 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 81, art. 4. 
1)7 See id. 
1)8 For example, minimum access for U.S. exports of the following items is guaranteed: 
29,001) tons of poultry to the EU, 54,000 tons of pork to the Philippines, 6,102,100 tons of com to Korea, 
and 1,000 tons of prunes to Poland. See STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 57, at 712. 
The Foreign Agricultural Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture has prepared fact sheets detailing 
the market access commitments and subsidy reductions made by key U.S. trading partners for several 
leading commodities, including citrus, cotton, dairy, feed grains, vegetables, pork, pOUltry, rice, sugar, 
and wheat. They are available form the Department of Agriculture's website at 
<http://ffas.usda.gov/fasresources/ag-trade-policy/com-fact-sheets.html>. 
1)9 Guidelines for the calculation of tariff equivalents are contained in an attachment to Annex 
5 of tile Agreement. The tariff equivalent is generally the difference between the internal and external 
price for the product, expressed as an ad valorem or specific duty rate. The external price is the average 
f.o.b. unit value price set by major exporters of the product, adjusted by adding insurance and freight 
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Members to convert existing measures into ordinary customs duties anj to 
bind them, subject to special safeguard provisions applicable in cases of 
rapidly increasing agricultural imports. 14o . 
In practice, tariffication means replacing non-tariff barriers with a 
tariff-rate quota. 141 A WTO Member will assess duties on agricultural 
imports that are in excess of the minimum or current access level 
commitments for the imported product. The duty rate assessed will be the 
one that results from the tariffication process. 142 The quantity of imports 
subject to minimum or current access level commitments will enter either 
duty free or be subject to an "in-quota" duty rate lower than the rate that 
results from tariffication. 143 
Agricultural tariffs, including those that predated the Uruguay 
Round and those resulting from tariffication, are to be reduced by an average 
of 36 percent on a simple average basis over a six-year period ending in 
2000 in the case of developed countries. For developing countries, the 
average reduction is 24 percent over a ten-year period ending in 2004. The 
lower, in-quota duty rates generally will not be reduced. All customs duty 
rates are to be bound, with developing countries establishing ceiling 
bindings where no bindings existed before the Uruguay Round. Prior to the 
costs. See id. Attachment to Annex 5:2. The internal price is the prevailing wholesale price in the 
domestic market. See id. Annex 5:4. 
The tariffication process is far from an exact science. It can result in a duty rate that is 
prohibitive, as illustrated by the phenomenon known as "dirty tariffication." WTO Members have 
allegedly manipulated the tariffication methodology in many instances, resulting in declarea tariffs 
higher than the estimated tariff equivalents. See Jeffrey 1. Steinle, The Problem Child of World Trade: 
Reform Schoolfor Agriculture, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333, 348-49 (1995). 
140 Non-tariff measures identified in the Agreement include minimum import prices, 
discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading entelprises, 
voluntary export restraints, and similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties, regardless 
of whether those measures were grandfathered under GATT 1947, maintained under GATI: 1947 
waivers, or listed in a country's protocol of accession to GATT 1947. See Agreement on Agriculture, 
supra note 81, art. 4.2 n.1. 
i'i Under a tariff-rate quota, one tariff rate (the "in-quota tariff rate") applies to imported 
products up to a stated amount (the "in-quota quantity"). A higher tariff rate (the "over-quota tariff rate") 
applies to imported products in excess of that amount (the "over-quota quantity"). 
i42 See STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 57, at 711. 
i4J The following illustration of the tariffication process is provided in the Uruguay Round 
Statement of Administrative Action: 
[A)ssume that during 1986-1988 a WTO 
member limited imports of butter to 10,000 tons (subject 
to a tariff offour percent ad valorem) with the result that 
the WTO member's domestic market price for butter was 
75 percent above the world market price. Under 
tariffication, that WTO member might establish a tariff-
rate quota for butter with an in-quota quantity of 10,000 
tons and an in-quota tariff-rate of four percent ad valorem 
and apply an over-quota tariff-rate of 75 percent ad 
valorem. 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 57, at 711. 
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Agreement on Agriculture, only 55 percent of tariff line items for 
agricultural products were bound in developed countries, and only 18 
percent were bound in developing countries. Least-developed countries 
commit to tariff bindings on agricultural products, but are not required to 
make any further commitments to reduce tariffs. 
In addition to the average tariff reductions, a minimum I5-percent 
tariff reduction must be made for each tariff line (10 percent in the case of 
developing countries). In order to meet the overall 36-percent tariff 
reduction commitment, Members undoubtedly will reduce duties on import-
sensitive agricultural products by the I5-percent minimum, and make 
greater reductions on products that are either less import-sensitive or in 
which there is little trade. 
The Agreement on Agriculture is merely the first step in an ongoing 
process of fundamental agricultural reform. Recognizing that the WTO's 
long-term objective is a substantial reduction in trade protection of the 
agricultural sector, WTO Members agree in Article 20 to continue the 
reform process by reinitiating negotiations in 1999. 
In rating the extent to which the Agreement on Agriculture produced 
libenilization in agricultural trade, one could ask how much pain the 
Agriculture Agreement inflicted on WTO Members. A fundamental maxim 
of both physical fitness and free trade is "no pain, no gain." It would appear 
that the Agreement on Agriculture was not extremely painful for most WTO 
Members. While the it mandates some reforms, those reforms are so modest 
that they do little to liberalize agricultural trade. The Agreement on 
Agriculture sets the stage, however, for future reforms and liberalization 
efforts by requiring all agricultural tariff lines to be bound. 
It is unfortunate that the Uruguay Round negotiators avoided the 
pain of concluding a comprehensive agreement and instead compromised 
with a gradual reform agreement, postponing resolution of many difficult 
issues that inevitably will have to be addressed. One of the dangers of not 
agreeing to a more aggressive agricultural reform package, and opting 
instead for gradualism, is that special interest groups have been given time 
to organize and possibly mount a war of attrition to slow and eventually stall 
long-range reforms. 
In the United States, farmers enjoy a comparative advantage in 
agriculture, so American farmers who wanted to continue to farm would 
have been able to do so even if radical farm reforms had been negotiated. In 
Europe and Japan, growers do not enjoy a similar comparative advantage, 
but they do live close to alternative jobs outside of agriculture. If far-ranging 
farm reforms had been adopted as part of a comprehensive Uruguay Round 
package, new jobs in services as well as manufacturing would have absorbed 
those dislocated European and Japanese farmers. In addition, if countries 
had cut all farm subsidies simultaneously, world food prices would have 
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risen and provided more cushion to farmers. 
In short, the Uruguay Round was a missed opportunity for 
meaningful agricultural reform that may never present itself again. Radical 
farm reform that was both multilateral and part of a broader package of trade 
reforms in non-farm sectors offered the best hope for lasting reform with the 
least long-term dislocation for farmers. 
G. Trade in Textiles and Clothing 
If one were forced to choose the most protected sector over the 50-
year history of the GATT-WTO system, steel, automobiles, agriculture, 
semiconductors, and footwear would all be contenders. Considering the 
length and the breadth of trade protection that the textile and clothing s(ctor 
has received for over three decades, it would be hard to argue with one 
economist's conclusion that this sector was (and in many respects continues 
to be) "the most systematically and comprehensively protected sector in the 
world .... "144 . 
The history of U.S. trade protection for the textile and clothing 
industry can be traced back to the inter-war period. Under the Tariff A.;t of 
1922 and the Tariff Act of 1930 (the notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act), 
the tariffwaU erected for cotton and wool goods was prohibitively high (46 
percent and 60 percent, respectively, compared to 35 percent for meat 
products and 31 percent for chemicals).14s Other countries, notably Japan, 
used a mix of high tariffs and quotas to protect their domestic textile and 
clothing industry. 
In the post-war era following the successful negotiation o~' the 
GA IT, GAIT contracting parties tended to keep their import restrictions on 
textiles and clothing from low-wage countries in place. When Japan joined 
GAIT in 1955, many GATT contracting parties, excluding the United 
States, invoked the Article XXXV non-application provision and thereby 
continued to restrict Japanese imports of textiles and clothing. The United 
States for its part· entered into a five-year voluntary export restraint 
agreement with Japan beginning in 1957, under authority of Section 204 of 
the Agricultural Act of 1956. While Japan's share of imported textile 
products fell off as a consequence, the slack was picked up by other textile-
exporting countries like Hong Kong. : 
In search of a more comprehensive solution to the problem of 
surging textile imports, in 1960 GAIT negotiators adopted the concept of 
"market disruption." This concept permitted contracting parties to impose 
144 See WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE FUTURE OF WORLD TRADE IN TEXTILES AND ApPAREL 145 
(1987). 
I'S See id. at 146. 
HeinOnline -- 16 Wis. Int’l L.J. 468 1997-1998
468 . Wisconsin International Law Journal 
import restraints on fairly-traded but low-priced textile imports that fell 
below a trigger price without a showing of injury to the domestic textile 
industry. With Umarket disruption" as the measure for safeguard measures, 
importing countries were relieved of the usual Article XIX requirement of 
finding injury before imposing safeguard measures. Market disruption 
became the cornerstone of the 1961 Short-Term Arrangement Regarding 
International Trade in Textiles,146 the 1962 Long-Term Arrangement 
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (with extensions through 
1973 ),147 and the succe.ssor Multifiber Arrangement that entered into force 
in 1974, covering cotton and non-cotton textile products. 148 
: The position of developing countries during the Uruguay Round 
textile and clothing negotiations was that trade restrictions on textile exports 
to developed countries should be eliminated over a six-year period. Under 
intense, protectionist pressure from the domestic textile industry, the United 
States took a gradualist approach by advocating a ten-year phase out of the 
MFA; the imposition of global (versus bilateral) quotas on textile trade, and 
a progressive increase in the size of quotas. Complicating negotiations for 
.the United States was the assurance to Congress from the Clinton 
administration during the approval debate ofthe North American Free Trade 
Agre-!ment (UNAFTA") that the U.S. textile industry would be protected 
adequately from low-priced Mexican imports through special rules of origin 
applicable to textiles and clothing. 149 
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (U A TC") is a blend of the 
parties' negotiating positions. ISO Under the ATC, trade in textiles and 
clothing is gradually brought under GATT-WTO disciplines. MFA quotas 
in effect on December 31, 1994, that were notified to the Textiles 
146 Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, July 21,1961,12 U.S.T. 
1675, T.LA.S. No. 4884. 
141 Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, Feb. 9, 1962, 
471 U,N.T.S. 295,13 U.S.T. 2673, T.l.A.S. No. 5240; extended by Protocol, May 1, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 
1337, T.LA.S. No. 6289; extended by Protocol, June 15, 1970,21 U.S.T. 1971, T.l.A.S. No. 6940. 
148 Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20,1973,25 U.S.T. 1001, 
T.LA.S. No. 7840. For a history of trade in textiles and clothing in the 20th century, see GENERAL 
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TEXTILES AND CLOTHING IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 5, at 62-65 
(1984). 
149 See E1U GUIDE TO GAIT, supra note 58, at 25. The EU's position was close to that of the 
United States, which also was under pressure from domestic textile manufacturers to protect the industry 
from !mport competition. See id. 
150 For additional commentary on the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, see generally 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 57, at 764-75; MCGOVERN, supra note 57, at § 
15.53: Robert C. Cassidy, Jr. & Stuart M. Weiser, Uruguay Round Textiles and Apparel, in THE WORLD 
TRADe: ORGANIZATION, supra note 57, at 223; Jennifer Hillman, Trade Activities Involving Textiles and 
Clothing, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, supra note 57, at 
879; Sanjoy Bagchi, The Integration of the Textile Trade into GATT, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 31 (1994); 
Maarten Smeets, Main Features of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, and 
Implie'ations for the Trading System, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 97 (1995); Kitty G. Dickerson, Textile Trade: 
The GATT Exception, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 393 (1996). 
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Monitoring Body within 60 days after entry into force of the A TC, are 
carried forward into the A TC. Thereafter, the MFA restrictions are 
superseded by the ATC, which phases them out o.ver.t~n years, by January 
1, 2005, through two mechanisms: product integration and qnota 
acceleration. 
First, the ATC integrates trade in the textile and clothing sector into 
the GAIT -WTO system over a ten-year transition period, making such trade 
subject to the normal WTO rules on permissible trade restrictions, including 
tariffs, antidumping and countervailing duties, and GAIT Article XIX 
safeguard measures. lSI Second, the ATC provides for a ten-year phase-out 
of all quotas maintained on non-integrated products that were establi:;hed 
under the bilateral agreements entered into under MFA auspices. (Unilateral 
quotas that were imposed under Article 3 of the MFA were eliminated one 
year after entry into force of the ATC. IS2) The A TC also requires enhapced 
market access for textile-exporting countries. 
If the parties to an MFA bilateral agreement are WTO Members, 
their obligations are subsumed under the A TC. The obligations of parties to 
an MFA bilateral agreement where both parties are not WTO Members l e.g., 
the bilateral agreement between China and the United States) continue in 
force independent of the A TC., 
1. Product Integration 
Article 2 of the ATC lays out a three-stage timetable during which 
textile quotas are phased out and trade in textiles and clothing progressively 
integrated into the GAIT-WTO system. 1S3 Once these product groups are 
integrated into GAIT 1994, any border measure taken against the integrated 
products must comply with regular GATT -WTO rules, in particular GATT 
Article XIX on safeguards, the Agreement on Safeguards, and GAIT Article 
Xl on quotas. Each WTO Member must notify the Textiles Monitoring Body 
of all restrictions the Member has on textile and clothing imports. 1s4 
The product integration process requires importing countri~s to 
bring 51 percent of theiF textile imports under normal GATT -WTO rules in 
three successive stages that take effect upon entry into force of the A TC, 
three years later, and at the beginning of year eight. With the entry into force 
of the ATC, each importing WTO Member integrated into GATT 1994 at 
least 16 percent of the total 1990 volume of textile and clothing products 
lSI See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, supra note 104, art. I. 
ISl See id. art. 2.5. 
I S) See id. art. 2.6. The base year for integration stages and quota growth is 1990. The 
products that are subject to integration and quota growth are from four groups: tops and yarns, fabrics, 
made-up textile products, and clothing. The Annex to the ATC lists all covered products. 
IS4 See id. art. 2.7. 
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impOlted by the member. ISS Each Member is free to choose which tariff lines 
or product categories it wants to integrate, thereby preserving the ability to 
postpone integration of the most import-sensitive products. Nevertheless, 
Members must select products from four product groups: tops and yarns, 
fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing. 
By January 1998 (37 months after entry into force of the A TC), 
Members must have integrated another 17 percent of the total 1990 volume 
of textile and clothing products imported by the Member.ls6 By January 
2002 (85 months after entry into force of the A TC), Members must integrate 
another 18 percent of the total 1990 volume oftextile and clothing products 
imported by the Member-.1S7 Finally, by January 2005 (121 months after 
entry ·into force of the A TC), the remaining 49 percent of textiles and 
clothing trade must be integrated immediately. ISS The ATC and all 
restrictions thereunder stand terminated in January 2005, on which date the 
textiles and clothing sector will be fully integrated into GATT 1994. There 
may be no extensions of the A TC. 159 
2. Quota Growth 
Article 2 provides for annual quota growth during each stage of the 
integration process. During Stage 1, which ended on December 31, 1997, the 
quota level under MFA bilateral agreements in force prior to the effective 
date of the A TC was increased annually by not less than the growth rate 
established under the bilateral agreement, plus an additional 16 percent. 160 
The level of each remaining restriction must be increased annually during 
Stage' 2, which ends December 31,2001, by the growth rate established 
during Stage 1, increased by an additional 25 percent. 161 Similarly, during 
Stage 3, which ends December 31,2004, the growth rate must not be less 
than the growth rate established during Stage 2, increased by an additional 
27 percent. 162 
ISS See id. art. 2.6. 
156 See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, supra note 104, art. 2.8(a). For a report on the 
ATC integration process during Stage I, see Textiles Monitoring Body, Comprehensive Report of the 
Textiles Monitoring Body to the Council for Trade in Goods on the Implementation of the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing During the First Stage of the Integration Process, GILl I 79 (1997). 
151 See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, supra note 104, art. 2.8(b). 
158 See id. art.2.8(c). 
159 See id. art. 9. For the status of Members' integration programs, see Report of the Council 
for Tnde in Goods to the General Council, GIL/I34, at 16-17 (1996). 
w" See id. art. 2.13. Typical growth rates under MFA bilateral agreements were one percent 
for wool goods and six percent for all other products, although for major Asian suppliers (e.g., Hong 
Kong and the Philippines) the quota growth rate was less. See THE YEAR IN TRADE 1993, supra note 72, 
at 10. 
161 See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, supra note 104, art. 2.14(a). 
162 See id. art.2.14(b). 
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To illustrate this "growth on growth" quota growth rate, if the MFA 
annual quota growth rate was six percent annually, then for Stage I the 
annual quota growth rate was 6.96 percent (.06 + (.06 x .016)). For Stage 2, 
the annual quota growth rate would be 8.7 percent (.0696 + (.0696 x .25)); 
and for Stage 3, the annual quota growth rate would be 11.049 percent (.087 
+ (.087 x .27)). 
The MFA "flexibility" provisions of swing, carryover, and carry 
forward are continued in the A TC. 163 
Small supplier countries that account for 1.2 percent or less of 
individual import markets receive accelerated quota growth treatment by 
leapfrogging quota growth stages, i.e., smaller suppliers are entitled to a 25-
percent quota acceleration at the start of the ATC, an additional 27-percent 
increase in 1998, and final quota elimination in 2002.164 For the United 
States, small suppliers include Bahrain, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
Guatemala, Hungary, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Macau, Mauritius, 
Myanmar, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Uruguay.165 
3. Market Access 
As part of the integration process, Article 7 obligates Members to 
improve market access for textile and clothing products through the 
following measures: (1) tariff reductions and bindings; (2) the reduction or 
elimination of non-tariff barriers; (3) the facilitation of customs procedures; 
and (4) the fair and equitable treatment of textiles and clothing under 
antidumping duty, countervailing duty, and intellectual property laws. 
Members further commit not to introduce changes in their tariff 
classification schemes that would adversely affect market access. 166 . 
If any importing Member fails to adopt adequate market access 
measures, a complaining Member may be permitted to withhold from the 
offending Member increases in quota growth rates during the next stage of 
the transition. 167 
The Agreement itself does not address customs duties levied by 
WTO Members on textile and clothing products. Tariff concessions on these 
products are included in each Member's Schedule of Concessions appended 
to the protocol to GATT 1994. 
H Preshipment Inspection 
163 See id. art. 2.16. 
164 See id. art. 2.18. Members are abiding by this provision. See Report of the Council for 
Trade in Goods, supra note 159, at 19, para. 16.17. 
16S See Hillman, supra note 150, at 882. 
166 See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, supra note 104, art. 4.2. 
167 See id. art. 8.12. 
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Beginning in the 1980s, it became common for a number of 
countries, primarily developing countries, to hire commercial inspection 
firms to verify the customs classification and value of goods destined for 
their markets. These companies usually operate at seaports and airports in 
developed countries where they examine exporter claims concerning the 
quality, quantity, price, and financing terms of the goods for export. 168 
In response to a growing concern that the use of inspection firms 
was impeding the flow oftrade, the Uruguay Round negotiators concluded 
the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection ("PSI Agreement").169 The PSI 
Agreement requires WTO Members that employ inspection companies (user 
Members) to ensure that preshipment inspections are conducted in a 
reasonable manner so as not to unnecessarily interfere with legitimate trade. 
Article 2 of the PSI Agreement sets out 22 obligations of user 
Members. One of the most important obligations that user Members 
undertake is to ensure that inspection procedures and criteria are objective 
and applied in a non-discriminatory manner to all exporters. Article 2 also 
requires that preshipment activities be conducted in a transparent manner. 
For example, user Members must ensure that PSI firms provide exporters 
with all the information necessary for exporters to comply with inspection 
requirements. In addition, user Members must ensure that PSI firms avoid 
unreasonable delays in inspections and issue within five working days after 
they complete their inspection either a clean report of findings or a detailed 
written explanation that specify the reasons for why such a report cannot be 
issued. 
Article 4 of the PSI Agreement establishes a binding arbitration 
procedure in the event differences between an exporter and a PSI firm 
cannot be resolved. Such arbitration is to be conducted under the joint 
auspices of the Independent Entity (created by the WTO in 1996 as a 
subsidiary body of the Council for Trade in Goods), the International 
Chamber of Commerce, and the International Federation of Inspection 
Agencies. Decisions of the three-member panels are to rendered within eight 
working days of the request for independent review. 170 
1. Import Licensing Procedures 
A number of countries use a system of "automatic" and "non-
automatic" licensing systems to monitor and regulate imports. 171 An 
1(,. See A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 57, at 73&-39. 
1<.9 See Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Apr. IS, 1994, Uruguay Round Results, supra 
note 2. 
170 See id. art. 4. 
171 See STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 57, at 907. 
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"automatic" licensing system is used to monitor, but not to regulate, the 
importation of goods. Governments use a "non-automatic" system to 
administer quotas and tariff-rate quotas. Under the latter, only a limited 
number of licenses are issued. 
The WTO Agreement on Importing Licensing Procedures builds on 
the Tokyo Round Licensing Code and strengthens the rules governing 
import licensing procedures by improving the transparency and 
predictability of such procedures. The Agreement establish~s finn deadlines 
for the publication of new or revised licensing requirements and imposes 
time limits on processing licensing applications. The Agreement also 
establishes a limit on the number of government agencies an importer must 
contact in order to obtain a license.172 
Article 2 of the Licensing Agreement governs "automatic" licensing 
systems. In order to qualify as an "automatic" system, completed 
applications must be approved immediately and in no case more than 10 
days after submission.173 
Article 3 governs "non-automatic" licensing systems. Governments . 
using them must publish licensing criteria in a manner that is 
understandable. Denials of applications must be accompanied by reasons. 
An aggrieved applicant must be afforded an opportunity to appeal. Licensing 
systems that administer quotas must publish the amount of the quota, the 
quota allocations among supplying countries, and the opening and closing 
dates of quotas. Applications must be processed within 30 days on a t1rst-
come, first-served basis. If applications are considered simultaneously, then 
they must be processed within 60 days. 174 
J. The TRIPS Agreement 
Among the signal achievements of the GATT-WTO system, the 
Uruguay'Round TRIPS Agreement ranks high among them. The TRIPS 
Agreement is one of two Uruguay Round Agreements (the other being the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services) that breaks new ground by not 
dealing with trade in goods strictly. It thus takes the GATT-WTO system 
into uncharted territory.175 Some consider the TRIPS Agreement the most 
172 See id. 
173 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex lA, art. 2.2(a)(iii). 
174 See id. art. 3.5(f). 
I7S For a summary of the Uruguay Round negotiations leading to the TRIPS Agreement, see 
Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues: The Uruguay Round Agreement and 
Its Economic Implications, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 381, at 384 
(Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds. 1995); JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: 
A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 130, 251, 283 (1995); ERNEST H. PREEG, TRADERS IN A BRAVE 
NEW WORLD: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 
(1995). See generally MCGOVERN, supra note 57, ch. 21; L. Peter Farkas, Trade-Related Aspects of 
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remarkable achievement of the entire Uruguay Round. 176 It fills the 
intellectual property rights ("IPR") protection gap within GAIT by 
establishing minimum levels of protection for copyrights, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, plant varieties, 
computer chip layout designs, and trade secrets. It couples these IPR 
protections with the requirement that WTO Members adopt effective 
enforcement mechanisms. Unlike other GAIT commitments that mainly 
obligate Members to refrain from taking certain proscribed actions, the 
TRIPS Agreement obligates Members to adopt both minimum standards of 
IPR protection and domestic enforcement mechanisms. 
As is the case with most international agreements, the TRIPS 
Agreement represents a series of compromises. It gives developed countries 
the substantive minimum standards and procedural protections they wanted. 
At the same time, it accommodates the developing countries by giving them 
generous transition periods. The TRIPS Agreement does not achieve all the 
goals that some developed countries sought. For example, the long transition 
period (ten years) given to all Members within which to adopt laws 
providing for the patentability of drugs was criticized by the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry. Conversely, developing countries criticized the 
Agreement's restrictions on the use of compulsory licensing. 177 
1. Minimum IPR Standards 
As explained more fully in the following pages, Part II ofthe TRIPS 
Agreement, Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of 
Intellectual Property Rights, sets forth in detail the minimum standards 
Members must observe in granting IPR protection. It is divided into eight 
sections. The first seven sections identify the seven types of intellectual 
property Members must protect, namely, copyright and related rights, 
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout 
Intellectual Property, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 57, at 463; Frederick M. 
Abbott; The Future of the Multilateral Trading System in the Context of TRIPS; 20 HASTINGS INT'L & 
COMPo L. REV. 661 (1997); 1.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property 
Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345 (1995); 1.H. 
Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects for 
Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & 
ENTERTAINMENT L.1. 171 (1993); Ralph Oman, Intellectual Property After the Uruguay Round, 42 1. 
COPYRIGHT SOc. 18 (\994); Jeffrey A. Divney & Gary J. Connell, Intellectual Property Provisions of 
the GATT, 23 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069 (1994); Hans Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate 
Trade, Adequate Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y 1. 153 (1995); Michael L. Doane, TRIPS 
and IntemationalIntellectual Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U.1.1NT'L 
L. & POL'y 465 (1994). 
176 See, e.g., MCGOVERN, supra note 57, § 21.211. 
177 See RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM, 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS & U.S. LAW \ 094-97 (\998). 
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designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information. These sections 
also specify the scope of that protection. The eighth section treats anti-
competitive practices associated with IPR licensing. , " 
a. Copyright 
Article 9.2 reiterates the core copyright principle that copyright 
protection only extends to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods 
of operation, or mathematical concepts. It thus qualifies Article 1, which 
permits Members to provide broader IPR protection than is required under 
the Agreement. Members are prohibited from expanding the types of 
expressions that are copyrightable. 
Article 10 follows the Berne Convention's classification of 
computer programs as literary works, and Members are required to protect 
them as such. Article 10.2 further requires copyright protection' for 
compilations of data or other materials which by reason of the selection or 
arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations. 
The minimum term of protection for most copyrighted works· is the 
life of the author plus 50 years. In cases where the term of protection is 
calculated on a basis other than the life of a natural person (e.g., in the ~ase 
of anonymous works), Article 12 provides a minimum term of copyright 
protection of no less than 50 years from the end of the calendar year of 
authorized publication. For photographic work or a work of applied art, the 
minimum term of protection is 25 years. For performers and producers of 
sound recordings, the term of protection is 50 years from the end of the 
calendar year in which the fixation or performance took place. 178 . For 
broadcasters, it is 20 years from the end of the calendar year of broadcast. 179 
Article 13 deals with limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights. 
It restricts such limitations or exceptions "to certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation ofthe work and do not unreasonably 
prejUdice the legitimate interests of the right holder." Such limitations 
include, for example, fair use of copyrighted work for educational purposes. 
Article 14, entitled Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms (Sound recordings) and Broadcasting Organizations, requires, 
in the case of sound recordings, that Members provide recording producers 
a 50-year term of protection, and the unlimited right to authorize or prohibit 
reproduction or commercial rental of their sound recordings. A special 
exception is carved out for countries with a system of payment to 
1711 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects oflntellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex Ie, art 14.5, 33 LLM. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
179 See id. 
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compensate for rental of sound recordings. ISO In the case of sound recording 
performers, Article 14.1 requires Members to make it possible for 
performers to prevent unauthorized fixation, broadcast, or reproduction of 
their live performances (i.e., "bootlegging"). Under Article 14.3, 
broadcasting organizations are to receive similar rights as performers. If a 
Member does not grant such rights to broadcasters, then the copyright owner 
is to receive them. 
b. Trademark 
Part II, Section 2, of the TRIPS Agreement deals with the subject of 
trademarks. Article 15.1 defines a trademark broadly as: 
Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking 
from those of other undertakings . . .. [P]ersonal names, 
letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of 
colors ... shall be eligible for registration as trademarks. 
Once it is determined that the subject matter is protectable and registerable 
as a trademark, Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement confers on the owner of 
a registered trademark the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not 
having the owner's consent from using identical or similar signs for goods 
or services which are identical or similar to those for which the trademark 
is registered. Where identical marks are used on identical goods or se~ices, 
a likelihood of confusion is presumed. 
The initial term and each renewal term of a registration may not be 
less than seven years, subject to renewal in perpetuity. lSI A registration may 
be canceled only after an uninterrupted, three-year period of non-use. IS2 
Valid defenses to an allegation of non-use include import restrictions or 
other governmental requirements making use of the trademark impossible 
within the territory ofthe Member.183 Use of a trademark by a person under 
the control ofthe owner, such as a licensee, constitutes use of the trademark 
for purposes of maintaining the registration. 184 
c. Industrial Designs 
'"0 Only Japan and Switzerland have such a system. See STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION, supra note 57, at 983. 
181 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 178, art. 18. 
I., See id. art. 19.1. 
18' See id. 
184 See id. art. 19.2. 
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Articles 25 and 26 of the TRIPS Agreement protect industrial 
designs. Article 25 requires Members to provide protection for 
independently created industrial designs that are new or original, i. e., that 
differ significantly from known designs or combinations of known designs. 
Members may provide that designs dictated essentially by functional or 
technical considerations are not protected. However, no requirement exists 
that the design have aesthetic appeal. 
Members are neither required to nor prohibited from registering 
industrial designs. If they do require registration of textile designs in order 
for them to be protected, Members must not make the requirements for 
securing protection of such designs so onerous, costly, or protracted that 
such requirements unreasonably impair the opportunity to seek and ohain 
protection. In lieu of protecting textile designs through industrial design law, 
Members are given the option of providing such protection through 
copyright law. 185 
Under Article 26.1, Members must establish legal mechanisms by 
which owners of industrial designs can prevent others from making, selling, 
or importing articles that copy the protected design. Limited exceptions to 
the protection of industrial designs are permitted, provided they do not 
prejudice the legitimate interests of owners. The term of protection must not 
be less than ten years. 186 
d. Patents 
Section 5, on patents, is the most significant achievement of Part II 
of the TRIPS Agreement. It also is the one section where the gre~test 
accommodations had to be made between the competing positions of 
developed and developing countries. 
With the limited exceptions described below, the scope of 
patentable subject matter extends to any invention, whether a product or 
process, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an 
inventive step (i.e., are non-obvious), and are capable of industrial 
application (i.e., are useful).187 Provided they have not fallen into the public 
domain at the time the TRIPS Agreement becomes applicable in a Member, 
patents are available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as 
to the place of invention, the field of technology, or whether the product is 
imported or produced locally.188 
IKS See id. art. 25.2. 
186 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 178, art. 26.3. 
187 See id. art. 27.1. "Non-obvious" and "useful" are the U.S. criteria for patentability of an 
invention, in addition to novelty. 
IK8 See id. arts. 25.1, 70.3. 
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The scope of patent rights is delineated in Article 28. In the case of 
products, a patent confers on its owner the exclusive right "to prevent third 
partie:; not having the owner's consent from the acts of: [sic] making, using, 
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product."189 In 
the case of processes, the owner has the exclusive right "to prevent third 
parties not having the owner's consent from the act of using the process, and 
from the acts of:[sic] using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these 
purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process.'!\90 Patent 
owners also have the right to assign, transfer, and license the patent. 191 The 
inventor has the right to be mentioned on the patent. 192 
A mandatory condition that Members must impose on all patent 
applicants is the requirement that an applicant disclose the invention in a 
manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be worked by a 
person skilled in the art. 193 A Member may in the alternative impose the 
more demanding standard that requires the applicant to indicate the best 
mode for working the invention known to the applicant on the filing date or, 
where priority is claimed, on the priority date of the application. 194 
Article 30 permits Members to make limited exceptions to the 
otherwise exclusive rights conferred on an owner by a patent, provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation 
of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the patent owner. The terms "unreasonable" and "legitimate" are not defined, 
virtually ensuring future disputes. 
i. Excluded Subject Matter 
Members may exclude, as non-patentable, the following inventions: 
• diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals; 
• plants and animals, other than micro-organisms (e.g., yeasts or 
bacteria); and biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals, other than non-biological and microbiological processes; 
IR9 See id. art. 28.1 (a). 
190 See id. art. 28.I(b). 
191 See id. art. 28.2. 
192 Paris Convention, art. 4 fer. 
193 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 178, art. 29.1. 
194 See id. Under Article 2.1 of the Agreement, the priority system of Article 4 of the Paris 
Convention is incorporated by reference. Under that system, the date of subsequent filings made in other 
Members relates back to the date of the first filing for a period of twelve months for patents and utility 
models, and six months for trademarks and industrial designs. As explained above, the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty extends this period for 18 months for patent applications. The Madrid Protocol 
authorizes single-country trademark registrations that perfect trademark rights in all other signatory 
count.ries. 
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and 
• inventions that if commercially exploited within the territory of 
the Member wOll;ld threaten public order or morality, including 
human, animal, or plant life, and the environment. 195 
Despite the exception for plant and animal patents, Members still must 
provide protection for plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui 
generis system. An acceptable sui generis system of protection for plant 
varieties would be one that is consistent with the International Convention 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants ("UPOV Convention"). As part 
of the TRIPS Agreement's built-in agenda, Members also agree to review 
patent protection for plants and animals in 1998.196 
ii. Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural Chemicals 
Resolving one of the thorniest IPR issues dividing developed and 
developing countries, namely, the patentability of pharmaceuticals and 
agricultural chemicals, Article 70.8 ofthe TRIPS Agreement makes sptlcial 
provision for those Members that do not provide patent protection for 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products on the date the TRIPS 
Agreement entered into force. 197 First, such Members immediately luuSt 
create an interim system that permits patent applications to be filed for these 
products. Second, when the application is filed, novelty will be determined 
as of the date of filing (the so-called "mailbox" provision).198 Third, for 
products that are the subject of an application under the interim system, the 
Member must provide exclusive marketing rights for five years after the 
product receives marketing approval,199 or until a patent is granted or 
19S See id. arts. 25.2, 25.3. 
1% See id. art. 27.3(b). 
1'17 The transition periods applicable to patent protection for pharmaceuticals and agricultural 
chemicals are discussed below. 
198 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 178, art. 70.8. In a 1997 WTO panel proceeding, the 
United States complained that India did not maintain a "mailbox" mechanism that was consistent with 
Article 70.8. The panel agreed with the United States. It rejected India's claim that the receipt of mailbox 
applications through an unpublished administrative system qualified as TRIPS' compliant. The panel 
also concluded that the transparency provisions of TRIPS Article 63 apply immediately, even for 
developing and least-developed countries that are the beneficiaries of the TRIPS' transitional rhase-in 
periods. See Report of the WTO Panel, India -- Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agrj';ultural 
Chemical Products, WTfDS501R, at 56-57,59, paras. 7.39-7.43, 7.48-7.50 (1997). 
In early 1997, the United States and Pakistan resolved a similar dispute brought by the United 
States to the Dispute Settlement Body. The United States complained that Pakistan had failed to create 
a system to permit the filing of applications for patents on pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical 
products. See Complaint of the United States, Pakistan -- Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, WSIDS36 (1996). 
199 In order to be entitled to exclusive marketing rights, the product must be patented and 
approved for marketing in another WTO Member. See id. art. 70.9. In 1997, a WTO panel found India 
to be in breach of this obligations under Article 70.9 because it did not have legislation in place 
authorizing executive authorities to grant exclusive marketing rights. See Report of the WTO Panel, India 
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rejected, whichever period is shorter. Finally, Article 39.3 mandates that 
when Members require as a condition for approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products the submission of 
undisc.losed test or other data that involved a considerable effort to originate, 
the l\lember must protect such data from unauthorized disclosure. 
Alternatively, a Member may introduce procedures to ensure that the data 
are protected against unfair commercial use. 
iii. Compulsory Licensing 
In order to shield patent owners from excessive government 
encroachment on their exclusive rights, Article 31 tightly regulates any 
compulsory license system (euphemistically referred to in the Agreement as 
"other use without authorization of the right holder") that is used by a 
Member to force a patent owner to license a government entity or a third 
party designated by the Member. 
Circumstances in which a compulsory license may be authorized in 
countries with such measures include situations where the owner fails to 
work the invention within a certain period of time after receiving a patent, 
or to prevent or remedy other anti-competitive practices that might result or 
have resulted from the exercise of the exclusive patent rights by the 
owner.200 
When authorizing a compulsory license, a Member's action is 
circumscribed in the many respects. 
1. Authorization of such use must be considered on its individual 
merits.zo1 
2. Unless it is to remedy an anti-competitive practice, such use may 
only be permitted if the proposed user has made efforts to obtain 
authorization from the patent owner on reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period oftime.202 
-- Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTIDSSOIR, at 63-64, 
paras. 7.60-7.64 (1997). The Panel's decision was affirmed by the Appellate Body. See Report of the 
Appellate Body, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, AB-
1997-5, WTIDS50/ABIR (1997). 
200 U.S. law authorizes the issuance of compulsory licenses under the Atomic Energy Act, the 
Clean Air Act, and the Energy Policy Act. See STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 57, 
at 1005. Regulations governing the grant of compulsory licenses comply with the TRIPS Agreement 
criteria, with the exception of the restrictions on the compulsory I icensing of semiconductor technology, 
which were amended. See id. 
201 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 178, art. 3 I (a). 
202 This requirement may be waived by a Member in cases of national emergency, 
circumstances of extreme urgency, or public non-commercial use. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
178, art. 3\(b). 
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3. The scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the 
purposes for which it was authorized.203 
4. Such use shall be non-exclusive.204 
5. Such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the 
enterprise or goodwill which enjoys such use.20S 
6. Unless it is to remedy an anti-competitive practice, any such use 
must be authorized predominately for the supply of the domfostic 
market of the Member authorizing such use.206 
7. Authorization for such use is subject to termination when a 
change in the circumstances which led to it no longer exist.207 
8. The patent owner must be paid adequate remuneration. The need 
to correct any anti-competitive practices may be taken into account 
in determining the amount of the remuneration.208 . 
9. The validity of any decision relating to the authorization or to the 
remuneration shall be subject to judicial or other independent 
review by a higher authority within the Member.209 
10. Where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a 
patent (lithe second patent") which cannot be exploited without 
infringing another patent (lithe first patent," which is the subject 
matter of the compulsory license), (a) the invention claimed in the 
second patent shall involve an important technical advance of 
considerable economic significance in relation to the invention 
claimed in the first patent, (b) the owner of the first patent shall be 
entitled to a cross-license on reasonable terms to use the invention 
claimed in the second patent, and (c) the use authorized in respect 
of the first patent shall be non-assignable except with the 
assignment of the second patent.2lO 
Article 5 ofthe Paris Convention adds two important qualifications 
regarding compulsory licenses. First, no proceedings for the forfeiture or 
revocation of a patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years 
from the grant of the first compulsory license. Second, a compulsory license 
may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or insufficient 
20) A special requirement for semiconductor technology provides that the scope of the use 
shall be only for public non-commercial use (e.g., educational use) or to remedy a practice determined 
after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 178, 
art.31(c). 
204 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 178, art. 31(c). 
20S See id. art. 31 (d). 
206 In the case of a customs union such as the EU, it is an open question whether the relevant 
market is the entire territory of the customs union or the territory of an individual member-state. 
207 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 178, art. 31 (t). 
208 See id. art. 3 1 (g). 
209 See id. art. 31 (h). 
210 See id. art.31(i). 
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working of the invention before the expiration of a period of four years from 
the date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the 
grant of the patent, whichever period expires last. 
iv. Other Provisions 
Rounding out Section 5 of the TRIPS Agreement are Articles 32, 33, 
and 34. Article 32 requires an opportunity for judicial review of any decision 
to revoke or forfeit a patent. Article 33 provides' a minimum term of patent 
protection of 20 years from the date of filing. 
Article. 34 on burden of proof in civil proceedings respecting the 
infringement of a process patent eases the proof problems that a process 
patent owner can encounter in an infringement action. Members must 
provide judicial authorities with the power to require that an alleged 
infringer prove that its product, if identical to the product that would be 
produced from the exercise of a patented process, was produced using a 
different process in at least oneofthe following circumstances: (1) if the 
prodl:ct obtained by the patented· process is new; or (2) if there is a 
substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and 
the patent owner has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the 
process actually used. 
e. Layout-Designs ofIntegrated Circuits 
The protection of integrated circuit layout-designs (topographies of 
computer chips) is provided for in part under Articles 35 through 38 of the 
Agreement, and in part under the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect . 
to Integrated Circuits (UIPIC Treaty"), incorporated by reference in Article 
35.211 Members are required to protect layout-designs, but in a manner they 
deem appropriate. In all events the following unauthorized acts must be 
declared unlawful: (1) reproducing a protected layout-design;212 and (2) 
impcrting, selling, or distributing for commercial purposes a protected 
layout design, an integrated circuit incorporating one, or an article 
incorporating such an integrated circuit.213 
211 The IPIC Treaty defines a layout design or topography in Article 2 as a three-dimensional 
disposition of the elements ofan integrated circuit, at least one of which must be an active element. IPIC 
Treaty Article 3 requires that in order to be protectable, the topography must be original and not 
commonplace, although a combination of commonplace elements may be original. IPIC Treaty Article 
6.2 provides that there are no rights against an identical layout design that was independently created. 
See Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect to Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989,28 I.L.M. 1477 
(1989). 
212 See id. art. 6.1. 
m See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 178, art. 36. 
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A Member may not make unlawful importing, selling, or 
distributing for commercial purposes an integrated circuit or an ar!icle 
incorporating such an integrated circuit, ifthe person performing the act did 
not know or had no reasonable grounds to know of the unlawfully 
incorporated layout design. However, once the responsible person has 
received sufficient notice that the layout-design was unlawfully reproduced, 
Members must require that a person pay a reasonable royalty to the right 
holder for stock in hand or ordered before the notice.214 
The minimum term of protection is 10 years from the date of filing 
an application for registration or from the first commercial exploitation, 
wherever in the world it occurs.215 Notwithstanding these two yardsticks, a 
Member may provide that protection shall lapse 15 years after the creation 
of the layout-design.216 
f. Undisclosed Information 
Article 39.2 requires Members to provide protection to the holders 
of undisclosed information (i.e., trade secrets), provided the information (1) , 
is secret, (2) has commercial value because it is secret, and (3) has been 
subject to reasonable steps to keep it secret. Included under this rubric are 
data submitted to governmental agencies in connection with patent 
applications for pharmaceuticals, discussed above. 
K. The General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT 1947 was concerned almost exclusively with rules on trade 
in goods. The Uruguay Round's banner achievements were in expanding the 
scope of the GATT-WTO system to include non-goods sectors, liberalizing 
trade in several advanced sectors, and setting the WTO Members on a 
course to further liberalization agreements on advanced-sector trade. With 
the successful conclusion of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
and the TRIPS Agreement, the negotiators broke new ground by introdllOcing 
core GATT disciplines to trade in services and providing effective 
protection of intellectual property rights. Follow-on WTO negotiations also 
have produced agreements on trade in information technology products, 
telecommunications, and financial services. 
The service sector has overtaken manufacturing as the most 
important part of developed countries' economies. Service indw;tries 
"4 See id. Article 37.2 incorporates the restrictions on compulsory licensing contained in 
Article 31, mutatis mutandis. See id. art. 37.2. 
215 See id. arts. 38.1, 38.2. 
216 See id. art. 38.3. 
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account for 61 percent of gross domestic product ("GOP") and over one-half 
of emrJloyment in developed countries.217 The ratio of world merchandise 
trade to services trade was four to one in 1995.218 The WTO estimates that 
world trade in services exceeds $4 trillion amlually. 
Jobs in the service sector provide nearly 80 percent of U.S. 
employment.219 That figure is expected to increase to 88 percent by 2005.220 
The service sector generated 75 percent of GOP in the United States in 
1996.221 Services trade represents more than one quarter of total U.S. 
exports. In 1995, total U.S. exports of services was over $210 billion, which 
grew in 1996 to nearly $224 billion. This figure compares with total U.S. 
exports of merchandise trade of nearly $625 billion in 1996. The United 
States also had a trade surplus in services of$68 billion in 1995, and of$73 
billion in 1996. It enjoys a services trade surplus with Canada, the EU, and 
Japan. 
Given the substantial increase in the volume of services trade, 
liberalizing trade in services by bringing multilateral disciplines to bear on 
this sector was an important Uruguay Round goal for developed countries. 
Developed countries enjoy a comparative advantage in the more capital-
intensive and highly-skilled service industries, such as telecommunications 
and financial services. 
Developing countries, on the other hand, were unreceptive to the 
proposal to add services trade to the Uruguay Round agenda. Behind the 
leadership of India and Brazil, they were opposed to putting services trade 
on the Uruguay Round agenda at all. To the extent they enjoy any 
comparative advantage in this sector, it is in the labor-intensive construction 
industry. But restrictive immigration and labor laws historically have 
prevented trade in such services. More importantly, developed countries 
showed no interest in changing these trade-restrictive immigrationlaws.222 
Ultimately, services trade was added to the Uruguay Round agenda. 
After resolving some preliminary issues (e.g., the definition and 
quantification of services trade), the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services was successfully concluded. It was, however, one of the last agenda 
items to be wrapped up during the negotiations . 
. . The GATS is the first multilateral agreement covering trade and 
investment in the services sector. It is divided into seven parts, consisting of 
217 See The Manufacturing Myth, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 91. 
218 See THE ECONOMIST, May 3, 1997, at 99. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. 
221 See Good Newsfor Us. Trade, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 17, 1997, at 18. 
222 For background on the issues confronting the Uruguay Round negotiators in liberalizing 
trade in services, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. TRADE 
POLICY 119-30 (l987); EIU GUIDE to GATT, supra note 58, at 28. 
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twenty-nine articles and eight annexes.223 The bricks and mortar of. the 
GATS are built on three pillars. First, the GATS framework agreerpent 
prescribes core principles and basic obligations governing trade in services 
that are applicable to all WTO Members. These basis obligations include 
rules on MFN treatment, national treatment, and transparency. The GATS 
is modeled after the GAIT in both name and content. 
Second, market access commitments made by WTO Members are 
included in national schedules of commitments that are appended to and 
made an integral part of the GATS. The Members' schedules of market 
access commitments are analogous to the schedule of tariff concessions that 
Members make under GAIT Article II. 
Third, the GATS' eight annexes complement the general rules and 
market access commitments. The Uruguay Round participants recognized 
that negotiations would have to be continued on certain service sectors if the 
Round was ever going to be concluded. These specific sectors (e.g., 
maritime transport, telecommunications, financial services) had proven to 
be major stumbling blocks for the negotiators. To that end, appended to the 
GATS are several annexes with guidelines and deadlines for future market 
access negotiations on the maritime transport, financial, and basic 
telecommunication services sectors. Market access commitments have he en 
successfully negotiated for the financial services and telecommunication 
sectors. Negotiations on maritime transport services has been deferred ';lntil 
2000. 
Part I of the GATS sets out its scope of coverage and defines several 
key terms (other definitions are provided in GATS Article XXVIII). Under 
GATS Article I: 1, WTO Members agree in principle to universal coverage 
of all trade in commercial services.224 No service sector is excluded a priori 
under the framework agreement. The GATS Annexes do exclude. air 
transport services and reserve for later negotiation specific commitments on 
maritime transport, financial services, and telecommunications trade. 
1. Modes of Supply 
Article 1:2 defines "trade in services" by the following four "modes 
m See generally GATS, supra note 26. . 
224 GATS Article J:3(b) defines "services" as "any service in any sector except services 
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority." Article I:3(c) in tum defines "services supplied in 
the exercise of governmental authority" as "any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, 
nor in competition with one or more service suppliers [i.e., government monopolies]." See GATS, supra 
note 26. 
Government procurement of services is governed by the Agreement on Government 
Procurement. It is discussed below. See Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO 
Agreement, Annex 4, Uruguay Round Results, supra note 2, Annex 4 [hereinafter Government 
Procurement]. 
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of supply" (i.e., the way in which services are delivered). 
1. The cross-border supply of services from the territory of one 
Member into the territory of any other Member. For example, a securities 
firm i~ Country A sells bonds from Country A to consumers in Country B; 
or an architect from Country A sends design drawings by mail to a client in 
Country B. 
2. The consumption of services in the territory of one Member by 
the service consumer of any other Member. For example, a tour company 
in Country A supplies a service to Country B consumers in Country A; or 
a student from Country A studies abroad in Country B. 
3. The service supplier of one Member supplies services through a 
commercial presence in the territory of any other Member. For example, a 
bank located in Country A renders banking services through its branch 
located in Country B; or an advertising firm in Country A establishes an 
office in Country B to render services to clients located there. 
4. The service supplier of one Member supplies services through the 
presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other 
Member. For example, an architect from a U.S. firm performs on-site design 
services in Europe; or an accountant from Country A travels to Country B 
to rerider accounting services to a client in Country B. 
The first, second, and fourth modes of supply involve the cross-
border delivery of services. The third mode of supply involves the sale of 
services through an affiliate, i.e., the delivery of services by a foreign-owned 
firm within the territory of another Member through facilities or other 
commercial presence. 
The Annex on Article II Exemptions is arguably the most important 
of the eight annexes appended to the GATS. It authorizes MFN exemptions, 
provided that the exemption is listed in the Member's Schedule of 
Commitments and does not extend beyond 10 years. Only a handful of the 
scheduled MFN exemptions do not include an expiration date. All unexpired 
exemptions will be reviewed by the Council for Trade in Services by 2000. 
Approximately two-thirds of the WTO Members listed MFN exemptions in 
their schedules (Japan did not list any MFN exemptions). For example, the 
EU Schedule of Commitments provides preferences to EU-member states 
for audiovisual services. 
Exemptions are subject. to negotiation in subsequent trade 
liberalizing rounds?2S Any exemption with a term greater than five years is 
subject to review by the Council for Trade in Services. The Council has no 
express authority to demand termination of the exemption, however.226 
221 See GATS, supra note 26, art.lI: Annex, exemptions, para. 6. 
226 See id. para. 3. 
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Meaningful trade in services requires that service suppliers and their 
customers be able to make unimpeded capital transactions across national 
borders. To that end, Article XI limits the ability of Members to restrict 
international transfers and payments for current transactions relati~g to 
specific market access commitments. Members may restrict such payments 
and transfers solely in accordance with Article XII on balance-of-payments 
restrictions. 
2. Market Access 
, . 
If the framework agreement is the skeleton of the GATS, then the 
schedule of market access commitments is the flesh on the bones. The 
Members' schedules list the service sectors and modes of supply for which 
individual Members have agreed to provide full or partial access to the 
service suppliers of other WTO Members. 
In order to harmonize Members'schedules, during the Uruguay 
Round the GATT Secretariat suggested the use of a Services Sectoral 
Classification List ("SSC List"). The SSC List includes 155 service 
industries, each with four possible modes of supply, with each mode suhject 
to both market access and national treatment commitments.227 This matrix 
equals 1,240 service "cells" for which commitments were requested. Thus, 
more than 100 Uruguay Round participants negotiated bilaterally for market 
m The following table illustrates the format of members' schedules of commitments: 
[MEMBER'S NAME]-- SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 
Modes of Supply Sector or Limitations on Limitations on Additional 
Sub-Sector Market Access National Commitments 
Treatment 
Cross-border 
supply 
Consumption 
abroad 
Commercial 
presence 
Presence of 
natural persons 
See World Trade Organization, Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific 
Commitments and the Lists of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, available at 
<http://www.wto.orglwto/new/guideI.htm> . 
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access to 1,240 service "cells" on an MFN and national treatment basis. The 
negotiation of these schedules on a bilateral request/offer basis was, not 
surprisingly, time-consuming. 
Some Uruguay Round participants wanted to schedule market 
access commitments on the basis of a positive list approach. That is, unless 
the se,rvice sector or mode of supply is expressly listed in a Member's 
schedule of commitments, it is not covered under the GATS. Other 
participants wanted to proceed on the basis of a negative list approach. That 
is, market access would exist for all sectors and modes of supply on a 
national treatment basis unless express reservations were made in the 
Member's schedule of commitments. 
The specific commitments made under the GATS are a blend of 
these two approaches.228 Only those industries that are listed in a Member's 
schedule of commitments are open to foreign service suppliers with respect 
to at least one mode of supply (i.e., a positive list approach). However, if a 
Member has made a commitment, only the conditions, limitations, or 
qualifications on market access and national treatment listed in the schedule 
may be imposed (i.e" a negative list approach). 
Developed countries made market access commitments on 
approximately 45 percent of their service sect()rs. Developing countries as 
a group made commitments on only 12 percent. Starting with 620 as the 
maximum number of service sectors, sub-sectors, and modes of supply on 
which commitments could have been made, the United States made 384 
commitments; the EU, 392; Canada, 352; Japan, 408; and Mexico, 252. For 
all service sectors, only 25 percent are scheduled by developed countries 
without conditions or qualifications. The comparable figure for developing 
countries is 7 percent.229 
Unless a reservation is otherwise recorded in a Member's schedule 
of coinmitments, if a Member makes market access commitments, then full 
market access and national treatment is required. A Member is prohibited 
from maintaining or adopting several types of limitations or measures, 
unless it has otherwise so specified in its schedule.230 Typical kinds of 
numerical limitations that a Member might inscribe in its schedule of 
commitments include the following: 
• limitations in the form of quotas or the requirement of an 
economic needs test on the number of service suppliers or 
228 An explanatory note to the GATS prepared by the GATT Secretariat during the Uruguay 
Round provides that when market access commitments are made, they do not include a right to supply 
services that are inputs to the committed service. See GATS, supra note 26, Explanatory Note, para. 17 
(1991). 
229 See BERNARD HOEKMAN, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services, in THE 
URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, supra note 70, at 327,359: 
23() See GATS, supra note 26, art. XVI:2(a)-(f). 
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operations;231 
• limitations in the form of quotas on the total value of 
service transactions or assets;232 
• measures that restrict or require specific types of a legal 
entity or joint venture through.which a service supplier may 
supplyaservice;233 
• limitations on the total number of natural persons that may 
be employed in a particular service sector; and 
• limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms 
of a maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or 
the total value of individual or aggregate foreign 
investment. 
489 
Most market access and national treatment commitments to date are 
essentially standstill agreements. That is, existing market access and 
national treatment limitations, if any, are maintained. However, Members 
commit not to impose additional or new trade restrictions in the future. 
Consequently, while the GATS lays a foundation, broad trade liberalization 
in services did not take place in the Uruguay Round. With the exception of 
the financial services and telecommunications negotiations, where Members 
sought genuine liberalization of those two service sectors, the most 
noteworthy achievement of the first round of services trade negotiations was 
to provide an unprecedented amount of information on barriers to services 
trade maintained by WTO Members. Thus, through the commitments·that 
identify measures that are barriers to services trade, the Uruguay Round 
negotiators accomplished the twin goals of establishing benchmarks for 
future services trade negotiations and making barriers to services trade more 
transparent where market access commitments were made. Because of the 
GATS positive list approach, however, benchmarks and transparency are 
non-existent if no market access commitment was made for a service s(;ctor 
or sub-sector. Improved commitments on trade liberalization of most selvice 
sectors must await the follow-on services negotiations scheduled for 2000. 
3. Progressive Liberalization 
Mindful that an agreement on the complete liberalization of trade 
231 Examples include a license for a new restaurant based on an economic needs test, annually 
established quotas for foreign medical practitioners, nationality requirements for service suppliers 
(equivalent to a zero quota), and restrictions on the amount of broadcasting time available for foreign 
films. See Explanatory Note, supra note 228, para. 6. 
m For example, foreign bank subsidiaries' assets might be capped at a fixed percentage of 
total domestic assets of all banks. See id. 
23J Examples include a requirement that foreign companies establish subsidiaries, or that in 
a particular sector commercial presence take the form of a partnership. See id. 
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in services was not likely to happen overnight, Part IV schedules future 
negotiations for further liberalization of trade in services. It also lays down 
. rules for negotiating schedules and for the subsequent modifications of those 
schedules. 
Article XIX schedules successive rounds of negotiations beginning 
no later than 2000 and periodically thereafter. They are aimed at the 
progressive liberalization oftrade in services. For each round, negotiating 
guidelines and procedures are to be established, taking into account the trade 
liberalization efforts undertaken by Members autonomously since 1995 and 
the special situation of least-developed countries.234 Article XIX 
contemplates that the process of progressive liberalization may take place 
through bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral negotiations in each round, 
provided they are aimed at raising the overall level of specific 
commitments.235 
4. Schedules of Specific Commitments 
Article XX establishes the format for each Member's schedule. In 
contrast with the broad brushstrokes of the framework agreement, the 
Members' schedules of specific commitments are detailed. As previously 
noted, each Member's schedule of commitments is inscribed with the 
limitations on market access and national treatment that a Member imposes 
on foreign service suppliers.236 All schedules must specify: (l) terms, 
limitations, and conditions on market access; (2) conditions and 
qualifications on national treatment; (3) undertakings relating to additional 
commitments; (4) the time frame for implementation of commitments; and 
(5) the date of entry into force of commitments.237 Measures that are 
inconsistent with both Article XVI (market access) and Article XVII 
(national treatment) are to be inscribed in the column relating to market 
access limitations, in which case the inscription will be considered a 
condition or qualification on national treatment as well.238 
During the Uruguay Round negotiations participants agreed to 
follow a set of guidelines for the scheduling of specific commitments under 
the GATS. The guidelines encouraged Members to use the SSC List 
developed during the Uruguay Round. This SSC List is based on the U.N. 
2J4 See GATS, supra note 26, art. XIX:3. 
m See id. art. XIX:4. 
lJ6 At the request of the USTR, the ITC has assumed responsibility for maintaining and 
updating the U.S. Schedule of Commitments in all service sectors. See generally U.S. INT'L TRADE 
COW-i'N, U.S. SCHEDULES OF COMMITMENTS UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
(USnC, May 1997). 
lJ7 See GATS, supra note 26, art. XX: 1. 
lJS See id. art. XX:2. 
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Provisional Central Products Classification ("CPC") System.239 Although the 
use of the SSC List is not mandatory, most Members have adopted it as the 
basis for scheduling their commitments.24o 
Schedules are bifurcated into cross-industry ("horizontal") 
commitments and industry-specific ("vertical") commitments. Cross-
industry commitments in effect ~re across-the-board conditions :and 
restrictions applicable to all industries listed in a Member's schedule. 
Although GATS Article XX does not require cross-industry commitments, 
and although no guidelines were established for such commitments, the 
participants adopted this approach in the interests of avoiding excessive 
repetition in the industry-specific schedules. As a consequence, in order to 
determine the extent of market access and national treatment, it is necessary 
to consult both the cross-industry and specific-industry schedules. 
Horizontal commitments appear at the beginning of national schedules. 
The cross-industry commitments deal for the most part with issues 
bearing on the third (commercial presence) and fourth (the presence of 
natural persons) modes of supply, e.g., investment, taxation, real estate 
transactions, government subsidies, and the temporary entry of persons. For 
example, the United States has made horizontal commitments on the 
temporary entry and stay of natural persons; the acquisition of land by 
aliens; differential taxation measures; and subsidies available from the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") in the form of insurance 
programs, small business loan programs, and several state preferential loan 
programs.241 
239 The Services Sectoral Classification List classifies services into the following twelve 
sectors (further divided into 155 sub-sectors): 
13. Business (six sub-sectors, including professional services) 
14. Communication (five sub-sectors, including telecommun':cation 
services) 
15. Construction and Related Engineering (five sub-sectors) 
16. Distribution (five sub-sectors, including wholesale, retan, and 
franchising) 
17. Education (five sub-sectors) 
18. Environment (four sub-sectors) 
19. Financial (three sub-sectors) 
20. Health and Social Services (four sub-sectors) 
21. Tourism and Travel (four sub-sectors) 
22. Recreational, Cultural, and Sporting (five sub-sectors) 
23. Transport (nine sub-sectors) 
24. Other Services Not Included Elsewhere. 
240 The GATS classification system has been criticized for lacking clarity. See Classification 
Called Unclear; Film Industry Urges Broader Application, 14INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 585 (\997). 
241 See The United States of America, Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/90, 1-14 
(1994), reprinted in U.S. SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 236. In the second and third columns 
on limitations on market access and limitations on national treatment, the United States has inscribed 
"Unbound," except for measures concerning services salespersons, certain intra-corporate transferees 
(managers, executives, specialists, and managerial personnel engaged in establishing a commercial 
presence in the United States), and fashion models and specialty occupations. 
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In addition, Members may list Article II MFN exemptions that 
permit preferential treatment of some Members' service suppliers over 
others. For example, the United States has listed MFN exemptions regarding 
the movement of persons for countries with whom the United States has a 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ("FCN") Treaty or a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty ("BIT"); certain differential taxation measures; and 
certain aspects of air, road, pipeline, and space transport.242 
The specific-industry commitments consist of a matrix in which 
commitments are made for each industry (referenced by a SSC List number 
and letter, or by a U.N. Provisional Central Products Classification System 
number) under each of the four modes of supply. For each mode of supply, 
a Member may offer a "full commitment" (inscribed in the schedule by the 
word "none," indicating no restrictions on market access or national 
treatment in a given sector and mode of supply) or a "partial commitment" 
(inscribed in the schedule by noting the specific market access or national 
treatment restrictions on a given sector and mode of supply). 
Full and partial commitments are "bound," requiring compensation 
to adversely affected Members in the event new restrictions are imposed or 
existing ones become more burdensome in the future. In the absence of a 
full 0T partial commitment, measures that restrict market access or are 
inconsistent with national treatment may be maintained or increased in the 
future. The absence ofa commitment is inscribed in a Member's schedule 
with the word "unbound" in the given sector and mode ofsupply.243 
5. Movement of Natural Persons 
Under the Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying 
Services Under the Agreement, Members agree to provide temporary entry 
for management and specialized personnel during the ordinary course of 
providing services.244 "Movement of natural persons" refers to the temporary 
admission of foreign nationals into the territory of another WTO Member 
as part of the business of supplying services abroad.245 The GATS does not 
apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to a Member's 
242 See The United States of America, Final List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, 
GA TSIEU90, 78-94 (1994), reprinted in U.S. SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 236. The United 
States also listed a number ofMFN exemptions in financial services that require reciprocal treatment of 
U.S. financial service suppliers. The financial services MFN exemptions have been delisted as a result 
of the 1997 financial services agreement. 
243 In certain circumstances, the term "unbound" is followed by an asterisk to indicate that 
the mode of supply for the particular service sector is not technically feasible, e.g., cross-border supply 
of hair-dressing services is technically infeasible. 
244 See GATS, supra note 26, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services 
Under the Agreement, para. 1. 
2'5 See id. 
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employment market. It also does not apply to measures regarding· 
citizenship, residence, or employment on a permanent basis.246 
The Annex does not prevent a Member from applying measures to 
regulate the entry of natural persons. Such measures may include measures 
to ensure the orderly movement of persons across its borders, provided that 
such measures are not applied in a manner that nullifies or impairs the 
benefits accruing to any Member under the terms of a specific 
commitment.247 However, the sole fact that a visa is required for natmal 
persons of certain Members and not others is not to be regarded as nullifying 
or impairing benefits under a specific commitment.248 
A Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on Movement of Natural 
Persons established a Negotiating Group on Movement of Natural Persons 
to reach further commitments to liberalize the movement of natural persons. 
Negotiations were concluded in July 1995 on additional commitments 
inscribed in schedules that were adopted in the Third Protocol to GATS.249 
L. Trade in Financial Services 
Realizing that a final agreement on financial services was Ol.:t of 
reach by the December 1993 deadline for the Uruguay Round, participants 
agreed to continue negotiations on financial services through June 1995 to 
see if adequate market access commitments in the areas of banking, 
securities, and insurance could be secured.2so 
Frustrated with the reluctance of participants to make broad 
financial services offers during the Uruguay Round, the United States 
reacted by making conditional MFN offers as a negotiating tactic for prying 
more liberal offers from footdraggers. Countries whose offers were deemed 
adequate received reciprocal offers from the United States. Unconditi.mal 
MFN treatment was withheld, however, from countries that the Ur.ited 
States considered to be "free riders." This two-tiered approach rankled many 
participants as a dangerous departure from the near-sacrosanct unconditional 
MFN principle enshrined in GATT Article pSI 
The United States announced on June 28, 1995, that it would 
maintain its exemption from the MFN obligation relating to trade in 
financial services because it regarded the offers made by the other 
(1996). 
2.6 See id. para. 2. 
247 See id. para. 4. 
248 See id. para. 4 n.I. 
2" See Decision on Acceptance of the Second and Third Protocols to the GATS, SIL/28 
250 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1994: OPERATION OF THE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 14 (USITC, No. 2894, (995). 
2S1 See id. 
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participants as insufficient. In response, the EU arranged for improved offers 
in an effort to induce other participants not to withdraw their financial 
services commitments.252 By July 1995, approximately 30 WTO Members 
(counting the EU as one) reached an interim agreement on financial service 
commitments. They adopted a Second Protocol to the GATS containing 
schedules of their commitments that expired on December 12, 1997. That 
date coincided with the new date for the completion of the financial services 
follov,·-on negotiations that were launched in 1997.253 
1. The Understanding on Financial Services 
The Understanding on Commitments on Financial Services 
("Understanding") was incorporated in the Final Act Embodying the Results 
ofthe Uruguay Round.254 The Understanding was intended to harmonize the 
structure of the market access commitments agreed to by the Members 
during the post-Uruguay Round financial services negotiations. It 
supplements, but does not conflict with, Part III of the GATS on specific 
commitments in two areas: market access and national treatment. 
First, the Understanding contains a standstill restriction that 
provides that Members will only inscribe conditions, limitations, and 
qualifications to their specific commitments to the extent of existing non-
conforming measures.255 Under Part III of the GATS, in contrast, it also is 
possible for a Member to inscribe future non-conforming measures in a 
Member's schedule of commitments. 
. Second, regarding market access commitments, Members agree to 
the following eight rules:256 
(1997). 
1. Members shall list in their schedule of financial service 
commitments existing monopoly rights and shall endeavor to 
eliminate them or reduce their scope.257 
lSl See THE YEAR IN TRADE 1994, supra note 250, at 31 n.83. 
lS3 See Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Financial Services Negotiations, S/L/39 
lS, See Final Act, supra note 60, para. I. The Understanding is special among the Uruguay 
Round agreements in being one ofa small family of pi uri lateral agreements that are part of the GATT-
WTO system (the other plurilateral agreements being the agreements on government procurement, dairy 
produtts, and bovine meat). As is the case with the other plurilateral agreements, the Understanding is 
not binding on all WTO Members either because it was not made an integral part of the WTO 
Agreement, having been excluded from the Annex 2 list of Uruguay Round Understandings. The 
Understanding was the work product of the OECD-member countries and was intended to bind them 
only. 
lSS See Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, Uruguay Round Results, supra 
note 2, para. A. 
lS6 See id. paras. B.l-.ll. 
lS7 This obligation extends to "other public entities" that are otherwise excluded from GATS 
coverage under the Annex on Financial Services, para. I (b )(iii). See GATS, supra note 26. 
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2. Notwithstanding GATS Article XIII on government procurement, 
Members agree to accord MFN and national treatment to non-
resident financial service suppliers in the purchase or acquisitio~ of 
financial service by public entities.258 
3. Members shall permit the cross-border delivery and purchase of 
insurance services relating to (a) maritime shipping, commercial 
aviation, and space launching; (b) reinsurance; and (c) financial 
information and data processing.2S9 
4. Members shall grant non-resident financial service suppliers the 
right to establish a commercial presence within their territory, 
including through the acquisition of existing enterprises, subject to 
terms, conditions, and procedures for authorization of the 
establishment of a commercial presence that are otherwise 
consistent with the GATS.260 
5. Members shall permit financial service suppliers of any other 
Member established in the former's territory to offer any new 
financial service.261 
6. Members shall not take measures that prevent transfer~ of 
information or the processing of information that are necessary for 
the conduct of ordinary business of a financial service suppJier, 
subject to the right to protect personal data and privacy and the 
confidentiality of individual records and accounts.262 
7. Members shall permit the temporary entry of personnel. of a 
financial service supplier that has established a commercial 
presence in the territory of a Member, including senior managl!rial 
personnel possessing proprietary information essential to the service 
supplier, specialists in the operation of the supplier, and, subject to 
the availability of qualified personnel within the Member's 
territory, computer and telecommunications specialists, actu.lrial 
specialists, and legal specialists.263 
8. Members commit to remove or limit any significant adverse 
effects on other Members' financial service suppliers of (a) non-
2S8 See Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, Uruguay Results, supra note 
2, para. B.2. 
2S9 See id. para. B.3. 
260 Commercial presence includes wholly- or partly-owned subsidiaries, joint ventures, 
partnerships, sole proprietorships, franchising operations, branches, agencies, representative offices, or 
other organizations. See GATS, supra note 26. para. D.2. 
261 A new financial service includes the delivery of new and existing products that are not 
supplied by any financial service supplier in the territory of a particular Member but are supplied in the 
territory of another Member. See id. para. D.3. 
262 See Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, Uruguay Results, supra note 
2, para. 8.6. 
263 See id para. 8. 7. 
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discriminatory measures that prevent other Members' financial 
service suppliers from offering all the financial services permitted 
by the Member, (b) non-discriminatory measures that limit the 
expansion of financial service activities into a Member's entire 
territory, (c) measures that apply to both banking and securities 
services when the financial service supplier concentrates its 
activities in securities services, (d) and other measures that 
adversely affect the ability of financial service suppliers to operate, 
compete, or enter a Member's market. Members need not, however, 
discriminate against their own financial service suppliers in 
honoring this commitment.264 
Third, regarding national treatment, Members agree to provide 
financial service suppliers of other Members access to payment and clearing 
systems operated by public entities, and to official funding and refinancing 
facilities available in the ordinary course of business, other than the facilities 
of a Member's lender of last resort.265 When membership or participation in 
any self-regulatory body, securities or futures exchange, or any other 
organization is required by a Member as a condition of supplying a 
particular financial service on an equal footing with resident financial 
service suppliers, Members must ensure that such entities accord national 
treatment to non-resident financial service suppliers.266 
2. The Interim Agreement on Financial Services 
The Uruguay Round participants had laid the groundwork for 
multilateral negotiations leading to a rules-based agreement on financial 
services. With an agreement in place containing binding market access 
commitments, backed by the mandatory dispute settlement provisions of the 
DSU, financial service suppliers would have a certain and predictable legal 
climate within which to plan foreign investment and operations. 
Despite the best efforts of the Uruguay Round participants to chart 
a course toward deeper and broader offers on market access for financial 
services that would culminate in a comprehensive, multilateral agreement, 
those efforts failed to produce commitments from key players, most notably 
the United States. The United States concluded that market access 
commitments by some Latin American and Asian countries were not 
adequate to warrant U.S. support of a comprehensive agreement. 
Accordingly, the United States signed the Second Protocol and submitted its 
264 See id. para. B.8. 
265 See GATS, supra note 26, para. C.l. 
2(,6 See id. para. C.2. 
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schedule of commitments.267 This schedule essentially was a list of the 
commitments it had made in December 1993. However, the U.S. schedule 
included an MFN exemption that restricted access to its financial services 
sector by other Members; financial services suppliers on the basis of 
reciprocal treatment of U.S. suppliers by those Members.268 
Undaunted and behind the leadership of the EU, 29 participants 
reduced their commitments to a Second Protocol to the GATS, the 
implementing document of the interim financial service agreement that 
contains their schedules of commitments on financial services.269 The 
Second Protocol ("Interim Agreement") entered into force on September 1, 
1996, and expired December 12, 1997.270 
The Interim Agreement contains commitments from more than 90 
countries that include some access to Members' banking, insurance, and 
securities markets. For example, Canada extended NAFTA treatment to all 
WTO Members. The Philippines opened its insurance market to foreign 
firms for the first time in 50 years. The Interim Agreement also increased 
the number of licenses available for foreign financial institutions. For 
example, Thailand committed to issue seven extra banking licenses by 11)97. 
Finally, the Interim Agreement increased levels of foreign equity 
participation in branches or subsidiaries of banks and insurance firms in the 
territory of another WTO Member. For example, Brazil opened participation 
in the privatization of its banks to foreign firms.271 The commitments ex1:end 
to all WTO Members on an MFN basis.272 
3. The 1997 Agreement on Financial Services 
Negotiations on a comprehensive financial services agreement 
267 See Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Financial Services Negotiations, supra note 
253; See also United States: Specific Schedule of Commitments, GATS/SC/90/Supp. I, and List of 
Article II (MFN) Exemptions, GATSIELl90/Supp. I (1995), reprinted in U.S. SCHEDU:"E OF 
COMMITMENTS, supra note 236. 
268 See BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 8, at 1405-10; James Bedore, 
Financial Services: An Overview of the World Trade Organization's Negotiations, INDUS., TRADE & 
TECH. REV. 1 (USITC, Dec. 1995); ASEAN Members Agree to Maintain Offers in WTO Financial 
Services Negotiations, 12INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) at 1175 (1995); Japan. South Korea Sign On to 
Financial Services Accord, 12 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) at 1266 (1995); Financial Services Committee 
Approves Accord Without u.s., 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 1311 (1995). 
269 WTO Members involved in negotiating the Second Protocol include Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, the EC, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Poland, Singapore, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. 
270 Decision Adopting the Second Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 
adopted by the Committee on Trade in Services on July 21,1995, SILll3 (1995). 
271 For the specific commitments made by the 29 participants in the Interim Agreement, see 
THE SECOND PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES, REVISED SCHEDULES 
OF COMMITMENTS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES (world Trade Organization ed., 1996). 
272 See GATS, supra note 26, art. II: I. 
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resumed on April 7, 1997. Participants set December 12, 1997, as the 
deadline for reaching an agreement?73 Negotiators started with a clean slate, 
so that all Members that had made commitments under the Interim 
Agreement started from zero. They· were successfully completed on 
December 12, 1997, with the agreement scheduled to enter into force at the 
latest by March 1, 1999. A total of 56 offers (representing 70 countries, 
counting the EU-members states as one) were submitted and annexed to the 
Fifth Protocol to the GATS, bringing to 102 the number of WTO Members 
that have made financial services commitments under the GATS.274 As 
measured in revenue, the agreement covers more than 95 percent of trade in 
bankirig, insurance, securities, and financial information. Importantly for the 
long-term health of the agreement, India and the United States both 
withdrew their broad MFN exemptions based on reciprocity applicable to 
the financial services sector.275 
In the insurance sector, 52 countries representing over 90 percent of 
world insurance premiums have guaranteed market access through a 
commercial presence for all insurance sub sectors (i.e., life, non-life, 
reinsurance, brokerage, and auxiliary services). Forty-five countries permit 
100-percent ownership of insurance subsidiaries or entry through branches, 
including the Quad Members and Mexico); 7 countries allow 100-percent 
ownership of subsidiaries, but no entry through branches (i.e., Brazil, Chile, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Nicaragua, South Africa, and Venezuela); and 9 
countries allow majority control of insurance subsidiaries (i.e., Egypt, 
Ghan::t, Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Slovenia, and 
Thailand).276 
The participants in the 1997 financial services negotiations also 
made commitments in connection with the cross-border delivery of 
insurance services. For example, in the specialty category ofMA T insurance 
(marine, aviation, and transport), 27 countries permit cross-border MAT 
insurance, including Canada, the EU, Japan, and Mexico. Thirty-five 
countries have made commitments in the reinsurance and brokerage 
subsectors of cross-border insurance activities,. For example, Japan has 
authC'fized the cross-border delivery of reinsurance, but not brokerage 
services.277 
27l See Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Financial Services Negotiations, supra note 
253. For background on the Interim Agreement negotiations and the 1997 WTO financial services 
negotiltions, see WTO. Background Note. Financial Services (1997), available at 
<http://www.wto.orglwto/services/financia.htm>. 
214 For a summary of the improvements in the new financial services commitments, see WTO, 
SucceJiful Conclusion of the WTO's Financial Services Negotiations, PRESS/86 (1997). 
275 See id. 
276 See id. 
277 See id. 
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In banking, 60 countries guarantee a right of establishment for 
banks. Thirty-five countries, including the Quad Members, permit 100-
percent ownership of subsidiaries or branches. Sixty-four countries have 
grandfathered acquired rights offoreign banks.278 
In the securities sector, 45 countries, including the Quad Members, 
guarantee a right of establishment of foreign securities firms. Thirty-seven 
of them permit 100-percent ownership of subsidiaries or branches. Fifty-
nine countries have grandfathered the rights offoreign securities firms. Fifty 
countries permit foreign firms to provide and transfer financial data, and 
information.279 
M Telecommunications Trade 
The telecommunications industry generated $867 billion in revenue 
in 1996 from the sale of goods and services, a figure that is predicted to 
exceed $1.25 billion by 2000.280 In 1996, world trade in telecommunication 
goods and services was worth $115 billion.281 The world 
telecommunications market is clearly an economically valuable one, 
accounting for more than 2 percent of world GDP.282 It also is a fast-growing 
one, with average annual revenue growth rates of 5.2 percent since 11}80, 
and 9.7 percent in developing countries from 1990 to 1995.283 The Quad 
Members plus Australia account for more than three-quarters of revenue in 
world telecommunications.284 
For countries with an advanced-sector economy, or hoping to have 
one someday, telecommunication products are an increasingly valuable and 
growing component of an advanced economy's manufacturing base. For 
1996, world trade in telecommunications equipment alone was worth $85 
billion.28S Equally important, a reliable telecommunications network is a 
critical element of an advanced economy's infrastructure. It makes possible 
other advanced-sector economic activities, including virtually all service 
sector activities. 
Telecommunication services are commonly bifurcated into basic 
278 See id. 
279 See List of Commitments of the Participants in the 1997 Financial Services Negotiations, 
available at <http://www.wto.orglwto/new/sumfin.htm>. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Financial Services Negotiations, Press Release, Dec. 13, 1997, available 
at <http://www.ustr.gov>. 
280 THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 1997, at 119. 
281 See id. 
282 See id. 
283 See id. 
284 SeeTHE ECONOMIST, supra note 280, at 119; U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN 
TRADE 1996: OPERA nON OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT PROGRAM, 39 (USITC, No. 3024, 1997). 
28S See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 280, at 119. 
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and value-added services. Value-added services are sometimes referred to 
in the United States as "enhanced" services. Basic telecommunication 
services include voice telephone, telex, and telegraph. Value-added services 
are computer-based and include electronic and voice mail, online and 
database information retrieval, and data and transaction processing. 
Many countries offered commitments on value-added 
telecommunications during the Uruguay Round. Negotiations on basic 
telecommunications was a different story. The openness of countries' 
markets in basic telecommunications varies widely. For example, in contrast 
to the open and competitive U.S. telecommunications market that followed 
the 19~4 break-up of AT&T, the basic telecommunications market in 
Europe is dominated by public and private monopolies or single service 
providers. Because of this gulf in perspectives, offers on basic 
telecommunications were slow to develop. Despite these difficulties, rather 
than end negotiations on this branch of telecommunication services trade, 
the participants agreed instead to extend negotiations on basic 
telecommunications for two years. After a further extension of negotiations, 
an Agreement on Basic Telecommunications finally was concluded in early 
1997. It entered into force on February 6, 1998, and liberalizes trade in the 
basic telecommunications sector.286 
In sum, at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December 1993, 
approximately one-half of the participants scheduled specific commitments 
on value-added telecommunication services. Negotiations on basic 
telecommunication services were extended through 1996. The participants 
also reached agreement on access to Members' telecommunication 
networks, memorialized in the GATS Annex on Telecommunications. The 
achievements of the Uruguay Round negotiations on telecommunication 
services are explained in the next two sub-sections. 
1. The Annex on Telecommunications 
The telecommunications sector serves a dual role as both a distinct 
sector of economic activity and as the means of delivery for other economic 
activities. Recognizing this duality, the GATS Annex on 
Telecommunicationswas negotiated to ensure that in its role as the means 
of delivery, access to telecommunication networks does not turn into a non-
tariff barrier to trade. 
, The Annex on Telecommunications applies to all measures that 
affect" access to and use of public telecommunication transport networks and 
286 See id. 
HeinOnline -- 16 Wis. Int’l L.J. 501 1997-1998
Vol. 16, No.2 The GATT-WTO System at Fifty 501 
services.287 It does not apply to measures affecting cable or broadcast 
distribution of radio or television programming. Every Member must ensure 
that the obligations of the Annex are applied to their o~n suppliers of public 
telecommunication transport networks and services by whatever means 
necessary. 
Unless a Member has scheduled a specific commitment that requires 
access or use, nothing in the Annex on Telecommunications requires a 
Member to authorize a service supplier of any other Member to estabiish, 
construct, acquire, or otherwise supply telecommunication transport 
networks or services.288 Likewise, much to the relief of developing countries, 
the Annex on Telecommunications does not require a Member to acquire, 
lease, or build a telecommunications network or supply telecommunication 
services that are not offered to the public generally.289 
Paragraph 4 of the Annex on Telecommunications pertaining to 
transparency obligates Members to make publicly available all relevant 
information on conditions affecting access to and use of the networks and 
services. 
Paragraph 5 is the heart of the Annex on Telecommunications. Its 
heading could easily serve as the sub-title of the Annex: Access to and Use 
of Public Telecommunications Transport Networks and Services.29o 
Paragraph 5(a) provides in pertinent part: 
Each Member shall ensure that any service supplier of any 
other Member is accorded access to and use of public 
telecommunications transport networks and services on 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, 
for the supply of a service included in its Schedule. 
A footnote clarifies that the term "non-discriminatory" refers to MFN and 
national treatment as defined in the GATS.291 It adds that sector-speCific 
usage of the term means "terms and conditions no less favourable than those 
accorded to any other user of like public telecommunications tram,port 
networks or service under like conditions." This language strongly suggests 
that no derogations from the MFN or national treatment obligations may be 
2H7 See GATS, supra note 26, Annex on Telecommunications, para. 2(a). Public 
telecommunications transport service means service that a Member requires to be offered to thr public 
generally (thus, they may be privately owned), and include telegraph, telephone, telex, and data 
transmission. Public telecommunication transport network means the infrastructure which permits 
telecommunications between defined network termination points. See id. para. 3(a), (c). 
2RS See id . . para. 2(c)(i). 
2H9 See id. para. 2(c)(ii). 
290 See id. para. 5. 
29, See GATS, supra note 26, para. 5(a) n.2. 
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listed :n a Member's schedule of commitments regarding access to or use of 
public telecommunication networks or services. 
The specific access and use rights accorded foreign service suppliers 
include: (1) the right to purchase or lease and attach terminal or other 
equipment that is necessary to supply services; (2) the right to interconnect 
private leased or owned circuits with public netWorks or services; (3) the 
right to use operating protocols of the supplier's choice in the supply of any 
service; and (4) the right to use networks and services for the movement of 
. information within and across borders, subject to reasonable measures 
necessary to ensure security and confidentiality (e.g., encryption 
requirements).292 
. A Member may impose three general types of measures on access 
and use. First, a Member may impose measures necessary to ensure that 
public service suppliers are able to make their networks or services available 
to the public generally.293 Second, a Member may impose measures 
necessary to protect the technical integrity of networks or services.294 Third, 
a Member may impose measures necessary to ensure that service suppliers 
are providing only services for which the Member has scheduled a 
commitment.29s Provided that they fall within one of the three types of 
permissible measures just described, a Member may impose specific 
conditions on access and use. These conditions include: (1) restrictions on 
resale or shared use; (2) requirements to use specified technical interfaces 
and protocols for inter-connection with such networks and services; (3) 
approval of terminal or other equipment that interfaces with the network; (4) 
restrictions on inter-connection of private leased or owned circuits with such 
networks or services; and (5) requirements on registration and licensing.296 
Developing countries are given a special dispensation that allows 
them to protect ("strengthen" in the words of the Annex) their domestic 
telecommunications infrastructure and service capacity through reasonable 
conditions on access and use, notwithstanding the limitations imposed on 
Members by Paragraph 5 in that connection.297 Any such conditions must be 
specified in the developing-country Member's schedule (no Member has 
done so). The Annex on Telecommunications also encourages technical 
cooperation between developed- and developing-country Members.298 
Finally, recognizing the importance of international standards for 
global compatibility and inter-operability of telecommunication networks 
l?2 See id. para. 5(b)-(d). Compare with GATS, supra note 26, art. III bis. 
29) See id. para 5(e). 
294 See id. 
29S See GATS, supra note 26, para. 5(e). 
2% See id. para. 5(f). 
297 See id. para. 5(g). 
298 See id. para. 6. 
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and services, Members agree in Paragraph 7 to promote such stanQards 
through appropriate international organizations. Such organizations include 
the International Telecommunication Union and the International 
Organization for Standardization. Members also agree to engage rel~vant 
non-governmental organizations by making arrangements with them for 
consultation on matters arising from the implementation of the Annex on 
Telecommunications. 
2. Commitments on Enhanced Telecommunication Services 
The modes of delivery for enhanced telecommunication services are 
either cross-border or through a foreign commercial presence. Physical 
delivery is through telecommunication and computer networks that link 
communication centers throughout the world. As noted above, the Annel( on 
Telecommunications ensures suppliers reasonable and nondiscrimin(!tory 
access to and use of public telecommunication network carriers and seryices 
when such services or facilities are required to supply a service includt;d in 
a Member's schedule of commitments. 
Enhanced telecom service suppliers create global network~ by 
leasing lines from basic telecommunication carriers. Consumers can access 
enhanced services, such as e-mail or computer databases, by connecting to 
an enhanced telecommunication network through a personal computer. 
Consumers can use a local telephone number provided by the supplier, a 
long-distance number, an Integrated Services Digital Network ("ISDN") 
connection through a local telephone network, or a local telephone company 
to connect to a network. 
The negotiations on specific commitments on enhanced 
telecommunication services were a modest success. Fifty-eight countries, 
including all the Quad Members, scheduled commitments on value-added 
telecom services.299 As is true with the vast majority of specific GATS 
commitments negotiated during the Uruguay Round, however, the value-
added service commitments are standstill commitments that maintain the 
status quo rather than liberalize trade. However, because the global market 
for value-added telecom services was comparatively open at the start·ofthe 
negotiations, the standstill commitments made in the Uruguay Round will 
prevent rollbacks on existing market access. The openness of the enhanced 
telecommunications market is an indication that countries believe that their 
enhanced telecom service providers are competitive on a global basis and 
299 See generally U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES: 
EXAMINATION OF MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS' SCHEDULES OF COMMITTMENTS, (USITC, No. 2940, 
1995). 
HeinOnline -- 16 Wis. Int’l L.J. 504 1997-1998
504 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
that neither they nor the public need protection from foreign competition.30o 
With few exceptions, U.S. providers of enhanced 
telecommunication services operate freely in Canada, the EU, Japan, and 
Mexico. This open business environment for value-added 
telecommunication services is largely the by-product of bilateral and 
regional agreements that predate the GATS.3ot Nevertheless, the GATS 
buttresses this already favorable climate through the standstill commitments 
scheduled by the Quad Members. 
First, with regard to the cross-border delivery of enhanced 
telecommunication services, market access is virtually unrestricted in 
Canada, the EU, Japan, and the United States. While no national treatment 
limitations exist in Mexico, some modest market access restrictions require 
that a permit be obtained to provide many types of value-added services.302 
None of the Quad Members listed any MFN exemptions that apply directly 
to enLanced telecommunication services. 
Second, with regard to the delivery of enhanced telecom services 
through a commercial presence, foreign suppliers face far more restrictions 
in all Quad Members. For example, while Canada and Japan do not have any 
limitations that specifically are targeted at .the enhanced telecom service 
sector, cross-industry ("horizontal") restrictions on market access include 
capping equity ownership, voting rights, and representation on boards of 
directors. Typical cross-industry limitations on national treatment include 
requirements that newly established businesses be controlled by residents 
of the host country. 
U.S. enhanced telecom service providers have expressed overall 
satisflction with the GATS commitments made by Canada, the EU, Japan, 
and Mexico. Their main criticism is the GATS scheduling methodology. 
The GATS' positive list approach does not automatically accord market 
access or national treatment to new services that grow out of technological 
advances. Because restrictions on emerging services are unbound, trading 
partners may impose on such services whatever national treatment 
limitations or market access restrictions they choose without paying 
compensation to adversely affected WTO Members. NAFTA's negative list 
approach is, for that reason, a preferable methodological approach because 
all emerging services are automatically entitled to market access and 
)00 See Richard Brown, Basic Telecommunications Service Negotiations in the World Trade 
Organization: Impetus, Offers, and Prospects, INDUS., TRADE & TECH. REV. I, 5-6 (USITC, Jan. 1997). 
)01 For example, the United States and Japan concluded an international value-added network 
services ("IVANS") agreement in 1991 that provided market access to Japanese business markets for 
U.S. providers of enhanced telecommunication services. NAFTA also provides U.S. enhanced service 
suppliers with liberalized access to the Canadian and Mexican markets. 
J02 See Marie C. Wold, Liberalization of the Mexican Telecommunication Sector, INDUS., 
TRADE, & TECH. REV. 1 (USITC, Apr. 1997). 
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national treatment. 
3. Commitments on Basic Telecommunication Services 
On February 15, 1997,69 developed and developing countries from 
55 WTO Members (54 governments plus the 15 EO-member states) 
successfully concluded an agreement on basic telecommunication services 
that entered into force January 1, 1998. Not only were the number of otfers 
broader than those from April 1996 (55 versus 34), but they were deeper as 
well, covering services not previously scheduled by Members in April 1996. 
No single document memorializes the participants' "agreement" per 
se. Rather, the legal document that provides authoritative and complete 
information on the commitments made by each participant is the national 
Schedule of Specific Commitments annexed to the Fourth Protocol of the 
GATS.303 
The agreement covers 95 percent of world revenue in 
telecommunication serviees. Before the agreement, only 17 percent cif the 
top 20 telecommunication markets were open to foreign service providers. 
With the agreement, 100 percent of those markets now are open.304 . 
The basic telecommunication services covered by the agreemen.t are 
defined broadly as any telecommunication transport network or service. 
Specifically, these services include telephone services, circuit-switched data 
transmission services,305 packet-switched data transmission services, telex 
services, telegraph services, facsimile services, private leased circuit 
services, analog and digital cellular mobile telephone services, mobile data 
services, paging, personal communications services, submarine cable 
services, satellite-based mobile services, fixed satellite services, VSA T 
services, gateway earthstation services, teleconferencing, video transport, 
and trunked radio system services.306 
The 55 national schedules of specific commitments have three 
303 See Schedules of Specific Commitments for Participants in the Basic Telecommunications 
Negotiations, available at <http://www.wto.org>. For additional information and summaries of the 
commitments made by the participants, see Statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky. Basic 
Te lecom Negotiations, Feb. IS, 1997, available at 
<http://www.ustr.gov/agreements/telecomlbarshefsky.html>; WTO Negotiations on Basic 
Telecommunications: Informal Summary of Commitments and M.F.N. Exemptions, available at 
<http://www.wto.orglwtolWhats_newlbt-summ3.htm>. . 
304 See Statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, supra note 303. 
30S Circuit-switching is the technical description of older technology for the switching process 
that dedicates to two or more users the exclusive use of the circuit until the connection is terminated. 
Packet-switching is newer technology that is used almost exclusively for data exchange. Unlike circuit-
switched data, packet-switched data are transmitted in mUltiple "packets" through available circuits and 
reassembled at the termination point. See generally A Survey of Telecommunications, THE ECONOMIST, 
Sept. 13, 1997, at 25-27. 
306 See WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, supra note 303. 
HeinOnline -- 16 Wis. Int’l L.J. 506 1997-1998
506 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
elements: market access, investment, and pro-competitive regulatory 
principles. A sample ofthe market access commitments shows that 47 of the 
55 schedules, representing 99 percent of WTO Members' total basic 
telecommunication services revenue, commit to the competitive supply (i.e., 
two or more suppliers are permitted) of voice telephone service either 
immediately on January 1, 1998, or, in the case of 25 Members, on a 
phase(l-in timetable. Forty-one schedules list commitments on local service; 
38 list commitments on domestic long-distance service; and 42 list 
commitments on international service.307 Market access commitments on 
other basic telecommunication. services include 49 schedules with 
commitments on data transmission service, 46 on cellular/mobile telephone 
service, 41 on leased circuit service, and 36 on fixed satellite service. Nine 
countries listed MFN exemptions (Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the Unite'd 
States).308 
On investment, most schedules of commitments (42 of 55, covering 
97 percent of WTO Members' total basic telecommunication services 
revenue )309 permit delivery through some form of a commercial presence. 
Foreign service suppliers thus have the right to acquire, establish, or own all 
or part of a foreign-based telecommunications company. For example, in its 
schedule of commitments the EU has inscribed "none" in the market access 
and national treatment columns with respect to the delivery of the following 
services through a commercial presence: voice telephone, packet-switched 
data transmission, circuit-switched data transmission, telex, telegraph, 
facsimile, leased circuit, and mobile and personal communication 
systems.310 With respect to these same services, Japan has limited foreign 
capital participation in its two largest carriers, Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone ("NTT") and Kokusai Denshin Denwa ("KDD") to a maximum 
of20 percent.3\l 
307 The following countries have deferred full market access to international telephone 
services: Spain, until December I, 1998; Peru, until 1999; Argentina, Ireland, Portugal, Singapore, 
Venezuela, until 2000; Bolivia, the Czech Republic, until 2001; Greece, Poland, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic, until 2003; Hungary, Mauritius, until 2004; Bulgaria, Indonesia, until 2005; ·Grenada, Senegal, 
Thailand, Turkey, until 2006; Brunei, until 2010; Antigua and Barbuda, until 2012; and Jamaica, until 
2013, 
308 See WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, supra note 303. 
309 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, World Trade Organization (WTO) Basic 
Telecommunications Services Agreement I, available at 
<http://www.ustr.gov/agreements/telecom!agreements.html>. 
310 European Communities and Their Member States, Schedule of Specific Commitments, 
Supplement 3, GATS/SC/31/Suppl.3 (1997). Some EU-member states have deferred the implementation 
of the commercial presence commitment until 2000 (Ireland and Portugal) and 2003 (Greece). See also 
John David Donaldson, "Television Without Frontier": The Continuing Tension Between Liberal Free 
Trade and European Cultural Integrity, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 90 (1996). 
311 See Japan, Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/46/Suppl.2 (1997). 
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Canada likewise has restricted the delivery through a commercial 
presence of basic telecommunication services by limiting foreign capital 
participation in most basic telecommunication service companies based in 
Canada to a cumulative total of 46.7 percent of voting shares, based on 20 
percent direct investment and 33 113 percent indirect investment. In light of 
several developing-country offers that allow more foreign participation than 
does Canada, this limitation was not well received by Canada's major 
trading partners. An exception to this limitation has been made for mobile 
satellite systems and fixed satellites that are 100-percent foreign-owned and 
controlled. These services may be used by Canadian service providers to 
provide services in Canada.312 
Mexico also has inscribed market access limitations with regard to 
delivery through a commercial presence. Only companies organized u-:lder 
the laws of Mexico are eligible to receive approval from the Secretary of 
Communication and Transportation to supply basic telecommunicition 
services in Mexico. Direct foreign participation in such companies is capped 
at 49 percent.313 An exception exists for cellular services where Mexico 
allows 100-percent foreign ownership. The United States has inscribed 
market access limitations with respect to direct foreign ownership of a 
common carrier radio license.314 
Under the rubric of regulatory principles, the Negotiating Group on 
Basic Telecommunications developed a Reference Paper on competition 
principles, based on the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996. It addresses 
the following matters: 
(1997). 
• safeguards against anti-competitive practices by monopolies, such 
as cross-subsidization or using information obtained from 
competitors with anti-competitive results; 
• cost-based and timely interconnection on non-discriminatory 
terms, rates, and quality; 
• transparent and non-discriminatory universal service 
requirements (i.e., requirements that mandate basic 
telecommunication service for every citizen at affordable prices); 
• transparent and publicly available licensing criteria, including a 
ll2 See Canada, Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 3, GATS/SC/16/Suppl.3 
III See Mexico, Lista de compromisos especificos [List of Specific Commifments], 
Supplement 2, GATS/SC/56/SuppI.2 (1997). 
ll4 The United States of America, Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, 
GATS/SC/90/SuppI.2 (1997), reprinted in U.S. SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 236. The 
limitations are fourfold. A license may not be granted to or held by (I) a foreign government, (2) a non-
U.S. citizens, (3) any corporation not organized under U.S. laws, or (4) a U.S. corporation of which more 
than 20 percent of the capital stock is owned or voted by a foreign government, a non-U.S. citizen, or 
a corporation not organized under U.S. laws. See Vincent M. Paladini, Foreign Ownership Restrictions 
under Section 310(8) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 341 (1996). 
HeinOnline -- 16 Wis. Int’l L.J. 508 1997-1998
508 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
statement of reasons for licensing denial; 
• independence of regulators from suppliers of basic 
telecommunication services; 
• transparent and non-discriminatory rules for the allocation of 
scarce resources, such as radio spectrum frequencies; and 
• publication of international accounting rates.31S 
Sixty··three of the 69 participating governments, covering 94 percent of 
WTO Members' total basic telecommunication services revenue, inscribed 
commitments on regulatory principles in the "Additional Commitments" 
column of their national schedules. Of these, 57 committed to the Reference 
Paper by inscribing it in whole or in part in their schedule of commitments, 
including the Quad Members and Mexico. Bangladesh, Brazil, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Turkey, and Venezuela deferred the date of entry into force of the 
regulatory principles. Bolivia, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines 
adopted them in part.316 
Of all the service sectors for which GATS commitments have been 
made, the scope of the commitments made on basic telecommunications 
services are the most ambitious to date. It opens the world's three largest 
telecommunication markets - the EU, Japan, and the United States - to 
international competition beginning in 1998. Still, much hard work lies 
ahead, especially in loosening the grip that government-owned 
telecommunication monopolies have on their domestic markets. Additional 
market openings will be sought in the GATS negotiations scheduled for 
2000.317 
N Government Procurement 
Government procurement refers to the activity of a government in 
purchasing goods and services for its own requirements and not for resale. 
Government purchases of goods and services at the national and subnational 
level are substantial. By one estimate, the world market for government 
procurement exceeds $1 trillion annually.318 For the very reason that 
governments purchase significant amounts of goods and services, 
historically, strong political pressures exist for making such purchases 
315 See U.S. Trade Representative, WTO Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement, 
supra note 309. 
316 See id. 
317 See GATS, supra note 26, art. XIX. 
31M See Gerard De Graaf & Matthew King, Towards a More Global Government Procurement 
Market: The Expansion of the GAIT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the 
Uruguay Round, 29INT'L LAW. 435,436 (\995). 
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exclusively from local sellers.319 
The issue of government procurement was placed on the Uruguay 
Round agenda at the very start of the negotiations in 1987. As a result of an 
EU-US disagreement over expanding coverage to include subcentral levels 
of government (the EU, but not the United States, wanted state government 
procurement to be part of any new agreement), negotiations on a new 
procurement agreement were stalled during the Round. Following.U.S. 
assurances to secure commitments from state governments to open their 
procurement, the parties signed the replacement Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Government Procuremenf20 literally on the eve of the ministerial surr~mit 
to approve the results of the Uruguay Round negotiations in April 1994.321 
The renegotiated Government Procurement Agreement ("GPA") 
improves the Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code ("Code") in at 
least three respects.322 First, the Code's rules on bid challenge procedures 
and dispute resolution are strengthened. Second, the new GP A expands the 
Code vertically by covering subcentral levels of government and central 
government-owned utilities and transportation facilities. Third, the new 
GP A expands the Code horizontally by covering government procurement 
of services and construction contracts. Besides these achievements, the 
negotiators added an important new Member, Korea. Estimates put the 
dollar value of the new Agreement at $350 billion annually, expanding the 
coverage of the Code tenfold.323 
The GPA applies to any law, regulation, procedure, or practice 
regarding any procurement by entities covered by the Agreement as 
319 See Alan Kashdan, Government Procurement, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
supra note 57, at 555. 
320 See generally Government Procurement, supra note 224. See generally Paul J. Carrier, 
Sovereignty under the Agreement on Government Procurement, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 67 (1996); 
Paul Carrier, Domestic Price Preferences in Public Purchasing: An Overview and Proposal of the 
Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement, 10 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 59 (1997). 
321 See Alan Kashdan, Government Procurement, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
supra note 57, at 555. 
3ll The Agreement on Government Procurement had twelve signatories as of 1997: Aruba, 
Canada, the EC, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Korea, Lichtenstein, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, and 
the United States. Hong Kong, which was a signatory to the 1979 Procurement Code, broke off accession 
negotiations during the Uruguay Round, citing the requirement of reciprocal market access as rontrary 
to the unconditional MFN principle. It recanted and finally joined in 1996. Singapore and Liechtenstein 
completed accession negotiations in 1997, and Taiwan was in the process of completing accession 
negotiations. Report (1996) of the Committee on Government Procurement (1994 Agreement), 
WT1L1190, 2-3 (\996). For an overview of the Agreement on Government Procurement, see Jean 
Heilman Grier, Japan's Implementation of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, 17 U. PA. 
J.INT'L ECON. L. 605, 606-20 (1996). 
m See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE GAIT NEGOTIATIONS: A BUSINESS 
GUIDE TO THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 71 (1994). 
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specified in Appendix 1.324 Appendix I is divided into five annexes that 
contain the equivalent of the schedule of commitments made under GAIT 
and the GATS: central government entities (Annex 1), sub-central 
govemment entities (Annex 2), all other entities that procure in accordance 
with the provisions of the GPA, e.g., government-owned utilities and 
transportation authorities (Annex 3), services, whether listed positively or 
negatively, that are covered by the GPA (Annex 4), and construction 
contracts (Annex 5). 
Each Annex also contains value thresholds for each party.32S 
Although the thresholds listed by the parties differ in specific cases, 
generally, the thresholds are SDR 130,000 ($182,000) for central 
government procurement of goods and services,326 SDR 200,000 ($280,000) 
for subcentral government procurement,327 SDR 400,000 ($560,000) for 
government-owned utilities,328 and SDR 5 million ($7 million) for 
construction contracts.329 
Unlike the procurement of goods, in which the MFN obligation 
applies, an element of reciprocity is introduced in the procurement of 
services. For example, the United States and Canada both make service 
procurement available to other parties only if they also have scheduled the 
covered service in their Annex 4. 
32' See Government Procurement, supra note 224, art. 1:1. Regarding laws, regulations, 
procedures, or practices on procurement, Article XIX, Information and Review as Regards Obligations 
of Parties, is a transparency provision. It obligates the parties to publish all laws, regulations, judicial 
decisiuns, and administrative rulings of general application, and any procedure (including standard 
contra·;t clauses) regarding government procurement covered by the Agreement, in appropriate 
publications listed by the parties in Appendix IV, "in such a manner as to enable other Parties and 
suppliers to become acquainted with them." See id. art. XIX: I. Article XIX:5 further obligates the parties 
to compile annual statistics on their procurement, including statistics on the estimated value of contracts 
awarded, broken down on an entity-by-entity basis, by category of product or service. 
m Under NAFT A, central government purchases of goods between Canada and the United 
States is subject to a lower threshold of$25,000. For other federal government procurement in the three 
NAFTA Parties, the thresholds are $50,000 for goods and services, and $6.5 million for construction 
contracts. For procurement by government-owned utilities and transportation authorities, the threshold 
for goods and services is $250,000, and $8 million for construction services. See North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (containing chs. 10-22), art. 1001, 
Annex 100 1.2 ( c). 
326 In connection with procurement of services by publicly-owned utilities and transportation 
authorities, the thresholds are as high as SDR 450,000 in some cases. Japan's threshold for architectural 
and engineering services in general is SDR 450,000. See WTO Committee on Government Procurement, 
Thresholds in Appendix I of the Agreement Expressed in National Currencies for 1996/1997, GPAlW/12 
(1996). See also Grier, supra note 322, at 623-25. 
127 Israel has set its threshold at SDR 250,000, the United States and Canada at SDR 355,000 
($500,000). 
)2' The United States agreed to apply a threshold of SDR 179,000 ($250,000) for federally-
owned utilities, such as. the Tennessee Valley Authority. 
329 In connection with construction contracts entered into by publicly-owned utilities and 
transportation authorities, the thresholds are as high as SDR 15 million in some cases. Israel's threshold 
for construction contracts is SDR 8.5 million; Japan's and Korea's is SDR IS million ($21 million) for 
construction services. The United States applies these same thresholds on a reciprocal basis. 
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Derogations from the MFN obligation have been made in the Annex 
2 offers on subcentral governments. In exchange for the voluntary 
commitment of37 U.S. states to be bound by the GPA and of two other U.S. 
states and seven cities to extend national treatment in certain goods,and 
services procurement, the EU agreed to extend the coverage of the GPA to 
all subcentral levels of government in the procurement of goods, b,ut not 
services. 
The balance of the GPA addresses issues of technical specifications, 
bid tendering procedures, qualifications of prospective tenderers, invitations 
to bid, selective tendering procurement, time limits for tendering, tender 
documentation, submission of tenders, award of the contract, notice of 
award, and challenge procedure.33o 
0. Dispute Settlement in the GATT-WTO System 
Without an effective enforcement mechanism, the commitments 
made by WTO Members would ring hollow. Criticisms of the dispute 
settlementprocess under GAIT 1947 are legion and will not be recounted 
in any depth here.331 The most frequently recurring complaints about dispute 
settlement under GAIT 1947 include the following: 
• GATT lacked a single dispute settlement procedure, with the 
Tokyo Round Codes containing separate dispute settlement 
mechanisms; 
• GAIT disputes were sometimes resolved through the grant of 
waivers; 
• small countries were handicapped in achieving effective re~ults 
against large countries; , 
• the GATT panel process was lengthy and subject to delaying 
tactics; 
• GAIT contained no provision for the automatic establishment of 
a pa el;, 
• inadequate staff and experts often hamstrung panels in their fact-
330 See generally Alan Kashdan, Government Procurement, in THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, supra note 57, 
HI For an analysis of dispute settlement under GATT 1947 and criticisms of that process, see 
ROBERT E, HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT 
LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); JOHN H, JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990); U.S. INT'L 
TRADE COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GATT 
AND THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS (USITC, No. 1793, 1985); PIERRE PESCATORE, HANDBOOK OF 
GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1992); Robert E, Hudec, A Statistical Profile of the GATT Dispute 
Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. 1. GLOBAL TRADE I (1993); William 1. Davey, The GATT 
Dispute Settlement System: Proposals for Reform in the Uruguay Round, in WORKSHOP ON THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS OF GATT (1992); William 1. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GA TT, 
II FORDHAM INT'L LJ, 51 (1987); Rosine Plank, An UnoffiCial Description of How a GATT Panel 
Works and Does Not, 4], INT'L ARB, 53 (Dec. 1987), 
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finding; 
• the insistence on approval of panel reports by consensus 
permitted the losing country to block adoption of reports; 
• effective enforcement and sanctions were almost nonexistent, 
with the exception of bilateral retaliation; and ' 
• GATT did not require notification of the implementation of a 
panel recommendation. 
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes332 (UDSU) addresses almost all of 
these criticisms. As noted in DSU Article 3.2, U[t]he dispute settlement 
system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system." To that end, the DSU 
establishes an integrated, rules-based dispute settlement process with a right 
of appellate review. The DSU virtually assures that all panel or Appellate 
Body reports will be adopted expeditiously and without modification.333 
DSU Article 1 integrates the dispute settlement process of the 
GATT-WTO system by extending the DSU's scope of coverage to all 
disputes brought under the WTO Agreement, the MTAs, and the Agreement 
on Government Procurement.334 With the exception of certain special or 
additional rules contained in eight of the MTAs listed in Appendix 2 of the 
DSU, the rules and procedures of the DSU apply to all disputes.33S 
DSU Article 6.1 addresses one of the major criticisms of the GATT 
panel process, namely, the lack of automaticity in the establishment of a 
panei after a complaining party so requests. DSU Article 6.1 provides a 
panel will be convened automatically and at the . latest at the Dispute 
m See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 [hereinafter DSUl 
m For additional analyses of the WTO dispute settlement process, see FRANK W. SWACKER, 
KENNETH R. REDDEN, & LARRY B. WENGER, WORLD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS: THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGA?-lIZATION (WTO) AND DISPUTE REsOLUTION (1995); Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the 
Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over Diplomats, 29INT'L LAW. 389 (1995); Judith Hipler Bello, The 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More. 90 AM. 1. INT'L L. 416 (1996); Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT. 88 AM. J.INT'L L. 477 
(1994); John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding -- Misunderstanding on the 
Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. lINT'L L. 69 (1997); Azar M. Khansari, Searchingfor the Perfect 
Solution: International Dispute Resolution and the New World Trade Organization. 20 HASTINGS INT'L 
& COMPo L. REv. 183 (1996); Grant A1donas, The World Trade Organization: Revolution in 
International Trade Dispute Settlements, DISP. REsoL. 1. 73 (Sept. 1996); Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 17 U. PA. 1. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996); Judith H. Bello 
& Alan F. Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net 
Benefits, 28 INT'L LAW. 1095 (1994). 
33' See DSU, supra note 332, art. \.I, app. 1. With the exception of the Civil Aircraft 
Agreement, the parties to PT As have agreed that the DSU will apply to the resolution of disputes arising 
under those PT As. . 
m See id. art. 1.2. For example, article 11.2 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures provides that in disputes involving scientific or technical issues, WTO 
panels should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel. 
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Settlement Body ("DSBIJ) meeting following the meeting at which the item 
appears on the DSB' s agenda, unless the DSB unanimously agrees not to do 
so. Failure to establish a panel, of course, would require the concurrence of 
the complaining Member. .. 
DSU Article 20 eliminates another source of disenchantment with 
the GAIT dispute settlement process, namely, protracted panel proceedings. 
DSU Article 20 sets a general time frame of nine months (12 months if the 
panel report is appealed) for the completion of a panel proceeding, unless 
otherwise agreed to by the disputing Members. The nine-month period !uns 
from the date the panel is established until the date the DSB considers the 
report for adoption. 
The inability of disputing parties to frame the issue or issues to be 
presented to a panel for its resolution often impeded the establishment of 
GAIT panels. DSU Article 7 eliminates this stumbling block by providing 
standard terms of reference, unless the parties agree otherwise within 20 
days from the establishment of the panel. 
Within one week after appointment of the panelists and agreement 
on the terms of reference, the panel is to meet with the parties to establish 
a timetable for the panel process, including deadlines for written 
submissions. DSU Article 12.8 establishes a six-month deadline (t~ree 
months in urgent cases) that starts from the date the panel is composed and 
the terms of reference are agreed upon by which the panel must issue its 
final report. If a panel cannot issue its report within six months, then it may 
extend the time period for completing its report. In no case, however, should 
the period of time from the establishment of the panel to the circulatic-n of 
the report to the Members exceed nine months.336 Panel proceedings also 
may be suspended for up to 12 months at the request of the complaining 
Member.337 
It is a virtual certainty that panel reports will be adopted and become 
binding under the improved WTO dispute settlement process. Consequently, 
appellate review, an innovation introduced by the Uruguay Rqund 
negotiators to ensure the WTO dispute settlement process has received wide 
acceptance. Not only should appellate review give the DSU broader 
336 See id. art. 12.9. For example, in the panel proceeding, United States -Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the panel delayed the completion of its proceedings for an 
additional six months due to the complexity of the matter and the need to seek technical and scientific 
expertise. Thus, instead of completing its proceedings within the normal six-month period, this panel will 
take over a year. See Communication form the Chairman of the Panel, United States -- Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTIDS58/10 (1997). See also Panel on U.S.-Japan 
Film Dispute Delays Final Report Until October, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 1058 (1997). 
m See DSU, supra note 332, art. 12.12 For example, at the request of the EU on April 25, 
1997, the panel established in United States -- The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 
WTIDS38, suspended its work. See Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, United States--
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WTIDS38/5 (1997). 
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acceptance and greater legitimacy, but it also will ensure uniform 
interpretation of Uruguay Round agreements. 
As a general rule, appellate proceedings are not to exceed 60 days 
from the date a Member formally gives notice of its decision to appeal to the 
date the Appellate Body circulates its report.338 The scope of appellate 
review is limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal 
interpretations developed by the panel.339 
In accordance with DSU Article 17.9, the Appellate Body adopted 
working procedures in 1996, subsequently revised in 1997.340 The Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review provide, inter alia, for the following: 
• every effort will be made to take decisions by consensus; 
• to ensure consistency and coherence in decision-making, the 
Appellate Body members will convene on a regular basis to discuss 
matters of policy, practice, and procedure; 
• the three-member divisi~n responsible for deciding an appeal will 
exchange views with other members before the division finalizes its 
report; and 
• uniform procedural rules govern filing and service of documents, 
ex parte communications, notice of appeal, the contents of written 
submissions, and transmittal of the record. 
In a remarkable volte-face from the GAIT practice that permitted 
a losing party to block the adoption of a panel report, a WTO panel or 
AppEllate Body report is adopted automatically unless the DSB disapproves 
the report by consensus.341 The DSU guarantees the winning Member the 
fruits of its victory, even if all other WTO Members object to the report. If 
a panel report is not appealed, the report will be adopted at a DSB meeting 
within 60 days after circulation of the panel report to the Members.342 If a 
DSB meeting is not scheduled within this 60-day period, a special DSB 
meeting will be held for this purpose.343 An Appellate Body report must be 
adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the disputing Members 
unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report 
within 30 days after its circulation to WTO Members.344 
Article 21.1 recognizes that prompt compliance with DSB 
recommendations is essential to the effective resolution of disputes. The 
Member found to have violated an MTA (lithe Member concerned" is the 
term used in the DSU) must state its intentions regarding the implementation 
3JR See DSU. supra note 332, art. 17.5. 
m See id. 
)40 See Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/ABIWP/3 (1997). 
)41 See DSU, supra note 332, art. 16.4 & n.7. 
342 See id. art. 16.4. 
J4J See id. art. 16.4 & n.7. 
344 See id. art. 17.14. 
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of the recommendations at a DSB meeting held within 30 days after a report 
has been adopted. If immediate compliance is impracticable, then a Member 
may have "a reasonable period of time" within which to comply.34s A 
reasonable period of time can be the period of time proposed by the Member 
with the approval of the DSB, generally not to exceed 15 months measured 
from the date of the establishment of the panel. In no event is it to exceed 
(1) 18 months, unless the parties so agree; (2) a period of time mutually 
agreed by the parties to the dispute; or (3) a period of time determined 
through binding arbitration, generally not to exceed 15 months from the date 
of adoption of the report.346 
If there is a disagreement over whether a Member has in. fact 
complied with a DSB recommendation, the matter may be referred to the 
original panel for its determination of this issue.347 Its report is to be 
circulated within 90 days after referral. Until the matter is satisfact('lrily 
resolved, it is to remain on the DSB's agenda with the Member concerned 
giving a status report of its progress on the implementation of the 
recommendation.348 
Full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into 
conformity with an Uruguay Round MTA is the DSU's preferred method for 
resolving a WTO-dispute.349 By removing the offending measure, trade 
liberalization is promoted and trade equilibrium restored. In terms of a 
complete remedy, however, the aggrieved Member is not necessarily made 
whole solely by the removal of the offending measure. The specific remedy 
of removing the offending measure may not compensate the complaiaing 
Member for any trade losses it may have suffered as a result of the 
responding Member's violation. However, in cases involving, for exan·~ple, 
an improper assessment of ordinary customs duties, antidumping duties, or 
countervailing duties, refund procedures exist under national law. 
Failing full implementation of a DSB recommendation, DSU Article 
22 authorizes compensation to a complaining Member from an offending 
Member on terms mutually agreed to between the disputing Members.3so 
Compensation might restore the overall balance of trade liberalization that 
existed prior to the dispute if, for example, the offending Member offers to 
reduce tariffs on products of export interest to the complaining Member. 
However, any compensation agreement in the form of improved market 
J4S See DSU, supra note 332, art. 21.3. 
346 See id. arts. 21.3(a)-(c), 21.4. 
347 See id. art. 21.5. 
J48 See id art. 21.6. See, e.g., United States _. Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, Status Report by the United States, WTIDS2/IO/Add.4 (1997) (the fifth status report submitted 
by the United States pursuant to DSU Article 21.6). 
349 See DSU, supra note 332, art. 22.1. 
)50 See id art. 22.2. 
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access for the complaining Member's goods must be "consistent with the 
covered agreements,"351 that is, it must be instituted on an MFN basis, 
thereby generalizing the benefit of the compensation to all WTO Members. 
This requirement could complicate compensation negotiations. 
Failing conclusion of a compensation agreement within 20 days 
after the expiration of a reasonable period of time for implementing a 
recommendation, a complaining Member may request the DSB to authorize 
the suspension of concessions limited solely to the Member concerned. The 
suspension need not occur on an MFN basis. This limitation is a form of 
damage control, thereby minimizing the negative trade impact of retaliation. 
Regarding the suspension of concessions, the general principle is 
that the complaining Member first should seek to suspend concessions with 
respect to the same sector in which the violation occurred, i.e., cross-sector 
retaliation is discouraged. For example, with respect to a trade-in-goods 
violation, a suspension of concessions may take place with regard to goods 
generally. If the GATS has been violated, then the suspension should focus 
on the principal service sector affected (there are eleven, including, for 
example, telecommunication and financial services). If the TRIPS 
Agreement has been violated, then the suspension should focus on the 
specific intellectual property right that was violated (e.g., patent, trademark, 
copyright).352 
If a sector-specific suspension is not practicable or effective, then 
the sllspension may be in other sectors under the same agreement (e.g., 
suspension of telecommunication trade benefits in retaliation for a financial 
services violation). If such retaliation is not practicable or effective, or the 
circumstances are serious enough, then suspension under another agreement 
may be authorized.353 
The level of the suspension is to be equivalent to the level of the 
nullification or impairment. If the Member concerned objects to the 
proposed level of suspension or to cross-sector retaliation, the matter is to 
be referred to binding arbitration which is to be completed within 60 days.354 
In a flank attack on unilateral actions taken by the United States 
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,355 DSU Article 23, 
Strengthening the Multilateral System, flatly prohibits Members from 
making unilateral determinations on the following matters: (1) whether an 
Uruguay Round agreement has been violated, (2) whether another Member 
has failed to implement a DSB recommendation within a reasonable period 
lSI See id. art. 22.1. 
lS2 See id. art. 22.3(t). 
m See DSU, supra note 332, art. 22.3. 
lS4 See id. art. 22.6. 
m See 19 U.S.C. § 2411. 
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of time, or (3) whether the level of suspension of concessions is appropriate. 
The DSU is the exclusive mechanism for resolving these issues, absent the 
mutual agreement of the disputing Members.356 
As noted by the DSB in its 1996 annual report, the number of 
matters referred to the DSB is considerably greater than the number under 
GAIT during similar periods.3S7 The following table provides a snapshot of 
the status ofWTO disputes as of January 1998: 
Consult- Distinct Active Appellate Disputes Settled, 
ation Matters Cases Reports Under Withdraw-n, 
Requests Adopted Consult- or Inactive 
ation Cases 
109 76 18 8 34 20 
The Quad Members (Canada, the EU, Japan, and the United States) 
have been the main participants in DSU proceedings, both as complaining 
and responding parties. The leading complainants are the United States (34), 
the EC (21), Canada (9), and Japan, Mexico, and India (5 each).358 The 
leading respondents are the EC (21), the United States (20), Japan (11), 
Korea (8), India (8), and Brazil (7).359 
Developing countries also have begun using the DSU in increasing 
numbers, in contrast to the experience under GATT 1947. The following 
tables summarize the number of complaints brought by and against 
developed and developing country Members as of January 1998. 
Complaints by Developed- Developed- Developing-
Country Members Country Country 
Respondents Respondents 
75 requests for consultations 28 22 
involving 51 distinct matters 
3S6 In lieu of panel proceedings, DSU Article 25 authorizes disputing Members to mutually 
agree to resolve their dispute through binding arbitration. See DSU, supra note 332, art. 25. 
357 Summaries of all pending, completed, and settled DSU proceedings and DSB repolts have 
been prepared by the WTO Secretariat, available at <http://www.wto.orglwto/disputelbulletin.htrn>. 
358 See WTO Focus Newsletter, Aug. 1997, at4; Annual Report (1997), supra note 77, Annex. 
359 See id. 
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Complaints by Developing- Developed- Developing-
Country Members Country Country 
Respondents Respondents 
25 requests for consultations 14 6 
involving 21 distinct matters 
Complaints by Both Developed Developed- Developing-
and Developing Country Country Country 
Members Respondents Respondents 
10 requests for consultations 4 6 
involving 4 distinct matters 
Outside of GATT 1994, the MTAs most often the 'subject matter of 
DSU proceedings have been the SPS and TBT Agreements (20), the TRIPS 
Agreement (10), the Agreement on Agriculture (9), the TRIMs Agreement 
(9), and the GATS (4).360 
IV. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE GATT -WTO SYSTEM 
National laws and regulations that discriminate against foreign 
direct investment distort international trade in much the same way as do 
tariffs, quotas, and other NTBs. By favoring domestic investors or 
discriminating against foreign investors, the most efficient producers may 
be not be able to penetrate a market due to government interference in the 
market. 
The forces that drive a firm to consider making a foreign direct 
inver.tment ("FDI") are manifold. As global competition intensifies, many 
firms identify advantages in establishing a presence overseas.361 For 
example, building a manufacturing facility in a region where labor and raw 
materials costs are low may improve profitability. Likewise, acquisition of 
an equity position in principal suppliers may enhance managerial control, 
reduce costs, and improve efficiency. As high-tech products near the end of 
their life cycle, the product and production technology become more 
standardized and labor intensive, forcing companies to invest abroad to take 
advantage of lower-cost sources of materials and labor, thereby improving 
160 See WTO Focus Newsletter, Aug, 1997, at 4, 
1(,1 For the reasons why finns engage in foreign direct investment (FDI), and the perceived 
benefits and costs of FDI, see REPORT OF THE WTO SECRETARIAT, TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 8,15-17 (1996), available at <http://www.wto.orglwtolWhats_new/chpiv.htm>. 
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their competitive position.362 A company may also elect to sell its products 
through affiliates located in foreign markets, thereby increasing sales and 
reducing foreign exchange risks. A firm might consider'a foreign investment 
in order to bring its product closer to the target market. 
Benefits also accrue to the host country from foreign direct 
investment. The economic benefits of FDI include the efficient use of host-
country resources, technology transfer to the host country (including 
organizational and managerial skills), positive employment effects in the 
host country, and improved productivity of local firms. 
The growth of multinational enterprises has resulted in a tremendous 
increase in the volume of foreign direct investment.363 The total inflow of 
foreign direct investment worldwide in 1995 was $315 billion, with $203 
billion of that figure going to developed countries.364 The inflow of foreign 
direct investment into developing countries increased from $13 billiQn in 
1981 to nearly $100 billion in 1995.365 Total worldwide FDI in i995 
increased 40 percent from $225 billion in 1994.366 Five countries - France, 
Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US - account for two-thirds oftotal FDI 
outflows. Ten countries received two-thirds of total FDI, with the four 
leading host countries for FDI inflows during the decade 1985-95 being the 
United States ($478 billion), the UK ($200 billion), France ($138 billion), 
and China ($130 billion).367 
Despite the benefits ofFDI and the tremendous growth worldwide 
in FDI, many barriers still exist. The most common restrictions include 
investment notification, approval, or authorization requirements that are 
362 See BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 8, at 75 (1996). 
363 Investment can be divided into two broad categories: portfolio investment and FDI. The 
former involves acquiring shares of foreign corporations without exercising any direct control over 
management of the organization. FDI, in contrast, involves acquiring a significant controlling interest 
of existing foreign firms or establishing new firms. One measure of a controlling interest is that a foreign 
investor must hold at least 10 percent ofa firm's equity in order for that investment to be classified as 
FDI. See Approaching the Next Frontier for Trade in Services: Liberalization of International 
Investment, INDUS., TRADE, & TECH. REv. 2 (USITC, No. 2962, Apr. 1996). Because the issue of control 
is less important with portfolio investment, so too are issues of government pol icy and industrial 
competitiveness are less significant. However, because FDI often involves issues of significant control 
over a domestic firm, it raises sovereignty issues for many host countries. Nevertheless, growth in FDI 
is considered by most developing countries to be beneficial because it enhances economic growth, 
productivity, and competitiveness. See generally UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REpORT 1996: INVESTMENT, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
ARRANGEMENTS 219 (1996); TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 361. An extensive 
bibliography on trade and investment can be found in TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: Id. at 
46-53. 
364 See WORLD INVESTMENT REpORT 1996, supra note 363, at 227. FDI in developed 
countries increased from $37 billion in 1981 to $109 billion in 1993. See Patrick Low & Arvind 
Subramanian, TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An Unfinished Business?, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND 
THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, supra note 70, at 413-14. 
365 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 363, at 227. 
]66 See id. at 227. 
367 See TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 361, at 5. 
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sometimes contingent upon satisfying criteria that are highly subjective and, 
therefore, subject to political manipulation; limitations on the acquisition of 
real estate; and conditions requiring nationality or residency of senior 
managers or members ofthe board of directors. One study of the investment 
policies of the members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development ("OECD"),368 whose investment policies should in theory be 
the most liberal in the world, reveals that they collectively maintain over 
400 investment restrictions.369 The IS-member states of the EU as a group 
have the greatest number of investment restrictions, accounting for 54 
percent of all restrictions identified for OECD members. The United States 
has the second largest number of restrictions, accounting for 17 percent of 
the GECD total, followed by Canada, Mexico, and Australia, with 14 
percent, 7 percent, al')d 6 percent, respectively.370 
GATT 1947 is virtually silent on the subject of FDI. Had it been· 
approved, the Havana Charter would have covered restrictive business 
practices, commodity agreements, and in Articles 11 and 12, foreign 
investment. The question of investment was revisited in the 1955 GAIT 
review conference after it was obvious that the Havana Charter and the ITO 
were stillborn. That conference recommended that contracting parties take 
steps to stimulate the international flow of capital.37\ 
. Progress on a comprehensive multilateral agreement on investment 
under WTO auspices has been halting.372 Many developing-country 
Members are hostile to the idea in the absence of a complementary set of 
rules on restrictive business practices. Some developing-country Members . 
fear that investment by multinational corporations can lead to the 
development of monopolies that in tum can lead to predatory pricing that 
drives local competitors out of business. 
Two WTO Working Groups have been established to examine the 
relationship between trade and investment, and between trade and 
competition policy. The Ministerial Declaration issued at the conclusion of 
the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference provides: 
Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters 
related to investment and competition policy and the built-
la. The OECD was founded in 1961 and is the primary organization for industrialized nations 
to discuss trade and economic matters. Its objectives are to achieve economic growth and employment 
in melnber countries while maintaining financial stability. Its 29 members include the 15 EU-member 
countries, Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. 
)69 See Liberalization 0/ International Investment, supra note 363, at 8. 
370 See id. 
l7! See TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 361, at 33-34. 
m See FDI Seen by Some OffiCials as Subject/or World Trade Organization Talks, 13 INT'L 
TRADE REP. (BNA) at 709 (1996). 
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in agenda in these areas, including the TRIMs Agreement, 
and on the understanding that the work undertaken shall not 
prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the future, 
we also agree to: establish a working group to examine the 
relationship between trade and investment; and establish a 
working group to study issues raised by Members relating 
to the interaction between trade and competition policy, 
including anti-competitive practices, in order to identify 
any areas that may merit further consideration in the WTO 
framework. 373 
521 
Whether the WTO will conclude a framework agreement on investment is 
uncertain. Considering the diverse and broad WTO membership that 
includes developed, developing, and emerging economies, a strong 
argument can be made that the WTO is the proper forum for concluding a 
multilateral investment agreement, not only because of its broad-based 
membership, but because of the close link between trade and liberalized 
investment rules.374 
Although no comprehensive WTO agreement regulating all aspects 
of FDI currently exists, the GATT -WTO system does integrate trade· and 
FDI in several important respects. The Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures, the GATS, the TRIPS Agreement, the AgreemeLt on . 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM"), the GPA, and the DSU 
provide a patchwork quilt of GAIT -WTO rules integrating trade and fOl'eign 
direct investment, albeit a quilt with several missing patches. 
A. The TRIMs Agreement 
The TRIMs Agreement represents a modest attempt to reinforce 
GATT rules respecting national treatment and the prohibition on im port 
quotas, but falls short of being a comprehensive set of rules regulating either 
international investment or restrictive business practices, topics much 
discussed in trade circles.375 The TRIMs Agreement builds on Article III, 
which requires Members to provide national treatment to imported products, 
m Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December 1996, WTIMIN(96)/DEC, 
para. 20. See generally Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 
1 (1997). 
J74 See generally EDWARD GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORA nONS AND NA nONAL GOVERNMENTS 
(1996), in which the author argues for a multilateral investment agreement concluded under WTO 
auspices. 
37S See Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy III, Agreement on Trade Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMS): Limitations and Prospects/or the Future, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
supra note 57, at 439. 
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and Article XI, which prohibits Members from imposing quantitative 
restrictions on the importation or exportation of goods. Although Article 
I1I:4, 5, and 7 do apply to certain aspects of investment laws, the GAIT 
panel dispute involving the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act 
spotlighted the need for Article III repair through the adoption of specific 
and unambiguous rules on certain trade-distorting investment measures, in 
particular local content requirements.376 
What is a trade-related investment measure or "TRIM"? A TRIM is 
any measure imposed by a government (usually but not exclusively a 
developing country) on a foreign investor (often but not always a 
multinational enterprise) as a condition for investing in the host country. 
TRIMs can be positive or negative. Examples of positive TRIMs include 
financial incentives, such as tax holidays or subsidies, to invest within the 
host country generally or within certain economically depressed regions of 
the host country specifically.377 Examples of negative TRIMs include local 
equity requirements, licensing requirements, profit remittance restrictions, 
foreign exchange restrictions, transfer-of-technology requirements, domestic 
sales' requirements, trade-balancing requirements, local-content 
requirements, export requirements, and import-substitution requirements.378 
The TRIMs Agreement deals exclusively with negative TRIMs and 
addresses only a handful of the most egregious trade-related investment 
measures; it has three main features. 
First, it identifies certain types of investment measures that are 
inconsistent with GAIT. Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement stipulates that 
"no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions 
of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994." Article 2.2 refers to the 
illustrative list of TRIMs that are inconsistent with Articles 111:4 and XI: 1 
of GATT 1994. The TRIMs Annex provides that measures must be 
mandatory, that is, enforceable under domestic law or under administrative 
rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage. Next, 
these mandatory measures are prohibited if they require the purchase or use 
. of domestic products (i.e., local content requirements), limit the purchase or 
use of imported products to an amount related to the volume or value of 
local products that are exported (i.e., trade-balancing requirements), or tie 
acce~;s to foreign exchange to an investor's foreign exchange earnings (i.e., 
foreign exchange balancing restrictions). The prohibited measures listed in 
the illustrative Annex to the TRIMs Agreement underscore the close link 
)7(, See Administration of the FlRA, supra note 29. 
177 For a list of typical TRIMs, see WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 363, at 
181; Low & Subramanian, supra note 364, at 417. 
37ft For an illustrative list oflocal content requirements in 27 developing countries, see Low 
& Subramanian, supra note 364, at 4 I 9-20. 
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between foreign investment and international trade. The prohibitions ofthe 
TRIMs Agreement apply equally to measures imposed on domestic films, 
not just on foreign investments, and cover both new and existing 
investments.' " 
Second, the TRIMs Agreement requires that all inconsistent TRIMs 
be notified and eliminated in two years in the case of developed countries, 
five years in the case of developing countries, and seven years in the case of 
least-developed countries.379 In order not to disadvantage established 
enterprises that are subject to a TRIM relative to new investments that are 
exempt from it, Members may apply the same TRIM to new investments 
during the transition period, where the existing and new investment produce 
like products.38o . 
Third, in a small victory for developing-country Members,. the 
Council for Trade in Goods is to review the operation of the TRIMs 
Agreement by the end of 1999. As part of the Council's review, the Council 
is to "consider whether the Agreement should be complemented with 
provisions on investment policy and competition policy."3S! The TRIMs 
Agreement's built-in agenda will dovetail into the work of the two Working 
Groups established in the 1996 Ministerial Conference meeting to examine 
the issues of trade and foreign investment, and trade and competition policy. 
The TRIMs Agreement is the first successful attempt made within 
the GATI-WTO system to facilitate foreign investment by eliminating 110n-
tariff barriers to trade in goods associated with foreign investment. The 
Agreement is designed to ensure that governments do not apply measures 
to foreign investment that create restrictions or distortions for trade in 
goods. It gives investors the assurance that they may freely buy, sell, import, 
and export goods that are produced in countries outside the country in which 
their investment is located. At the same time, however, the TRIMs 
Agreement may have been a solution in search of a problem. It is reported, 
for example, that only 6 percent of all overseas affiliates of U.S. companies 
are affected by TRIMs.382 It is also reported that most TRIMs have little 
effect on managers' behavior because they would have made most of the 
same decisions with or without local investment measures to influence or 
guide their decision-making.383 
379 See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. IS, 1994, WTO Agreement, 
Annex I A, Uruguay Round Results, supra note 2, art. 5.2. A time-extension is possible under Article 5.3 
if a developing-country or least-developed country Member "demonstrates particular difficulties in 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement." 
380 See id. art. 5.5. 
381 See id. art. 9. See generally Harvey M. Applebaum, Relationship o/the Trade Laws and 
the Antitrust Laws, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, supra note 
57, at 537. 
382 See EIU GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 58, at 32. 
383 See id. at 33. 
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The TRIMs of greatest concern to the United States going into the 
Uruguay Round covered only a small amount of total foreign investment and 
existed mainly in developing countries.384 Ironically, developing countries 
. were granted a waiver under Article 4 of the TRIMs Agreement for balance-
of-payment purposes. 
Overall, the TRIMs Agreement is an unbalanced document that 
reflects the bargaining positions of the EU and developing countries in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.38s What the United States wanted in a TRIMs 
Agreement was a comprehensive investment code. What the United States 
got was something far more modest in scope. The TRIMs Agreement 
became a bargaining chip for the United States that it waged in order to 
secure gains in the areas of intellectual property protection and trade in 
services. 
. The areas where a TRIMs Agreement was most needed, i.e., 
restri(:tive business practices and positive TRIMs, are the very areas where 
the TRIMs Agreement is virtually silent. And the practices that the TRIMs 
Agrerment does address could have been dealt with under existing GATT-
WTO rules. All of the legal tools necessary to curb the use of the negative 
TRIMs listed in the Annex were in place under GATT 1947. The negative 
TRI:tvls listed in the Illustrative Annex all violate Articles III and XI with or 
without a TRIMs Agreement stating that they do. The absence of a strong 
dispute settlement mechanism in GAIT 1947 probably explains why a 
TRIMs Agreement was considered necessary in the first place and why more 
TRIl\ls weren't challenged under GATT 1947.386 
B. The GATS 
Foreign investment in the services sector is governed by the GATS, 
which is in part a binding, multilateral sectoral agreement on foreign 
investment. The GATS permits market access for service suppliers through 
four modes of supply, one of which is clearly investment-related: the 
commercial presence of a service supplier.387 The term "commercial 
prest·nce" is defined as "any type of business or professional establishment, 
including through (i) the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a 
juridical person, or (ii) the creation or maintenance of <Qbranch or a 
representative office, within the territory of a Member for the purpose of 
;84 See id. 
;os See id. at 34, 36. 
;.6 The U.S. complaint against Canada's ·Foreign Investment Review Act is a notable 
exception. 
m See GATS, supra note 26, art. 1:2. 
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supplying a service."388 The GATS clearly contemplates FOI. Another 
closely-related mode of supply is the supply "by a service supplier of one 
Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory 
of any other Member."389 This mode of supply contemplates the temporary 
entry of personnel and the intra-company transfer of managerial and other 
key employees. 
Market access to and national treatment of any service sector 
through one or more of the four modes of supply depends on whether a 
Member has made a market access and national treatment commitment in 
its GATS Schedule of Specific Commitments.39o All WTO Members have 
submitted schedules, but many have placed limitations on market access and 
national treatment in connection with the "commercial presence" mode of 
supply. Typical limitations that Members list in their Schedules of 
Commitments relating to commercial presence are restrictions on the types 
of legal entity through which a service supplier may supply a service,:.and 
limitations on the participation in foreign capital in terms of the maxinjum 
percentage of foreign shareholding or aggregate foreign investIllent 
permitted.391 As part of the WTO's built-in agenda, these limitations will be 
reviewed in the follow-on services negotiations scheduled for 2000.392 
C. The TRIPS Agreement 
Like its sister agreement, the GATS, the TRIPS Agreement is the 
most comprehensive framework agreement of its kind. Although the TPJPS 
Agreement does not directly address the issue of FOI, its provision:> on 
minimum standards of intellectual property protection and domestic 
enforcement procedures bear directly on the legal environment in which FOI 
operates. If a foreign investor cannot place an investment in a host country 
with the assurance that its intellectual property rights (patents, trademark, 
copyright) will be adequately protected from infringement, that investor'may 
very well decide not to make the investment. With the minimum protections 
ofthe TRIPS Agreement in place for patents, trademarks, copyright, trade 
secrets, geographical designations, layout designs of integrated circuits,.and 
industrial designs, coupled with effective mechanisms for the enforcement 
of those rights against piracy and infringement within the host country, FOI 
will be encouraged, especially FDI by firms with valuable intellectual 
property to protect. 
3KR See id. art. XXVIII(d). 
389 See id. art. 1:2. 
390 See id. arts. XVI, XVII. 
391 See id. art. VXI:2(e)-(f). 
392 See id. art. XIX. 
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D. The SCM Agreement 
Host countries frequently offer a variety of fiscal and financial 
incentives to attract FDI. Fiscal incentives include tax holidays, accelerated 
tax depreciation, and export-based incentives, such as tax credits on 
domestic sales in return for export performance. Financial incentives include 
subsidized loans, loan guarantees, and government insurance at preferential 
rates.393 . 
The SCM Agreement establishes disciplines on the provision of 
subsidies. Fiscal and financial incentives are subsidies within the meaning 
of the SCM Agreement to the extent they are "a direct transfer of funds" 
from a government, "government revenue ... otherwise due [that] is 
foregone or not collected," or "a government [provision of] goods or services 
other than general infrastructure."394 The SCM Agreement prohibits 
investment incentives meeting the definition of "subsidy" and contingent 
upon export performance by an investor,39S as well as investment incentives 
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods.396 
Article 6 of the SCM Agreement makes actionable the provision of 
subsidies that cause "serious prejudice" to the interests of another Member. 
Annex IV of the SCM Agreement identifies government funds given to 
firms in a "start-up situation" as an example of a subsidy that can give rise 
to a "serious prejudice" complaint.397 
E. The Agreement on Government Procurement 
Article III:2 of the plurilateral Agreement on Government 
Procurement provides that procuring entities will not discriminate against 
locally-established suppliers on the basis of degree of foreign affiliation or 
ownership. 
F. TheDSU 
Any FDI-related dispute arising under any GATI-WTO MTA must 
be resolved under the provisions of the DSU. As noted, this vastly improved, 
J?l For a list of the main types of incentive measures offered to foreign investors, see WORLD 
INVESTMENT REpORT 1996, supra note 363, at 180. 
394 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, 
Anne.( lA, Uruguay Round Results, supra note 2, art. 1.1 (a)(I)(i), (ii) and (iii). 
39' See id. art. 3.I(a). 
396 See id. art. 3.I(b). This type of incentive is also listed in the Annex to the TRIMs 
Agreement as a prohibited measure. 
397 See id Annex IV:5. A "start-up" situation is one where financial commitments for product 
development or construction offacilities to manufacture products benefitting from the subsidy have been 
made, even though production has not begun. See id. n.65. 
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rules-based GATT-WTO dispute settlement process will give investors a 
more certain legal climate within which to make their foreign investment, 
to the extent a WTO agreement covers the matter in dispute and the 
investor's home country chooses to espouse the investor's claim in the DSB. 
V. CONCLUSION 
From a legal standpoint, there has never been a better time for small 
and medium-size firms to consider taking their business abroad. The legal 
climate for international trade and investment has never been more friendly 
or predictable. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade on imported goods 
have never been lower. Market access for goods and services has never been 
better. Although the GATT-WTO system has not yet adopted a 
comprehensive agreement covering all aspects of foreign direct investment, 
several WTO Agreements protect many aspects of a foreign direct 
investment, including rules protecting intellectual property and prohib.iting 
local-content requirements. In addition,under the GATS, many countries 
have made market access commitments permitting foreign investors to 
establish a commercial presence in order to provide certain services. ~ 
Despite the nagging U.S. trade deficit, in a 1996 poll of 1,000 
persons who were asked if world trade is good for the economy, 82 pel cent 
responded in the affirmative, with 15 percent responding that trade was a 
menace.398 In a similar poll taken four years earlier, nearly half of those 
surveyed saw trade as a threat.399 
Regardless of one's views on the desirability of international trade, 
the reality is that the world economy has become increasingly more 
integrated over the 50-year history of the GATT-WTO system. As a 
percentage of GDP, exports represented 20 percent of GDP for Germany, 
France, and the UK in 1995.400 For the NAFTA Parties, exports as a 
percentage of GDP were 32 percent for Mexico, 34 percent for Canada:, and 
just under 10 percent for the United States in 1995. Japan's export-to-GDP 
ratio also was just under 10 percent. 
Canada's economy is clearly the most integrated of this group of 
countries, followed by Mexico. Mexico's surge in export growth from a 
lowly 2.2 percent of GDP in 1973 is attributable to several factors. These 
factors include the market reforms introduced in the mid-1980s by the de la 
398 See J. COM., July 19, 1996, at 6A. 
399 See id . 
• 00 See THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 27,1996, at 113. Gennany, France, and the UK ranked among 
the top five exporters and importers in world merchandise trade in 1996. The United States and Japan 
ranked first and third, respectively. The leading exporter of commercial services in 1995 was the United 
States, with nearly $190 billion in exports, nearly double that of second-place France which had $96 
billion in exports of services trade. 
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Madrid government, Mexico's accession to GATT in 1986, and the 
successful conclusion of the NAFTA negotiations by the Salinas 
government in 1992 -- in short, to the increased integration of its economy 
into the world economy. 
Mexico has learned the lesson that domestic economic growth is 
inextricably bound with integration into the world economy. In the words 
of Prc,fessor Peter Drucker: 
The last 40 years ... teach that protection does not protect. 
... That protection breeds complacency, inefficiency and 
cartels has been known since before Adam Smith. The 
counterargument has always been that it protects jobs, but 
the evidence of the last 40 years strongly suggests that it 
does even do that. 
... The lessons of the last 40 years teach us that integration 
is the only basis for an international trade policy that can 
work, the only way to rapidly revive a domestic economy 
in turbulence and chronic recession.401 
International trade agreements that do not provide a certain legal 
environment within which business can operate are of little utility to firms 
contemplating overseas sales or investment. While not solely responsible for 
the liberalization of international trade, the rules-based GATI-WTO system 
deselves most of the credit for the increased integration of national 
economies into a world economy. Assured market access, backed by 
enforceable rules, is its hallmark. It provides businesses with the predictable 
legal climate that is indispensable to planning and without which 
international trade would grind to a standstill. 
'O'See Peter F. Drucker, Trade Lessonsfrom the World Economy, FOR. AFF., Jan.-Feb. \994, 
at 99, 108; U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION (USITC, No. 
2608, 1993). 
